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vEditor’s Note
Every attempt has been made by this editor to record a clear and accurate record of 
the Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium. Through the use of speak-
ing notes, transcripts, seminar notes, and tape recordings of the speakers or, when 
necessary, simultaneous translations, the opinions and views of the participating 
maritime leaders are recorded in this printed text. Slips of grammar, spelling, and 
wording have been silently corrected and full names and ranks have been added 
when omitted by the speaker. Square brackets were used to clarify a word or phrase 
in the text.
A new symposium and editorial policy change is reflected in this volume. In the 
proceedings of the previous ten symposia, the editor made concerted efforts to 
identify every speaker by name and nationality. This has continued in this volume, 
but only for the main presentations. In order to promote a wider discussion of 
the issues, the organizers announced to participants of this symposium that “The 
Chatham House Rule” was to be adopted for the discussion periods. This rule 
specifies that:
When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, 
participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity 
nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be 
revealed.1 
Thus, for the discussion periods transcribed in this volume, the speakers’ names 
and nationalities have been silently omitted and references to the identity of other 
speakers in the remarks have also been edited out as much as possible while preserv-
ing the meaning of the points being made. In these sections, speakers are identified 
only as “Question,” “Comment,” “Response A,” “Response B,” etc. 
The editor acknowledges with great appreciation the valuable support and as-
sistance of many people who contributed to the success of this endeavor. Their fine 
efforts made my job much easier and brought this project to a timely conclusion.
Newport J.B.H.
February 2017  
1. See more at: https:// www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule#sthash.fqQPlmVf.dpuf
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September 20, 2016
Greetings and welcome to beautiful Newport, Rhode Island. I am sincerely honored 
that you have travelled such great distances to join us for the 22nd International 
Seapower Symposium (ISS-22). I believe you will find this year’s agenda relevant 
and enlightening, particularly because it is based upon input received from you and 
our fellow Heads of Navy.
In the days ahead, there will surely be many fruitful conversations and I encour-
age you to take every advantage of the presence of so many of our partners to 
discuss issues that are germane to all of us who are dedicated to the safe and open 
access of the maritime commons. Indeed, as we exchange ideas, discuss operation-
al perspectives, and develop new friendships, we will reinforce the foundations of 
global stability as we become “Stronger Maritime Partners.”
I look forward to what we will all learn as we deepen our dialogue to advance our 
shared interests.
Sincerely,
J. M. RICHARDSON
Admiral, U.S. Navy
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Covers are stowed in Spruance Lobby as guests networked during the Chief of Naval Operations Twenty-Second 
International Seapower Symposium (ISS) at U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Approximately two-
hundred senior officers and civilians from 106 countries, including many of the senior-most officers from those coun-
tries’ navies and coast guards, attended the biennial event on September 20–23.

Executive Summary
This is a report of the Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium, attended 
by heads of navies and coast guards from more than half of the world—the largest 
gathering of naval leaders in the world. The theme of the symposium was “Stron-
ger Maritime Partners,” and its mission was to “further build the relationships that 
engender global solutions to complex maritime issues,” as stated by Rear Admiral 
Jeffrey A. Harley, President of the U.S. Naval War College. 
Chapter 1 Welcoming Remarks
“The need for this forum is more urgent than ever,” stated Admiral John M. Rich-
ardson, Chief of Naval Operations. He added that “in a world in which the pace of 
operations is increasing rapidly, it’s tremendously important that we build trust and 
confidence across our navies.” Moreover, he emphasized, “navies across the globe 
are key contributors to not only maritime security, but international security,” and 
“it’s the collaboration of all of us across the entire continuum that assures our col-
lective security and our collective stability.”
Chapter 2 Regional Naval Symposium Reports
To foster greater global maritime cooperation, the following regional symposia and 
their collaborative efforts were reported. 
• Report on Indian Ocean Naval Symposium by Admiral Sunil Lanba, India
• Report on Inter-American Naval Conference by Vice Admiral Ron Lloyd,
Canada
The Honorable Ray Mabus, U.S. Secretary of the Navy, provides remarks during the Chief of Naval Operations 
Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium.
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• Report on Western Pacific Naval Symposium by Admiral Ade Supandi,
Indonesia
• Report on Regional Seapower Symposium of the Mediterranean and Black
Seas by Vice Admiral Valter Girardelli, Italy
Chapter 3 An Address
The Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, stated that through partnerships, 
“we promote our shared goals, things like freedom of navigation and freedom of 
the seas. Those partnerships are developed here.” He recounted “the significant 
progress we’ve made together” in the Americas, Africa, Europe, and the Indo-Asia 
Pacific. He further stated, “The demand for sea services will only increase in the 
years and decades to come. We are living in a maritime century, and a global net-
work of navies is best suited to deter any crisis.”
Chapter 4 Global Partnerships: A U.S. Coast Guard Perspective
“No one nation can control all of what is at sea,” said Admiral Paul Zukunft, Comman-
dant, U.S. Coast Guard. “I’m talking about piracy, drug-trafficking organizations, and 
transnational organized crime.” He also noted rising sea levels and stated that illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing is “on a course for disaster.” To meet such global 
challenges, Admiral Zukunft said that “it really comes down to partnerships,” report-
ing that the U.S. Coast Guard interacts with over one hundred nations annually. 
Chapter 5 Cooperative Strategies and Interoperability
How to strengthen maritime partnerships and enhance maritime safety and security 
was the topic addressed by Mr. Chris Trelawny of the UN International Maritime 
Organization. Mr. Trelawny detailed existing conventions—protecting maritime trade 
from piracy and armed robbery—as well as those needed for the maritime sector in 
general. As he stated, “Greater strategic threats include illegal, unregulated, and 
unreported fishing, drug smuggling, and terrorism against oil and gas installations and 
transport systems.” 
Chapter 6 Panel Discussion on Cooperative Strategies and Interoperability
“We are going to talk about cooperation, interoperability, and maritime security,” 
said the panel’s moderator, Admiral Christophe 
Prazuck, Chief of Staff of the French Navy.
From Australia’s perspective, “maritime co-
operation is indispensable,” said Vice Admiral 
Tim Barrett, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy. 
It is a key part of Australia’s defense white paper. 
“The Australian Navy is committed in the years 
ahead to working ever more closely with other 
navies, as we collectively provide maritime secu-
rity in our region and around the globe.”
“The blue economy . . . is important to all 
countries,” said Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira, 
Commander of the Brazilian Navy, referring to the global maritime economy. He 
also said, “The Brazilian Navy believes that . . . building an environment based on 
““The International Seapower 
Symposium has representations 
of naval leadership and policy 
makers, who collectively, and 
so significantly, represent the 
maritime wisdom from nearly 
all around the globe.”
—Admiral Sunil Lanba, 
India
3partnership, trust, and information sharing, is the best and maybe the only way to 
preserve the maritime domain.”
Strategic frameworks have “facilitated cooperative capacity building” in the Gulf 
of Guinea, said Vice Admiral Ibokete Ibas, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Nigerian 
Navy. This has included regional maritime exercises, information sharing, joint ship 
construction, and counterpiracy operations. “All efforts have combined to deliver 
improved offshore security at a reduced cost,” he noted.
“Countering [piracy] is an excellent example of cooperation,” said Admiral 
Muhammad Zakaullah, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Pakistan Navy. But piracy is 
merely dormant, he said, proposing a multipronged strategy to comprehensively 
eradicate it. He also recommended expanding cooperative forces’ counterpiracy 
mandate to address other transnational maritime crimes.
Chapter 7 Utilizing International Law to Enhance Transparency
“Adherence to international law lays the foundation for a stable, predictable, and 
conflict-free world order,” said Admiral Nirmal K. Verma, Indian Navy (Ret.), CNO 
Distinguished International Fellow. He addressed the influence of international 
law on maritime security. “Most importantly, it has time-tested, dispute-resolution 
mechanisms,” he said, providing examples in which adjudications have led to the 
peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes. 
Chapter 8 Remarks 
The Honorable Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated, “One of the 
key themes of this symposium is maritime operations, in accordance with the norms 
of international laws . . . Only by ensuring that everyone plays by the same rules can 
Nigerian Navy Vice Admiral Ibokete Ibas addresses the complex security challenges of the Gulf of Guinea.
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we avoid the mistakes of the past.” However, he pointed out, “if history is any guide, 
collaborative, cooperative efforts are never going to completely eliminate the pos-
sibility that some countries may try to exert control of their nearby seas.” He added, 
“We are taking deliberate steps to ensure our Navy can sail wherever it needs to go, 
fight if necessary, and prevail if attacked.”
Chapter 9 Panel Discussion on International Norms and Standards
“Looking at my fellow panel members, we clearly represent the small navy and small 
state. That’s a voice that needs to be heard,” said the panel’s moderator, Rear Admi-
ral Lars Saunes, Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy. From a Norwegian perspective, 
he added, “we love laws and regulations.” 
The perspective of a coastal navy was provided by Captain Sten Sepper, Com-
mander of the Estonian Navy, who stated, “The threat related to geopolitical aspira-
tions of some states never faded completely.” 
Standardizing international law for enhanced maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea was a topic addressed by Rear Admiral Kofi Faidoo, Chief of the Naval Staff 
of the Ghana Navy. He noted that international law, like the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, outlaws piracy but that many gulf states do not have 
the laws needed for enforcement and prosecution. 
“Our interests are supported by the international rules-based order,” stated Rear 
Admiral John Martin, Chief of the Royal New Zealand Navy. “Like other nations 
we depend on larger nations adhering to internationally accepted norms and stan-
dards of behavior.”
Rear Admiral Chung Han Lai, Chief of the Republic of Singapore Navy, added, 
“As heads of our respective navies and coast guards, we have . . . the obligation to 
translate and apply international law and norms to operational arrangements to 
guide and govern the actions of our maritime forces.” 
As Chief of Naval Operations John M. Richardson pointed out in his opening remarks, plenty of time was scheduled 
into ISS XXII to “mingle and have the conversations that build those relationships that are so important.”
5Chapter 10 Presentation of the Hattendorf Prize for Distinguished Original Research 
in Maritime History
This prize recognizes world-class achievement in original research that contributes 
to a deeper understanding of the uses of the sea services throughout history. On 
this occasion, the Hattendorf Prize was presented to Captain Werner Rahn, German 
Navy (Ret.), for his work on the annotated edition of the War Diary of the German 
Naval Staff, 1939–1945. The prize is named for Professor John Hattendorf, who 
was also recognized upon his retirement from the U.S. Naval War College, having 
served since July 1977. 
Chapter 11 Cybersecurity’s Role in Maritime Operations
“No network is secure,” stated Dr. James Lewis from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. “There are multiple states pursuing offensive cyber capabili-
ties . . . in the mid-twenties, maybe thirties. Many more are developing defensive 
capabilities,” he added. “This is what warfare will look like in the future,” Dr. Lewis 
also stated. “Think of this as a new way to strike, precisely, against certain kinds of 
targets. The operational effect is really to degrade the performance of command-
ers, troops, and weapons.”
Chapter 12 Regional Breakout Group Reports
These reports addressed challenges, lessons learned, and actionable items as dis-
cussed in groups. The regions and presenters were as follows.
• Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Red Sea Region: Presented by Vice
Admiral Ravi Wijegunaratne, Sri Lanka
• Atlantic Ocean: Presented by Admiral Luís Fragoso, Portugal
• Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Caspian Sea Region: Presented by Rear Admi-
ral Mitko Petev, Bulgaria
• Norwegian, North Sea, and Baltic Sea Region: Presented by Rear Admiral
Miroslaw Mordel, Poland
• Caribbean Sea: Presented by Commander Antonette Gorman, Jamaica
• Gulf of Guinea: Presented by Rear Admiral Djakaridja Konaté, Côte d’Ivoire
• Pacific Ocean: Presented by Admiral Ahmad Kamarulzaman, Malaysia
Chapter 13 Closing Remarks
“Our maritime environment is changing as rapidly as ever, is busier than ever, and 
is becoming more important than ever,” Admiral Richardson said in closing. “That 
environment also unites us. . . . We’re each responsible to our respective nations 
for keeping the seas and rivers safe, for keeping sea lines and lines of communica-
tion open for trade.” He also reinforced the contributions of Admiral Lanba of 
India and Admiral Ferreira of Brazil: “It’s a blue century that faces us [and] part of 
what defines this blue century is an increasingly blue economy.” Admiral Richard-
son added, “The universal challenge we all share is keeping the maritime secure—it 
demands solutions.”
The Coast Guard National Security Cutter USCGC Hamilton (WMSL 753), the expeditionary fast transport ship 
USNS Carson City (EPF 7), and the amphibious transport dock ship Pre-Commissioning Unit John P. Murtha 
(LPD 26) were on hand for the Chief of Naval Operations Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium at the 
U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
1Welcoming Remarks
Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
Admiral John M. Richardson, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Good morning, Admiral Richardson, Admiral Zukunft, Admiral Harley, distin-guished leaders from navies and coast guards from around the world. We are 
honored to have your presence here in Newport today. 
I am Professor Tom Mangold, Dean of International Programs here at the Naval 
War College. I’m going to be your master of ceremonies for the next several days.
It’s a great pleasure for me to introduce the fifty-sixth President of the U.S. Naval 
War College, Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley.
Rear Admiral Jef frey A. Harley, United States:
Welcome to Newport, Rhode Island, the United States Naval War College, and the 
Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium. The College is honored to 
provide the setting for this important gathering, and we know that your time here 
will provide you an opportunity to think and discuss common maritime challenges. 
Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley welcomes guests to the Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium.
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We will also seek to further build the relationships that engender global solutions to 
complex maritime issues.
We’re particularly blessed to host the heads of navies and coast guards for more 
than half of the world. That’s a tribute to the significance of this symposium, and 
also a reflection of its extraordinary potential.
Our College was specifically created to educate and develop future leaders. We 
are especially proud of the eighty-six delegates in the audience today who are gradu-
ates of the U.S. Naval War College International Programs. 
Again, it is a deep pleasure and honor to welcome such a distinguished group of 
naval leaders and coast guard leaders to Newport and to the U.S. Naval War College.
It also gives me great pleasure to introduce our next speaker, the thirty-first Chief 
of Naval Operations for the United States of America. Please join me in welcoming 
to the stage Admiral John M. Richardson.
Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
Thank you, Jeff. Thank you all very much.
We spent time this morning talking about logistics as they affect communica-
tion. That is fundamentally why we are here. We are here to communicate with one 
another. 
It’s extremely important that we provide as many venues as possible for commu-
nication and overcome all barriers, whether language or physical, to allow us to get 
together in groups that will facilitate discussing a common set of problems, a com-
mon set of challenges. I’ll speak a little more about that later.
Before I really get going, I want to recognize a few folks. 
Admiral John M. Richardson provides introductory remarks at the start of ISS XXII.
9First, among us is the senior delegate. The person who has been in office longer 
than any of us is Superintendent John Mote, the Maritime Police Commander of 
Kiribati. Since 2003, he’s been in office. Congratulations.
Also the delegates from Kiribati, Myanmar, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste 
are here at the International Seapower Symposium for the first time. We want to 
welcome them.
And then we have the old guard—these nations have been represented at all twenty-
two International Seapower Symposiums. These delegations are from Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. 
Thank you for the investment in the 
International Seapower Symposium, and thank 
all of you, heads of navies, heads of coast guards, 
distinguished delegates from around the world. 
Thanks also to all of you who brought your 
spouses. I think that this is a team sport. We 
all need to work on these challenges together. 
It was a pleasure to see so many spouses and a 
couple of children last night. 
This is the twenty-second manifestation of the International Seapower Sympo-
sium. The first was conducted in 1969, forty-seven years ago. Delegates at that sym-
posium were veterans of World War II. Our delegate was Admiral Gene Fluckey, a 
submarine commander in World War II. He won the Medal of Honor, our highest 
military honor for bravery.
It was a very different world then. But even then, as now, our predecessors recog-
nized the need for robust international dialogue and partnerships. 
In fact, at the first International Seapower Symposium in 1969, Vice Admiral Col-
bert, then President of the Naval War College, concluded that, “this is an attempt 
in an academic setting to bring together seagoing professionals to discuss the chal-
lenging maritime posture we all confront together on the seas. Its agenda is broad, 
and the discussions are far-ranging.”
I couldn’t come up with a better description for why we are here today than that. 
Then, as now, we are here to promote mutual understanding.  
Our mission today is no different than it was in 1969. In fact, I would say the 
need for this forum is more urgent than ever. We are here to build, expand, and 
strengthen our individual and collective networks of partnerships. 
I would propose that in an increasingly crowded global maritime environment, 
in a world in which the pace of operations is increasing rapidly, it’s tremendously 
important that we build trust and confidence across our navies. It’s far better, when 
a crisis emerges, that we can exercise and mitigate that crisis based on a foundation 
of trust and a relationship that is mature. For this reason, I think it’s especially im-
portant that the heads of navies and coast guards are here. These personal relation-
ships are extremely important, and will be as we navigate our way forward.
“In an increasingly crowded 
global maritime environment, 
in a world in which the pace of 
operations is increasing rapidly, 
it’s tremendously important 
that we build trust and 
confidence across our navies.” 
—Admiral John M. Richardson 
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
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This year’s International Seapower Symposium was designed, from the start, with 
all of you in mind. This year’s theme, “Stronger Maritime Partners,” was a collective 
theme. 
We solicited all of you for topics. I wanted to build a symposium that addressed 
the concerns that you have and that is responsive to the challenges that you see. I 
thank each of you who provided a topic. We have structured the agenda around 
those topics that you provided, and we look forward to a vigorous discussion.
I think we would all agree, navies across the globe are key contributors to not 
only maritime security, but international security, whether you represent a blue-
water navy, a regional security exporter, a guardian of a maritime choke point, or a 
navy focused on coastal security. It’s the collaboration of all of us across the entire 
continuum that assures our collective security and our collective stability.
This is your conference. We’ve taken your submissions into account as we struc-
tured keynote addresses, panels, and topics such as cooperative maritime opera-
tions, cyber security, and the importance of international norms and standards. 
At one level, we have the formal agenda. But I think we would all agree that 
there’s tremendous benefit from this conference operating at another level, a more 
informal level. Since we are here together, we have the chance to meet one-on-
one. We’ve provided plenty of opportunities and venues for us to get together and 
have those one-on-one conversations that are sometimes difficult because of our 
schedules. We’ve built a lot of what we call “white space”—unscheduled time into 
the conference so that we can mingle and have the conversations that build those 
relationships that are so important.
While we are here executing our agenda, our spouses are also executing an agen-
da, a substantive program designed to explore topics like family support and family 
readiness.
Looking forward—we’re always looking forward in our business—part of your 
package included a survey form to allow you to grade us as we go. It’s our report 
card for the Seapower Symposium. We’ll be 
very responsive to your input. If we can re-
act and change something that needs to be 
changed now, by all means, we’ll do that. 
Please let us know if you have any need that 
we can fulfill. 
I’m also very interested in your thoughts 
about how we can make the symposium 
stronger for the next iteration, two years 
from now. If you have any of those ideas, 
I’d ask you to jot them down as you go. 
Please keep a list as these ideas come to 
you. We’ll collect them at the end of the symposium. We’ll make the next iteration 
even more substantial.
We spent a lot of time talking about communications and how to facilitate com-
munications. Everybody here has a lot to learn from one another. I encourage you 
to share your perspectives. Please speak out. No matter what part of the world you 
come from, we’ve got something to learn from you, and I ask you to participate. We 
have so much more in common than we have differences, just by virtue of the fact 
“Navies across the globe are key 
contributors to not only maritime 
security, but international security. 
. . . It’s the collaboration of all of 
us across the entire continuum that 
assures our collective security and 
our collective stability.” 
—Admiral John M. Richardson 
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
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that we operate in the maritime environment. We are dedicated to international 
rules, which allow all of us to prosper on a level playing field. 
As a matter of welcoming you, I want to reinforce that I see this as an invaluable 
opportunity for all of us to enhance our global situational awareness, strengthen 
our existing relationships between our navies, strengthen our relationships person-
ally between chiefs of navies and coast guards, and build new relationships when we 
see the opportunity.
As Admiral Harley said, it’s a homecoming for many of you. Many of you have 
been here in Newport before, either for the Naval Staff College or the Naval Com-
mand College. Welcome back to Newport for all who are returning from your ear-
lier studies.
I’ll keep my remarks short. Please take advantage of all the opportunity that this 
venue provides. Welcome to the International Seapower Symposium. And I thank 
you all for taking time from your busy schedules to be here.

Regional Naval Symposium Reports
Moderated by Professor Thomas Mangold
Dean of International Programs, U.S. Naval War College
Dean Thomas Mangold:
We are very privileged to receive reports on four regional naval symposiums. As we all have discovered during our professional travels abroad, there are 
many outstanding collaborative efforts going on among our naval partners around 
the globe that, regrettably, we never hear about. Most go unheralded outside of 
their own regions, and we fail to repeat the benefits of their pioneering work.
This morning, we are taking an important step to foster greater global maritime 
cooperation by sharing our regional experiences, comparing notes, and improving 
our ability to operate together during times of crisis.
So, we have four regional reports. I’ll get started by introducing our first 
speaker, Admiral Sunil Lanba, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy. Admiral 
Lanba assumed command of the Indian Navy in May of 2016, after serving as 
Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of the Southern and Western Naval Com-
mands. His nearly four decades of experience include command at sea and 
ashore, including command of a mine countermeasures vessel, the indigenous 
Leander-class frigate, a Kashin-class destroyer and the indigenous Delhi-class 
destroyer. He was also the executive officer of the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant 
(R 22). 
2
Speakers (L–R): Vice Admiral Valter Girardelli, Admiral Sunil Lanba, Vice Admiral Ron Lloyd, and Admiral Ade 
Supandi, welcomed by Admiral John M. Richardson, prepare to discuss the regional symposium reports.
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REPORT ON THE INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM
Admiral Sunil Lanba, India:
The International Seapower Symposium has representatives of naval leadership and 
policy makers, who collectively, and so significantly, represent the maritime wisdom 
from nearly all around the globe. 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson; President of Naval War College, 
Admiral Harley; fellow heads of navies; heads of coast guards; heads of maritime se-
curity agencies; distinguished guests; and ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed a proud 
privilege for me to present here and share my thoughts with this august gathering.
This century, without doubt, is a century of the sea, the great common, the mari-
time of all mankind. The opportunities the sea offer us, make it incumbent upon us 
seafarers to coordinate, not only to reap the benefits but also to collectively address 
emergent challenges. It is indeed topical that this year’s International Seapower 
Symposium is focusing on cooperative maritime operations, strategies and chal-
lenges to interoperability.
Before I set course and present my report, it would be appropriate to recollect 
memories of a great visionary, whose writings have inspired generations of maritime 
thinkers and practitioners. I refer to the great Alfred Thayer Mahan, who was twice 
President of the Naval War College and whose monumental works have shaped the 
minds of individuals, navies, and nations over centuries. This being the twenty-first 
century, the sea and oceans assume greater significance, as events unfold, revealing 
either a collaborative bond amongst nations or a confrontational approach.  
Unique Characteristics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Its Challenges. 
The vast, resource-rich expanse of the IOR has several opportunities, threats, and 
instabilities. The threats posed by malevolent, nonstate actors, natural calamities, 
and manmade disasters render national boundaries irrelevant. While there may be 
many numerous regional vulnerabilities, like-minded nations are stepping forward 
and increasingly agreeing to capitalize on collective regional strengths. Over the last 
two decades the characteristics, features, and challenges have rapidly transformed 
the IOR from being on the wings of international politics to the global center stage. 
With the wheels of economy turning furiously, the IOR is home to some of the 
world’s fastest-growing economies, as well as some very fragile economies. It not 
only represents the global energy supply but also a region of growing energy de-
mand. The interdependence of trade is such that if there is any impediment to the 
free movement of oil and trade to the IOR, it will have impact not just on the region 
but the entire global economy. The IOR has, thus, emerged as a major global inter-
section for geostrategic power play, economics, and resource competition. Oppor-
tunities and challenges are close to the prophetic words of Mahan for the twenty-
first century and Indian Ocean dynamics. 
Consequently, safety, security, and stability of the Indian Ocean are absolutely 
paramount for the well-being and prosperity of all nations. As a natural extension 
to this aspect, the IOR continues to be a favorite hunting ground for extraregional 
interests. 
As things stand today, barring a few exceptions, most Indian Ocean states do 
not have naval and maritime law-enforcement capability commensurate to the vast 
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maritime zones under their jurisdiction. Geographically, the prevalent environment 
of the Indian Ocean provides ample space for multispectrum challenges to prolifer-
ate seaward and adversely impact the interests and well-being of all regional states. 
While the individual maritime capabilities of many nations in the Indian Ocean 
littorals are limited, the regional aggregate amounts to a sizable capacity. Moreover, 
in the context of diversity and challenges that exist in the IOR, there are three im-
portant aspects that stand out:
• First is a high degree of commonality in the challenges facing most Indian
Ocean littoral nations.
• Second, there is a strong maritime element to most challenges, and also to
their solutions.
• Third and most importantly, there has always been a broad consensus that it
is not only possible but, in fact, essential for Indian Ocean littoral nations to
cooperate and collaborate in the maritime arena, to address challenges col-
lectively, and to move forward.
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. India and the Indian Navy have always sought 
opportunities that seek to enable a safe, tranquil, and secure Indian Ocean through 
cooperative mechanisms. Recognizing the common regional threat, that could only 
be addressed through a common, cooperative, and consensual approach toward mar-
itime security, the Indian Navy took the lead in setting up a regional forum, where 
the chiefs of naval littoral states of the IOR could meet regularly, and promote mutual 
beneficial means, methods, and mechanisms towards constructive engagement in the 
maritime domain. Thus, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) was founded in 
Because of its unique characteristics, the safety, security, and stability of the IOR are paramount for the well-being and 
prosperity of all nations.
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February 2008, at New Delhi, as the twenty-first century’s first significant international 
maritime security initiative, to address multiple challenges across the region, through 
a unified approach that capitalizes on the combined maritime potential of our region.
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium endeavors to generate a flow of informa-
tion between naval professionals for a common understanding on maritime issues. 
Founding members envisaged IONS as a consultative and cooperative construct, 
aimed toward strengthening maritime security and collectively confronting com-
mon threats within the maritime expanse of the Indian Ocean. These are threats 
that often emanate from outside our nation states, manifesting themselves as non-
state entities and showing disregard and contempt for national boundaries. These 
must be dealt with in a transnational manner to be effectively countered.
Our thought process, from the very beginning, has hinged on the principles of 
equality and consensus-building, and focused on regional problems of maritime 
security, as opposed to purely bilateral ones. Accordingly, the Indian Ocean Na-
val Symposium has been designed to function in an open, inclusive, consultative, 
cooperative, and consensual basis. In particular, respect for sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, political independence, noninterference in internal affairs, peaceful coex-
istence, and mutual benefit remain the guiding rules.
Subregions and Participants. Regional inclusiveness has been central to the model of 
IONS. Every navy that has been constituted by a nation state with permanently held ter-
ritories that abut or lie within the Indian Ocean can be a member. There are thirty-five 
littoral states in the IOR, which have been grouped into four subregions: South Asian, 
West Asian, East African, and Southeast Asian littorals and Australia. The chairmanship 
INDIAN	OCEAN	
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The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium is composed of four subregions; chairmanship rotates every two years within 
these subregions.
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is designed to rotate every two years within the four subgroups. This ensures that every 
subregion is able to receive the focus that it deserves.
Since its 2008 inaugural in New Delhi, IONS has accomplished its first task of 
building confidence in the regional framework, and is contributing to peace and 
civility in the region. The 2010 IONS gathering in United Arab Emirates was very 
encouraging towards consolidating the construct. Cape Town in South Africa wit-
nessed enhanced professional discourse and participation during IONS 2012 and 
the members collectively adopted the Charter of Business during IONS 2014 in 
Perth. Out of the thirty-five nations in the IOR, twenty-three nations have ratified 
the Charter of Business and are members. 
The seven observers to the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium include China, Ger-
many, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Russia, and Spain. It is indeed heartening that 
a number of other extraregional maritime nations are seeking observer status. The 
observer status for Netherlands and Italy is being promulgated, and we are actively 
looking at our rules to enable increased participation in IONS.
The conclaves of chiefs have been a very vibrant, professional, focused, and 
friendly part of this forum. The warm bonhomie, bonding, natural understanding, 
and mutual respect among the chiefs are evidenced by the strides that IONS has 
taken in a short time.
Working Groups. The chairmanship of the biannual construct has already trav-
eled through the four designated subregions, and is now headed to Iran in 2018. In 
the intervening period, preparatory workshops are conducted, which provide the 
members a platform to formulate the agenda for the symposium. There are also 
Of the thirty-five nations in the IOR, twenty-three have ratified the Charter of Business and are members of IONS.
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seminars organized by member nations on topical issues, which provide another 
avenue to channel the regional energies toward greater synergy.
The IONS open-essay competition is very popular among junior and mid-level 
officers. This has, indeed, been an unequivocal success. It has not only provided a 
platform for fresh ideas on cooperative mechanisms being put forth but also is shap-
ing young leaders toward the benefit of cooperative engagement. It is just a matter 
of time before these young leaders of their navies and maritime agencies will meet 
as buddies and resolve issues over a chat session.
While much has been achieved, it is never enough. The Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium established three dedicated working groups:
• Counterpiracy, chaired by South Africa and Tanzania
• Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), chaired by India
• Information sharing and interoperability, chaired by Pakistan
The working groups are progressing on discussions for formulating standing op-
erating procedures for coordinated responses and mechanisms.
Fostering Partnership. The fifth biannual assembly of IONS was held at the be-
ginning of this year, under the aegis of the Bangladesh Navy, the current chair. It 
explored the broad theme “Fostering Partnership in the IOR: Charting Courses 
for Maritime Cooperative Engagement.” The theme is centered on the growing 
belief that maritime security can only be achieved by extensive cooperation and col-
laboration among littoral navies that share common views of international law and 
norms. The deliberation focused on highlighting the roles of cooperative security 
mechanisms and architectures to meet the broad range of challenges, especially in 
a complex and rapidly changing strategic environment.
The members evolved the concept of an [IONS] Multilateral Maritime Search 
and Rescue Exercise (IMMSAREX) during IONS 2016. All member states are now 
actively working toward planning and conducting this exercise in 2017, under the 
arrangement of the Bangladesh Navy.
IONS 2016 was a grand success. It helped identify tangible deliverables, an out-
come of cooperation and collaboration among member nations. The last session of 
IONS—at Dhaka in January this year—reviewed the Charter of Business with input 
from all members, after the experience of two years.
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, within a short gestation period of eight 
years, has demonstrated that every diverse view can be accommodated on board. 
When it comes to securing mutual interests, the platform affords the chance to be 
equal partners. Since the inception of this platform, knowledge and understanding 
of maritime issues and the need for cooperation have increased exponentially. 
In the perspective of the Indian Navy, as enunciated in the Indian Maritime 
Security Strategy, entitled Ensuring Secure Seas, there is a need to focus on 
developing a favorable and positive maritime security environment.
Areas of Cooperation. While there are several areas in which cooperative efforts 
can be initiated, depending on the region and the challenges faced, I would like to 
highlight three specific areas, which can help all navies and cooperative constructs 
alike:
• Information sharing: Effective and real-time information flow to develop a
robust information grid is the first prerequisite to addressing any maritime
challenge. A shared information grid would provide for exchange of mari-
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time domain awareness, meteorological, seismic, radar, communication, and 
other data that can help focus and deal with severe events or disasters.
• Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief: HA/DR merits our immediate atten-
tion. Several nations have initiated measures, independently, to strengthen
their ability to respond swiftly. It is vital that we pool this experience and
these capabilities. Every subregion can look at setting up a coordination cen-
ter, which can ride on the information grid I spoke about earlier.
• Conduct of maritime security operations: Cooperation by navies of the world on
countering piracy has been met with significant success in curbing the threat
in the Gulf of Aden and off [the coast of] Somalia. Challenges of illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, maritime terrorism, and marine
trafficking are some challenges that can be tackled by a cooperative effort.
Adapt, Adopt New Ways, and Collaborate. Before I conclude, I will reiterate that 
it is incumbent on navies of the region to evolve and adapt to counter contemporary 
threats, even as we prepare for the future challenges. In addition to reorienting 
their posture and profile, navies will have to find new ways to protect maritime as-
sets and resources, while optimizing operations in a rapidly changing environment.
In India’s perspective, threats and challenges in the maritime domain necessitate 
regional cooperative efforts and collaborative mechanisms, with equal partnership 
for all. It is imperative that nations and the maritime forces, which are all stakehold-
ers of peace and tranquility of the sea, come together and play their part toward 
shaping a positive maritime environment.
CONCLUSION
• Regional cooperative efforts and collaborative mechanisms
• New ways to protect maritime assets and resources
• Need to evolve and adapt to counter contemporary threats
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium continues to reaffirm the strength of cooperative action.
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Security and stability in the maritime domain are the shared responsibilities 
of all coastal states. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium has once again reaf-
firmed the strength of cooperative action. It is therefore vital that we continue 
to nurture such mechanisms that contribute to peace and stability in the mari-
time domain. 
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Admiral. 
I’d like to introduce our second speaker, Vice Admiral Ronald Lloyd, Com-
mander of the Royal Canadian Navy, who will report on the Inter-American Naval 
Conference.
Vice Admiral Lloyd assumed command of the Royal Canadian Navy in June 2016, 
after serving nearly three years as the Deputy Commander. Vice Admiral Lloyd has 
deployed around the world numerous times in his illustrious naval career. He has 
navigated a multitude of Her Majesty’s Canadian Ships (HMCSs) and served as navi-
gation instructor. 
He was a combat officer on board HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) and served as the 
executive officer on board HMCS Ottawa (FFH 341). He was a commanding officer 
of HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339) and HMCS Algonquin (DDG 283) and spent time 
as commander of both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, as well as held various positions 
at the National Defense Headquarters. 
REPORT ON THE INTER-AMERICAN NAVAL CONFERENCE
Vice Admiral Ron Lloyd, Canada
I’d like to begin by thanking Admiral Richardson and the United States Navy for 
your exceptional hospitality in hosting the International Seapower Symposium. 
Thank you ever so kindly, and to Admiral Harley. An ideal venue for us to all gather 
and speak. It’s a real pleasure and privilege to present an update on the Inter-
American Naval Conference.
As we all know, and as Admiral Richardson reinforced in his opening comments, 
it is vitally important to continue to develop and strengthen relationships with like-
minded navies and coast guards, and to develop a level of trust that can only be fully 
achieved through direct personal engagement. As naval leaders, we have a collective 
responsibility to ensure the lawful and responsible use of the oceans, not only in our 
own operating areas, but worldwide.
Conference Purpose, Organization, and Functioning. Today it is my pleasure to 
provide a short update on the status of naval cooperation in the Americas and, more 
specifically, a summary of the recent Inter-American Naval Conference—or IANC—
a group composed of the heads of navies of nineteen countries in the Americas.
The IANC has met biennially since 1960 to discuss how best we can work together 
to face the challenges of our current and future maritime operating environments. 
The Royal Canadian Navy is proud to currently serve as the general secretariat for 
this important forum and hosted the twenty-seventh and most recent gathering in 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, in June of this year. This was the first time the conference was 
held in Canada.
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The hosting nation rotates between member navies, with the host nation des-
ignating a secretary general and standing up an administrative secretariat for the 
two-year term. These general secretariat duties will officially be passed to Colombia 
later this year, the next hosting nation.
The Inter-American Naval Conference is an ideal forum for direct, personal en-
gagement among naval leaders, both in session and with corresponding evening 
programs. At the recent meeting in Halifax, fourteen navies and two observer or-
ganizations were in attendance. Unique to IANC is the presence of two permanent 
observer organizations, the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American 
Naval Telecommunications Network.
The Inter-American Defense Board, located in Washington, D.C., was established 
in 1942. With twenty-eight member states and a rotating three-star chairman, the 
Inter-American Defense Board serves as a key interlocutor between services. The 
chairman, or an appropriate delegate from the Inter-American Defense Board, also 
attends the corresponding Conference of American Armies and the Air Forces’ Sys-
tem of Cooperation Among the American Air Forces. The chairman of the Inter-
American Defense Board is a focal point for defense engagement and cooperation 
in the hemisphere and, in this role, attends the important Conference of the De-
fense Ministers of the Americas, which also occurs every two years. This conference, 
occurring next month in Trinidad and Tobago, is attended by ministers of defense, 
chiefs of defense, and senior national policy advisors and staffs.
The Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network is the only permanent, 
multinational, navy-specific organization in the Americas. Its role is to provide 
The Inter-American Naval Conference held its twenty-seventh forum in 2016.
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advisory and administrative support to the hemispheric navies. It was stood up un-
der the direction of the Inter-American Naval Conference’s Council of Delegates in 
1976. Based in Jacksonville, Florida, the Network has a multinational staff and con-
tributes to the development of physical and web-based tools that enable our navies 
to communicate, directly, both ashore and at sea.
Recognizing the significant challenges that face the nations of the hemisphere, 
over time it became necessary to stand up several conferences. The work of these 
bodies becomes increasingly important as we respond to known or anticipated de-
fense and security threats in the region. As we all know, it is far more productive to 
address these issues collectively, as neighbors.
The Inter-American Naval Conference’s secretariat and the Council of Delegates 
monitor the activities of these specialized conferences. They are quick to adjust 
to their taskings, or mandates, to the changing demands in naval technology and 
innovation and the increasingly critical threat to our communications and cyber 
networks. 
Twenty-Seventh Inter-American Naval Conference. For the twenty-seventh IANC 
in Halifax, the member navies selected “The Future Maritime Operating Environ-
ment” as the central theme. Delegate presentations and discussions dealt with a 
range of topics, including resource exploitation, the United Nations Convention 
on Law of the Sea, the changing balance of power in global geopolitics, technology, 
and the costs and benefits of interoperability. 
I was asked to provide a few key points on the current state of regional naval co-
operation in the Americas. The Inter-American Naval Telecommunication Network, 
one of the two observer organizations I mentioned earlier, is a key piece of this col-
laboration. Through its dedicated data communication networks and an ambitious 
exercise program, the network is an ongoing success story. With a permanent staff, 
Delegate presentations at the Twenty-Seventh IANC encompassed a wide range of topics.
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its stability ensures the navies of the Americas continue to develop and utilize com-
mon communication tools with common standards.
Naturally, the most tactical of our regional cooperation activities occurs within 
the scope of regional exercises and operations. The navies of the Americas are all 
invited to participate in several large-scale, recurring naval exercises in the region, 
such as PANAMAX, designed to practice methods of protecting the safe passage of 
commercial traffic through the Panama Canal. Other activities include Exercises 
Unitas and Tradewinds, the latter focused on countering transnational organized 
crime and practicing humanitarian assistance and disaster-response measures.
Regional cooperation also occurs at sea while our multinational forces are de-
ployed under the coordination of the Joint Interagency Task Force South. It con-
ducts detection, monitoring, and interdiction missions throughout the Caribbean 
and Eastern Pacific of Central America to counter the flow of illicit narcotics in the 
hemisphere. 
As maritime practitioners, we are all aware of the Code for Unplanned Encoun-
ters at Sea, or CUES, that was developed by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
and ratified in 2014. Following an open and frank discussion at the Halifax con-
ference in June, the Council of Delegates voted in favor of endorsing CUES and 
directed that it be employed by member navies without delay. As the Secretary for 
the Inter-American Naval Conference, [I had] the Royal Canadian Navy formally 
advise the Indonesian Navy, [which provides] the current Secretary General of the 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium, of this initiative.
The Twenty-Seventh IANC report (Spanish) is available on the All Partner Access Network.
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The Council of Delegates also established a process to allow other navies of the 
Americas to seek observer status within IANC, further enhancing our collective ap-
proach to hemispheric defense and security. 
As Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, I was extremely pleased with the 
outcome of the Inter-American Naval Conference 2016. 
We Can’t Surge Trust. As flag officers, we all appreciate that facing each other 
across the table is vital to fostering the cooperation and relationships we need in 
support of our own national objectives. It’s not only the plenary sessions that pay 
dividends. Bilateral meetings and local social activities embedded into the programs 
are where some of the most important and productive discussions occur, and where 
some of the best relationships are established. 
For Canada—a nation with a small navy—these multilateral defense institutions 
are important components of our overall operational ambitions, throughout the 
global maritime commons. In addition, the relationships we build through forums 
like Inter-American Naval Conference can lead to collaborative agreements when 
operational needs arise.
For example, the Royal Canadian Navy has established an ongoing agreement 
with the Armada de Chile for the temporary use of one of its replenishment ships 
while we wait delivery of our future supply ships. By purposely building this rela-
tionship in advance with Chile, with our trusted international partner, Canada had 
already established a  familiar connection when the need arose. As we all know, and 
as repeatedly said, we can’t surge trust. 
The Royal Canadian Navy will continue to be an active participant in the Inter-
American Naval Conference as well as in other multinational forums, such as the 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium. We consider these organizations to be valuable 
tools for developing closer relationships in our hemisphere and beyond. 
Thank you for your attention.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Admiral.
Our third speaker is Admiral Ade Supandi, Chief of the Indonesian Navy. He will 
report on the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). 
He assumed command of the Indonesian Navy in December 2014, after being 
the Chief of the General Staff. He has held command at all levels, including Com-
mander of the Eastern Fleet, and Governor of the Indonesian Naval Academy.
He has graduated from the Indonesian Naval Academy, the Indonesian Com-
mand Staff College, the Indonesian Joint Command Staff College, and the National 
Resilience Institute.
REPORT ON THE WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM 
Admiral Ade Supandi, Indonesia:
Distinguished audience, ladies and gentlemen. Let me begin by thanking our host, 
Admiral Richardson, and the International Seapower Symposium committee for 
the kind invitation and the opportunity to deliver remarks as the current chairman 
of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.
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I will touch on recent progress that has been made in the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium and its future challenges.
Progress. Two years ago, WPNS members agreed to endorse the Code for Un-
planned Encounters at Sea, better known as CUES. It is a concrete form of naval 
partnership in application. It provides common procedures and communication 
signals for deconfliction and coordination between WPNS’s naval units.
In the last Western Pacific Naval Symposium, all members agreed that this docu-
ment should be continuously evaluated and improved by adopting lessons learned 
during its use in operations. The symposium agreed to establish a steering commit-
tee that will receive feedback so as to identify what should be done to improve CUES 
and keep it current. This is an indication of the effort by the WPNS to maintain 
relevancy in the future.
Also in this year’s Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the Royal Navy and the Co-
lombian Navy were granted observer status. This decision reflects the realization 
that the contemporary maritime security landscape has become even more con-
nected, and that extraregional navies with interests, presence, and knowledge of the 
Western Pacific region are welcome as valuable partners to the WPNS.
In a globalized world, the sea continues to be the avenue of communication and 
trade, but also with potential threats and dangers. The only option for us is to work 
together with partners from other regions. WPNS is enthusiastic about the possibil-
ity of expanding the observer status to other navies as well.
The third achievement that I would like to bring up is the increase in practical 
activities.  Concepts need to be elaborated and put into practice. For the coming 
two years, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium has a schedule of practical events, 
including working groups and exercises hosted by member navies.
Allow me to highlight an example, which is the Junior Officer Interaction Pro-
gram. It  aims to establish networking among junior officers. I believe that this is 
vital to building partnership—exposing a younger generation to the experience of 
Today’s threats to maritime security are much more complex compared to those of 1988, when WPNS held its first 
meeting.
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working together with partners from different navies. This will instill an awareness 
that we are bound together by the sea and need to work together.
Future Challenges. Despite the various achievements of the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium, the way ahead brings new challenges. 
When WPNS held its first meeting in 1988, the strategic landscape was quite dif-
ferent from today. The concept of maritime security was dominated by the potential 
of military conflicts, and naval cooperation 
was limited to traditional allies.
Today, we are living in a world where the 
threat to maritime security is much more 
complex. Moreover, the Pacific continuously 
increases in importance, and challenges fac-
ing WPNS navies are becoming more pro-
nounced. The primary challenges that WPNS faces in the future are the need to 
increase inclusiveness, to expand its cooperation, and to maintain its currency.
Cooperating with Non-naval Partners. The first challenge for the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium is to extend cooperation with non-naval institutions. One of the 
defining characteristics of the contemporary maritime security environment is the 
complex interaction of different types of security threats. This means that naval 
forces need to work more closely with non-naval agencies, specifically private and 
nongovernmental organizations.
The scope of cooperation should include exchange of information and other 
practical activities. It should also include development of new inclusive maritime 
security strategies that can balance national interests and sovereignty with common 
interests and goals.
WPNS provides an excellent framework to extend cooperation between naval 
forces and other maritime security stakeholders. 
Going forward, WPNS must meet several challenges, including expanding cooperation, increasing inclusiveness, and 
maintaining its currency.
“The sea brings us together, and 
so should our navies.” 
—Admiral Ade Supandi, 
Indonesia
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Engaging Extraregional Partners. Complex challenges also mean that the West-
ern Pacific Naval Symposium needs to engage more extraregional partners. The sea 
has always been the great avenue that connects distant lands. The increase in capac-
ity and dependence on shipping means that the sea is the common lifeline of our 
nations. The sea brings us together, and so should our navies.
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium charter states that extraregional navies 
with significant interests in the Western Pacific are welcome to become observers. 
So, a challenge for the Western Pacific Naval Symposium is to open its door wider to 
partners from outside its region.
Call for Innovation. The third and final challenge for WPNS in the future is the 
need to avoid stagnation and maintain currency in a dynamic world. As a forum 
conceived almost three decades ago, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium has prov-
en to be resilient and navigated through changes in the past. Thus, the challenge 
for WPNS is to continue avoiding stagnation, which calls for innovation. 
As an example, last April the Indonesian Navy hosted the Multilateral Naval Ex-
ercise Komodo, concurrently with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Padang 
and the International Fleet Review. The event brought together not only WPNS 
members but also Indian Ocean Naval Symposium members.
The innovation to conduct several events together, in a non-war-fighting 
exercise, allowed us to overcome sensitivities regarding the use of naval forces in 
combat-oriented exercises and bring together [greater] numbers and diversity of 
participants.
Adaptability and Spirit. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium continues to be 
an important naval cooperation framework after almost thirty years. I believe that 
it can serve as an excellent example for the theme of our symposium today, as a 
maritime partnership that actually works. However, the dynamic changes in global 
maritime security environment challenge WPNS to be more inclusive, expand its 
geographic reach, and continuously come up with new initiatives to stay current in 
a rapidly changing world. I am confident that the Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
will meet those challenges with the same adaptability and spirit that it has proven 
throughout its existence.
Finally, I once more thank the committee for the opportunity to speak here today 
and this distinguished audience for your kind attention.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you very much, Admiral.
Our fourth and final speaker this morning is Admiral Valter Girardelli, Chief of 
the Italian Navy. Admiral Girardelli assumed command of the Italian Navy in June 
of this year. Since graduating from the Italian Navy Academy, he has served aboard 
and commanded numerous small combatants, including the aircraft carrier ITS 
Garibaldi.
Ashore, he has served as Commandant of the Naval Academy and head of the Fi-
nancial Planning Office of the Navy and Defense Staffs. Before his current position, 
he was appointed Deputy Secretary General of Defense and Chief of the Cabinet of 
the Italian Ministry of Defense.
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REPORT ON THE REGIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM
OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEAS
Vice Admiral Valter Girardelli, Italy:
Authorities, admirals, colleagues, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, dear 
friends—I am particularly glad to be here today and honored to take the floor in 
front of such an eminent audience. Let me join the previous speakers in thanking 
Admiral Richardson and his staff for the outstanding organization and the wonder-
ful hospitality.
As most of you know, I took over my current responsibility three months ago, at 
the helm of a navy quite known for its historic commitment to innovation and for its 
contribution to the development of cooperation and future visions. 
Increasingly Turbulent Word. An attitude of constantly looking beyond the hori-
zon is fundamental to always being on top of the events. Therefore, it is an attitude 
to nurture on a daily basis, because day after day the global scenario is becoming 
increasingly turbulent, with a host of interrelated factors that generate crises and 
tensions of rising intensity and complexity. 
Just think about the massive uncontrolled migration flows, ethnic and religious 
clashes, climate change, and the struggles to access resources and markets—all 
growing beyond the local and regional dimensions. All that is clear to all of us. 
Crucial Role of Navies. Likewise, everybody in this room knows about the crucial 
role that our maritime instruments can play in the open seas as well as in the coastal 
and riverine waters, where we are more and more prone to operate, in conjunction 
with all involved stakeholders.
We also very well know how navies, through times, have showed their peculiar 
and foresighted ability in exploiting their intrinsic adaptability. Once more, we 
ought to leverage the abilities of our forces, also taking into account the invaluable 
heritage of our fathers. 
I am talking about the inspiration we can get from the innovative spirit witnessed, 
for instance, at Hampton Roads, over 150 years ago, or from the evolution of naval 
warfare in modern times, with the constant development of doctrines and concepts, 
like Forward . . . From the Sea, Sea Basing, or the latest, the Joint Concept for Access 
and Maneuver in the Global Commons.
Jointness and Operating Across Domains. This very spirit, we have to maintain—
first and foremost to show the effectiveness of our organization and, equally impor-
tant, to engage public opinion and politicians so they realize the utmost value of 
maritime capabilities and in making the best use of them, if and when necessary.
Today, there is a lot of talk about the need for a joint approach to the daily activi-
ties of our organizations. True and correct. However, let me say, jointness should 
never be a mere [cost-savings approach], but rather, [it should be] for responding 
to future challenges, which in my opinion, require a “cross-domain approach” to 
operations.
In this light, I believe that jointness is one of the options—yet not the only 
one—for responding to the current need to “[do] military business in a multi-
environmental and multi-dimensional way.”
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At this point, I wish to underscore that our navies are cross-domain oriented, 
and inherently multitasking by their nature. I am referring to the international and 
interagency posture of our surface fleets, and to their synergies with submarines, 
naval aviation, amphibious and landing components, special forces, and the pan-
oply of supporting assets, such as logistic, hydrographic, and survey ships. [It is] 
a beautiful ensemble that has proven to be crucial in many cases—for example, 
within the scope of entry and exit operations, as well as in the area of soft-power 
engagements that involve activities in capacity building, military diplomacy, or cross-
domain awareness.
That said, navies should always strive to improve—for instance, by fully harmo-
nizing missions and operations in common areas of interest, as could be the case 
between NATO and the European Union in the Mediterranean.
Cooperative Deterrence. And how about deterrence? [It is] a powerful concept 
that underpins capacities, capabilities, and commitments—able alone to prevent 
many problems—and one that we had better refresh!
To this [end], we should develop appropriate measures to also counter nonstate 
actors through an innovative form of cooperative deterrence and response, based 
on a federative approach that may capitalize on existing tools in cooperation initia-
tives. As I said, we should clearly leverage that.
We should, firstly, do it among our respective communities, by fostering such 
consciousness within our leadership and younger generations. We should then 
make our point in the joint environment, sustaining the cause for cross-domain, ca-
pable navies. We should furthermore promote this maritime culture with our policy 
makers.
Participants of the Tenth Regional Seapower Symposium focused on the strategic relevance of the wider Mediterranean.
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And we must all do this together, because we all know that no country—not even 
the best-suited ones—can independently cope with the increasing variety of mod-
ern threats. 
Tenth Regional Seapower Symposium. In this light, throughout its twenty years 
of activity, the Venice Regional Seapower Symposium has been constantly led by the 
willingness [to link] regional navies from across the wider Mediterranean and Black 
Seas, together with actors that either operate therein or participate as observers, 
and with several agencies from the maritime cluster.
The last Regional Seapower Symposium gathered thirty-eight navies—twenty-six 
represented at the level of their chiefs—and seven international organizations, both 
military and civilian, to discuss [the theme] “Enhancing Maritime Security in the 
Wider Mediterranean.” 
Let me now drill down on the main outcomes from those two days of fruitful 
discussions. Firstly and most importantly, all participants agreed on the strategic 
relevance of the wider Mediterranean and the need to maintain the freedom of ac-
cess to its resources and the sea lines of communication that directly affect global 
prosperity. 
All speakers brought their valuable insights and experiences. We share concerns 
about the complex and fast-changing geopolitical situation in the region, ranging 
from tensions on the eastern European flank and all across the south Mediterra-
nean belt to the proliferation of conventional submarines and to the massive migra-
tion flows.
For centuries the Mediterranean region, strategically located at the crossroads 
of three continents, has been bridging—yet not without difficulties—different 
Now more than ever, navies are called on to safeguard the sovereignty of states and the security of their societies.
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religions, cultures, economies, and societies. Today its stability and peace are seri-
ously challenged by several threats, often rooted way beyond its boundaries, with 
potential planetary reverberations. 
In this perspective, even more than in the past, navies are called on to safeguard 
the sovereignty of states and the security of their societies. They do this by promoting 
global peace, by securing economic interests, by reassuring citizens living abroad, by 
preventing crises, and by enforcing rule of law at sea and freedom of navigation.
In two different sessions we tried to answer crucial questions on the roles that 
navies have in a multifaceted scenario and how we can succeed despite reduced 
financial resources.
First, we rethought the way we shape our fleets and train our crews. The aim is to 
create credible, effective, well-trained, and adaptive fleets and crews, as cost-effective 
solutions for the whole spectrum of maritime challenges. More precisely, we have to 
build a new generation of modular ships, capable of performing a greater number 
of missions, from granting homeland security to supporting humanitarian assistance 
and disaster response, from fighting asymmetric threats to covering traditional 
warfare areas that have been—especially in the last few years—quite neglected, like 
antisubmarine warfare, just to name one.
Since our people remain the most precious enabler, we have to invest more in 
them than in the past, training them to acquire and maintain proper skills in a 
broader spectrum of emerging tasks, such as law enforcement, interagency coopera-
tion, and cyber warfare. 
It goes without saying that, if trained to face the high-end threats, it’s easier to 
accomplish lesser complex tasks.
The Tenth Regional Seapower Symposium accomplished several actions to bolster maritime security.
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A second set of findings was in regard to the need to increase dialogue and coop-
eration. A collaborative attitude among nations is key to developing partnerships, 
based on confidence and mutual trust, and to ensuring overall stability, starting with 
the maritime domain.
In this view, regional initiatives, mostly led by navies, play a fundamental role as 
force multipliers and as a means to deconflict overlaps and optimize resources. 
Indeed, existing partnerships—such as the near-real-time sharing of information 
with the Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Center, or regional initiatives like 5+5 
and ADRION—have already paid good dividends, proving that it’s worth investing 
in them.
Symposium Achievements. In this sense, let me recall some achievements of the 
last symposium. Nigeria signed the “Note of Accession” to the Trans-Regional Mari-
time Network (T-RMN), becoming the thirty-first navy to adhere to it. This boosted 
international cooperation among navies in the Gulf of Guinea.
Two technical agreements regarding maritime security were signed, enabling es-
tablishment of the “On-Call Maritime Force” within the ADRION Initiative, which 
recently had its first training activation.
Progress was made on the Italian Navy’s proposal for the development of the 
Maritime Cooperative Strategy for the Wider Mediterranean, aimed at broadening 
cooperation through regional hubs.
Let me express my personal satisfaction with the active participation and sincere 
contributions made last year in Venice by many senior leaders, who I am glad to see 
are here today. 
Regional Seapower Symposium in 2017. I [now] confirm my commitment to the 
eleventh Regional Seapower Symposium, which I’m glad to announce will be held 
in Venice, October 2017. Its main theme will be “Navies Beyond Traditional Roles: 
Crewing Efforts to Project Stability and Security from the Seas.” 
This theme aims to address topics such as the development of adequate legal 
frameworks for the best and joint use of maritime power, the recovery of deter-
rence, and the affirmation of the inherent characteristics of fleets, especially in 
terms of modularity, flexibility, versatility, and sustainability.
I believe we must exploit the theme of bringing the maritime dimension back 
to its central role of influencing societies through trade and connections, in the 
broadest sense.
Myself and my staff are already at work for our next appointment, always focused 
on making concrete steps in thwarting the “sea blindness” that still affects part of 
public opinion and that often influences the way strategies and policies are con-
ceived and perceived.
Thank you for your kind attention.
DISCUSSION
Question:
I would like to re-ask a question from two years ago. If I recall, one of the comman-
dants of a navy, probably Netherlands, said, “Almost all the topics we are discussing 
are related to coast guards, so are we becoming ocean guards?” I would like to ask 
the commandants of the navies if they can elaborate on this topic.
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Response A:
I think that the coast guard can and should play a strategic role in the maritime 
domain. I think that connection and shared tasking of navies and coast guards are 
essential to maintaining a clear picture of the situation, as well as readiness to act 
and prevent and solve emerging crises.
Response B:
In this instance, words matter. The manner in which we look at these [issues] is 
probably defined based on our experiences. 
One of the things that the Inter-American Naval Conference really reinforced for 
me is that, in terms of NATO navies, we typically look through the lens of a navy and 
a coast guard. Many of the navies of the Americas are actually responsible for the 
full spectrum of the mission set. 
So, trying to pigeonhole and use precision in language are always problematic in 
terms of where we go. If by “ocean guards” you mean that as a positive statement—
that we’re all  united as a group in terms of looking after the full mission set that 
our governments expect us to deliver on and if that’s a positive thing—then we’re 
ocean guards. 
But trying to pigeonhole navy and coast guard, I think, is a great academic con-
versation that you could probably have at the International Seapower Symposium 
for the next ten years. Probably at International Seapower Symposium XLIV we’ll 
still be having that conversation, unless the dynamics change.
For all intents and purposes, depending on the nation which you serve, there’s 
a navy and a coast guard. In some instances, it’s a navy exercising coast guard and 
navy mandates. I think it’s a great academic question, but once we get to sea it’s im-
material, and we’ll deliver on whatever it is our governments direct on a given day.
Response C:
Actually, the navy and coast guards have very different roles to play, when you’re 
talking of ocean guards. Generally, it’s the coast guards of most nations that are 
mandated to enforce their countries’ laws within the territorial sea and the large 
exclusive economic zone. That is where the coast guard comes to have a role.
You can’t really pigeonhole navies and coast guards by saying ocean guards. They 
have two very different roles to play and different mandates the world over.
Response D:
Navies and coast guards might differ on the perimeter of each country. For Indone-
sia, it looks like the navy and coast guard are the same but have different tasks. The 
challenges of maritime security now are more complex. So, indeed, is the coopera-
tion between the navy and the coast guard. I had experience [with this] last month 
in the U.S. Navy exercise with our coast guard in Indonesia. In the future, coopera-
tion between navies and coast guards will be wider and may need some strategy and 
policy.
Question:
I’d like to add one question for the panel. Around the world, we’re seeing lots of 
regional issues—a lot of common challenges, common missions—but we’re doing 
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them individually. Based on your regions, are there any mission sets that you think 
may be possible to do more in common with your neighbors, for example, search 
and rescue?
Response A:
I think that there are two very common missions associated with climate change 
and severe weather phenomena. One is search and rescue, another is humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief. I think there is a great potential for these two in the IOR, 
which is prone to severe weather phenomena like cyclones. Navies can cooperate 
and work to tackle these two.
Response B:
Indonesia’s experience with civilian rescue in 2015, at the beginning, that involved 
search and rescue between the Indonesian Navy and a foreign navy. Also included 
was the coast guard from another country. So, this is a possibility for expanding 
cooperation, not only for navies and coast guards but also other stakeholders. But I 
think we need some procedures if the units come from other countries.
Response C:
My sense is that, right now, in terms of the relationships and the partnerships and 
trusts that accrue, as a result of the forums that we’ve just spoken about, there is 
more of a drive toward international partnerships and delivering on mission sets 
collectively. As a result of navy-to-navy staff talks—as you increase that dialogue—
you overlay the Venn diagrams and see that you’re going to be operating in the 
same part of the world. 
Why can’t we do that? At our level, we probably are very much focused on trying 
to be able to deliver on just that.
Where we struggle is probably at the staff level, where they try and orchestrate 
and put those deployments together, where you can actually have more joint and 
combined operations. That’s why I really enjoy the navy-to-navy talks; I just had 
[one] with [Rear Admiral] John Martin from New Zealand. We’re going to have 
a couple units in that part of the world. Our staffs probably aren’t aligned up to 
deliver on that. 
I think one of our challenges, right now, is to reinforce that—communicate, 
communicate, communicate—down to our staffs, and enable them to reach out 
and try and drive those types of missions sets to fruition.
Response D:
I believe that a comprehensive approach to this kind of mission is the best way 
to succeed. There are many missions, many tasks that could be coordinated and 
shared between navies and other assets. If, for example, in the Mediterranean the 
highest levels of governments established a coordination mechanism for optimiz-
ing asset availability and direction and activity, I think that the role of navies will be 
enhanced.
Question:
It really caught my attention, Vice Admiral Girardelli’s mention of the deterrence 
issue. How did you come up with this view? How are you and your country, or your 
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region, attempting to address this issue of deterring nonstate actors threatening the 
security of many countries?
Response A:
Deterrence—the term could be interpreted in two ways. The traditional way is based 
on nuclear power and is not current and correct for this situation with nonstate 
threats. 
I think that deterrence in cooperation could be the way to solve, to fix, the insta-
bility in parts of the world. In other words, if the international community of navies 
can show it is able to build a reaction force, which can be established in a state that 
has failed—establish the ability to exercise justice, to intervene in conflict and il-
legal activities; for example, trafficking of migrants, arms, and so on—I think that 
could be deterrence in a new way, a new strategic approach.
Comment:
Excellent reports from the regional symposia. Not so much a question, as I just want 
to make comments on this.
Very much [of what was presented] covered security and also the threat perspec-
tive. It is very important, also, for us to understand the other perspectives that relate 
to the challenges to maritime security.
First would be political, in terms of domestic and regional as well as global politi-
cal perspective.
The other one is what we are experiencing. I’m sure a lot of us are experiencing, 
as well, the fiscal challenges, the economic perspective of things, because we tend to 
very much rely and depend on how much we can afford, especially smaller nations.
The other perspective would be cultural, where we talk about the partnerships 
involved in many of the regions and also the extraregional aspects of cultural issues. 
The internal social perspective is also very important.
The fourth perspective would be technology. We’re all very much in the navy 
uniform here. A lot of technology has changed the way we are doing things.
The next perspective would be the environmental aspect with respect to the 
weather and the way we work together.
And finally, the legal perspective. The rule of law is impacting a lot of our 
operations. 
So I would offer that, [the] terms of P-E-S-T-E-L (political, economic, social, tech-
nological, environmental, and legal), and not just the security and threat perspec-
tives when we talk about maritime security challenges.
Comment: 
I don’t have a question. You may notice that one part of the globe is missing on the 
table, which is Africa. I know why it’s missing, because for a few years we haven’t had 
a symposium.
This is a call to our African leaders. We need to rethink that. We need to launch 
this initiative, because we had three symposia. I think that before ISS XXIII, we’ll 
have a symposium in Africa.
There are a lot of initiatives going on in Africa. I think for the next days, Ghana 
and Nigeria, we will talk about those initiatives. And before XXIII, we’ll come and 
sit at the table and talk about our initiatives.
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Question:
That’s great. I’ll just ask one more question of the panel; I think it’s a good one. 
We’ve talked about some of our challenges at the lower end of the threat spectrum, 
often involving criminal behavior. So, when we talk about nonmilitary challenges—
or these new, evolving challenges—how do you work with the interagency, the other 
organizations in your government, usually civilian? 
So within your countries in a region, is there a way for civilians and militaries to 
cooperate to meet these important challenges? Immigration is one that is a big one 
that’s on people’s minds, I know, in Europe. Are there some ways that you could talk 
about that from your region and make some recommendations or observations?
Response A:
What I think is taking place in the region is that we went to the Inter-American Na-
val Conference and had this conversation.
In maritime security operation centers, that’s where you bring all of your part-
ners together in the same space. Then, as events unfold, you still respect various 
departmental or ministerial jurisdictions in order to still get the job done. 
It’s problematic sharing information just inside our own government depart-
ments, let alone across nations. You crack that nut in terms of how you can share in-
formation across jurisdictions, domestically. Then, there’s that tougher nut to crack, 
in terms of being able to share more broadly.
Hopefully, with the level of dialogue on how we can do that, we’ll actually be able 
to have that cooperation, not only domestically but internationally. But I’d say that’s 
the biggest challenge going forward.
Response B:
In any country, many are talking of interagency cooperation. It is very difficult to 
bring down barriers. You need an enlightened political leadership that can bring 
these barriers down and make agencies work together to deliver capability. I think 
this will be the case in country after country.
It takes time, effort, and you have to pick away slowly so that you can deliver the 
end capabilities that you are looking for.
Response C:
I would like to add one thing. Immigration, criminality, migration flows are the 
arena of the interagency—agree fully. But interministerial, intergovernmental, and 
international approaches are required for success.
Question:
I enjoyed very much your presentations. You are talking about things that we did not 
hear about when I was here in my first International Seapower Symposium, which 
was XVIII. When we were talking about the roles of navies, they did not include 
supporting law enforcement. And this is something that you all referred to in your 
presentations today.
So, when we look, for example, at narco-traffic at sea, that itself is a law-
enforcement problem. But because it’s affecting the security of people, countries 
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have to change the laws in order to be successful in helping combat narco-traffic 
and other things.
From the law-enforcement side—they have been moving. For example, now Hez-
bollah is laundering money for many cartels in the world. So those things are chang-
ing from law-enforcement to security issues.
Admiral Girardelli, you are talking about the need for international, intergov-
ernmental cooperation and how navies could help those organizations to see the 
importance of working together to solve problems that, initially, could be easy to 
look at but with time will be more difficult, and will be affecting national security in 
your countries. How do you see that in the future?
Response A: 
I guess innovation is key here, in terms of how we can deal with a cross-borders 
challenge. The Joint Interagency Task Force, I think, is a good example of where 
we’re being innovative and bringing multiple stakeholders to the table, in terms of 
increasing effectiveness.
We go back to the Inter-American Naval Conference in terms of dialogue: how 
can we do that more effectively across the region, so bilateral meetings take place 
in terms of how we can be more effective? As you know, the threat becomes increas-
ingly more challenging.
And the more effective we get, my conjecture is, the bigger the threat, in terms 
of reaction. That’s just something we need to keep in the back of our minds. As we 
become more successful, at some juncture, we will cross a threshold. There will be a 
step function in the threat. How will we deal with that going forward?
Response B:
With high-level career training, career preparation, navies could be, in the future, 
the focal point for supporting law enforcement.
Response C:
The navies have to work within national mandates, which deal with roles, law en-
forcement, and what navies are empowered to do. Unfortunately, in most countries 
navies are not empowered to do law-enforcement work. That’s the first plan that we 
need to do.
The Navy is not empowered to, say, enforce arrests, or this sort of thing. That 
mandate is with the coast guard. 
We need domestic laws that empower navies in these roles. That’s where it will 
start from.
Rear Admiral Jef frey A. Harley, United States:
I’d like to thank our panelists for breaking the ice for us. It takes a certain amount 
of courage to come on up here and give a very insightful and coherent presentation, 
summarizing the regional symposia around the world. 
I take the point about the lack of African presence on the stage. We’re going to 
hear from chiefs of African navies later in the symposium. We did have the Gulf of 
Guinea dialogue in Annapolis, Maryland. There are important issues that we have 
to address in terms of maritime security in the African region. I look forward to ad-
dressing those. 
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With respect to the questions and answers, it almost takes as much courage to 
ask the first question as it does to give the first presentation. To our people who 
asked such insightful questions, I want to thank you, as well, and encourage you to 
do more.
These opportunities are so rare for us to come together as chiefs of navies, and 
we have to open up a bit to take full advantage of this.
Last night, we had jazz music playing. The success of good jazz music is that we lay 
out a theme. Then, each musician picks up on that theme and is eager to contrib-
ute. I encourage all to take the fullest advantage of the opportunity that presents us 
here, as a plenary group and individually. 
Thank you for terrific presentations. Thanks for getting this thing rolling with 
such style.
An Address
The Honorable Ray Mabus
Secretary of the Navy
Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
It’s my pleasure to introduce the next speaker, who really needs no introduction.Many of you had a chance to speak with him personally. The Secretary has made 
it a goal to aggressively travel the world and get a firm understanding of what mari-
time security means from your perspective. 
He has been the Secretary of the Navy for seven years, which is a longer tenure 
than any other Secretary of the Navy since before World War I. He has been a ter-
rific mentor, a very active Secretary. The Navy is different and better by virtue of his 
tenure. 
He also has made every International Seapower Symposium during his tenure. 
He has made it a point to come up here to address this crowd, which speaks volumes 
about the import he attaches to this conference. 
3
The Honorable Ray Mabus gives his fourth and final ISS address as U.S. Secretary of the Navy.
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Please join me in welcoming the seventy-fifth Secretary of the Navy, The Honor-
able Ray Mabus. 
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus:
Good morning to all of you. And thank you, Admiral Richardson, our great Chief of 
Naval Operations. Thank you for your leadership and your efforts, and to the staff 
for coordinating this incredibly important 
event. And thanks also to Rear Admiral 
Jeff Harley and the Naval War College—
everybody here—for hosting this event. 
As the Chief of Naval Operations said, I’m 
circling around the bookends on my career. 
I was in the Navy in 1970, here in Newport. 
To come back forty-six years later to the In-
ternational Seapower Symposium brings me 
just pure joy. This War College continues to 
serve as an international professional uni-
versity, where our officers, and officers from 
around the world, come together to learn, to 
learn from one another, and to address the issues that affect us all. That’s precisely 
why all of us are here today. 
So, welcome. You are the leaders of the world’s navies. Thank you for being here 
at the Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium. And thank you for wel-
coming me to my fourth and final address to this audience as Secretary of the Navy.
As the Chief of Naval Operations said, I’ve been Secretary for more than seven years 
now. I’ve had the privilege to serve with three Chief of Naval Operations, and four 
Commandants of the Marine Corps. During my seven-plus years, I’ve traveled 1.3 
million miles to 152 countries and territories around the world, to visit you in your 
headquarters, to visit you on your ships, to get to know you personally.
I’ve hosted a lot of people in this room, at the Pentagon, or at our Naval Academy 
in Annapolis, or here at the Naval War College. It’s been one of the great privileges 
of this job, to get to know so many of you as chiefs of navies around the world. I’ve 
done these travels and these meetings, because as all of you know—and all the mari-
time leaders know—you can surge equipment, you can surge people, but what you 
cannot surge is trust. 
For nearly half a century, ISS has served as a foundation on which that trust can 
be built. As the Chief of Naval Operations said, this is a chance to get together and 
be candid with each other, talk to each other. I believe in his words—mix it up a 
little bit. 
Partnerships. While we represent individual navies, we each belong to a greater 
fellowship, the fellowship of the sea, forged by the timeless bonds of wind and wave. 
It reminds us that we, in the maritime services, don’t view the world’s oceans as 
bodies of water that separate us geographically, but rather we recognize them as 
connectors, a source of opportunity for us to work together.
Through these partnerships, we promote our shared goals, things like freedom 
of navigation and freedom of the seas. Those partnerships are developed here. 
“We in the maritime services 
don’t view the world’s oceans as 
bodies of water that separate us 
geographically, but rather we 
recognize them as connectors, a 
source of opportunity for us to 
work together.” 
—The Honorable Ray Mabus, 
U.S. Secretary of the Navy
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When I was getting ready for this speech, I was reminded of what one of our 
former Chiefs of Naval Operations said: the navy has both a tradition and a future, 
and we look with pride and confidence in both directions. I share that sentiment, 
so today I want to look in both directions. I’ll look back at some of the significant 
progress we’ve made together, over the past seven years, and I want to look forward 
to the horizon, to recognize how partnerships developed at ISS will enable us to 
meet the challenges that lie ahead. 
I first took office in May of 2009. Only a few months later, I spoke at the Nine-
teenth International Seapower Symposium. I pledged then that by working together 
we could combat terrorism, by working together we could deter piracy, by working 
together we could make the effort to stop weapons proliferation and arms smug-
gling, by working together we could counter illicit trafficking of all sorts, by working 
together we could protect fisheries and the larger ocean environment. And we have 
worked together in a lot of ways. 
In the Americas. We’ve collaborated, literally, from the top to the bottom, at sea 
and at the Inter-American Naval Conferences. During ICEX [Ice Exercise] 2016, 
we worked together with Canada, Norway, and the UK in the increasingly important 
northern waters. 
Here in North America, just last week I was in Mexico, where my host was Admi-
ral Soberón. By the way, Admiral Soberón is the only other person in the world that 
bears the title Secretary of the Navy. So he’s the only person I can have a counterpart 
visit with—unlike the Chief of Naval Operations and all the rest of you. We talked 
about the many ways that we train together and operate together, including joining 
forces on saving the critically endangered porpoise, the vaquita. 
As we speak today, Panama is hosting this year’s UNITAS, extending its legacy 
and the longest-running multinational naval exercise in the world. 
A little bit further south, last year Brazil hosted UNITAS 2015, where we joined 
Cameroon, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and the United 
Kingdom to train across a full spectrum of operations. And during Southern Seas, 
I got to go through the Straits of Magellan.
Going to Africa. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are placing a high priority 
on that region for our maritime engagements, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea. 
That’s why I hosted more than thirty African and European ambassadors at the 
Washington Navy Yard last summer, why at the last International Seapower Sym-
posium we had a day set aside for the Gulf of Guinea, and why we held a Gulf of 
Guinea Maritime Security Dialogue at the Naval Academy last fall with more than 
fifty nations present. 
At each of these, we talked about lessons from Obangame Express, the French-
led Exercise Nemo, the Angola-hosted International Conference on Maritime and 
Energy Security, and Naval Forces Africa Turn The Lights On Exercise. During 
that last event, we increased real-time AIS [Automatic Identification System] data 
by 80 percent; illuminated more than fifty non-AIS ships a day; increased our sea 
vision, maritime domain awareness tool logins by 15 percent; and increased greatly 
our overall tracking ability.
As part of Africa Partnership Station in 2015, U.S. sailors and Marines, working 
alongside their British counterparts, worked to build maritime capacity to counter 
piracy and illicit trafficking in Angola, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo. In the classroom, 
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thirty-three senior naval leaders from the maritime countries across Europe and 
Africa got together in Naples for the Combined Forces Maritime Component Com-
mander Course. 
Each of these officers returned to their respective navies with new ideas and a 
strengthened sense of partnership. All this was a result of increased cooperation be-
tween partner nations and a commitment to maritime domain awareness. As Com-
modore Yawson of Ghana rightly noted, no one nation can do it alone. Putting our 
effort together with the assistance of international partners is the right direction.
In Europe. We participated in the Regional Security Symposium in Venice. Dis-
cussions started there continue to be reinforced by actions we take at sea together.
Throughout the Mediterranean, NATO ships are patrolling commercial routes 
to deter, disrupt, and defend against terrorist and other illicit activities as part of 
Operation Active Endeavor. Standing NATO maritime and mine countermea-
sure groups are participating in large cooperative exercises to facilitate integrated 
responses for regional crises of any sort. The European Union’s Naval Forces Medi-
terranean are working together in Operation Sophia to interdict human traffick-
ing and stem the loss of life at sea. 
The United States Sixth Fleet maintains a presence in the Mediterranean, and 
also in the North Atlantic and the Baltic and the Black Seas, securing sea lanes 
and hosting multinational exercises as our carrier strike groups transit through that 
area. Our maritime patrol aircraft operating from Greece and Italy enhance mari-
time domain awareness and support counter-ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Le-
vant] efforts from Turkey.
We stationed four Aegis guided missile destroyers, equipped with ballistic mis-
sile defense capabilities in Rota, Spain. These ships are available for multimission 
endeavors. This spring the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) joined the Swedish Navy in 
conducting antisubmarine warfare exercises hosted by Poland. Later in June, as 
part of Baltops [Baltic Operations], Estonia, Finland, Germany, Poland, and 
Sweden trained in multiple missions throughout the Baltic. 
The U.S. Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force in Eastern Europe is conduct-
ing the regular military-to-military engagements, building the capacity to increase 
our interoperability, so we can respond together quickly to anything. I witnessed the 
future of that interoperability when our Great Green Fleet, an entire carrier strike 
group steaming on nuclear power and blended biofuels, unloaded these fuels when 
it ported in Europe, prior to entering the Suez. 
In the Indo-Asia-Pacific. We joined together at the ASEAN [Association of South-
east Asian Nations] Defence Ministers’ Meeting, the Shangri-La Dialogue, and the 
WESTPAC [Western Pacific] symposium. We created a code for unplanned encoun-
ters at sea. We published solidified maritime norms and expectations. Since [the 
U.S.] Navy will have 60 percent of our assets in the region by 2020, opportunities 
to collaborate at sea will continue to grow, with things like Malabar, Talisman 
Saber, and RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific Exercise]—RIMPAC, which was incred-
ibly successful this year. Not only do we have more nations participating, but we’ve 
increased the complexity of and the range of missions in the these exercises. 
We’ve also used these to find more ways to share technologies. I mentioned the 
Great Green Fleet earlier. In RIMPAC 2016, nine countries offloaded biofuels from 
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United States ships for use and for testing in their platforms—just one example of 
how we create operational flexibility and strategic advantages by working together. 
In developing these partnerships, we’ve had a lot of successes, and I’m sure we’ve 
fallen short from time to time. But as Winston Churchill once said: success is not 
final, failure is not fatal. It’s the courage to continue that counts. We have to have 
that courage to continue in these partnership efforts. 
Increasing Demand. The demand for sea services will only increase in the years 
and decades to come. We are living in a maritime century: 80 percent of the world’s 
population lives within one hundred kilometers of the sea, 90 percent of trade—
more than $9 trillion of trade a year—travels by sea, and 99 percent of all voice and 
data goes undersea in cables. It’s clear that the global economy, and in fact, the very 
livelihood of our nations, depends on freedom of the seas. It’s also clear that our 
navies have been the ones that keep those sea lanes open for everyone engaged in 
peaceful commerce. 
Unfortunately, the sea is equally accessible to those who wish to do us harm. 
Despite our efforts, here and elsewhere, we find ourselves witnesses to a very large 
array of emerging security threats: terrorists that target us around the world—in 
places like Paris and Brussels and Istanbul, Jakarta, Borno, and San Bernardino, 
California—and refugees from Syria and elsewhere creating a humanitarian crisis 
on a scale not seen in Europe since the 1940s. 
Contemporary threats can’t be characterized, exclusively, as diplomatic or mili-
tary or economic or legal. They don’t aim to attack any one nation, or even a group 
of nations. Instead, they target us indiscriminately and target our values, which is 
precisely why a cooperative, multinational approach is the best way to provide for 
our common defense. A global network of navies is best suited to deter any crisis 
and respond whenever a crisis occurs. 
It’s because navies uniquely provide presence around the clock, that their unri-
valed advantage—on, above, under and from the sea—reassures, deters, and gives 
our leaders options in times of crisis. Navies aren’t just in the right place at the right 
time. We’re in the right place all the time. There’s no next-best thing to being there. 
In every case—from high-end combat, to irregular warfare, to humanitarian assis-
tance, to disaster relief—it’s naval assets that get on station faster, stay longer, and 
bring everything we need with us. 
So it’s up to us as navies to lead. That’s why the United States adheres to the in-
ternational norms set forth by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and why 
President Obama pledged to support its ratification and to uphold those principles. 
It’s also why we’ve committed additional resources to the maritime domain. Our 
fleet is growing. We’re going to surpass 300 ships by the end of this decade. As we al-
locate those ships to where they’re needed the most, “being there” applies to more 
and more locations worldwide.
From the Northern Passage to the Straits of Magellan, from the Mediterranean 
to the Black Sea, from the Gulf of Oman to the Bay of Bengal, and throughout the 
Pacific—the U.S. Navy will be present, as we have been for seven decades.
Innovation. But we can’t limit ourselves just to thinking about geography. In our 
Navy, we’re seeking to find new and innovative solutions to asymmetric problem 
sets. We’re investing in a lot of technologies, as you are, like cyber, unmanned, 3-D 
printing, swarming vehicles, and directed energy.
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As we do, we’re focusing on making an open architecture so that we can ensure 
interoperability with our partners, from the language we speak to the tactics we em-
ploy. As we develop these new technologies, we will continue to work with partners 
around the globe. To better capitalize on our investments, all of us—all of us—have 
to invest in our own security. That means more than just weapons and equipment. 
It means upgrading and standardizing critical infrastructure like ports and roads 
and airfields that allow us to train and operate efficiently and effectively together, 
as combined forces. 
Opportunities. Integrating enables us to maximize economic prosperity, to main-
tain international order, to promote security. As a whole, we’ve become greater than 
the sum of our parts. We’ve accomplished a lot together, and we will continue to 
do so. We have to look for opportunities to cooperate at every turn, even when they 
seem unlikely or have been unattainable. The world is a more secure and a more 
prosperous place because of the partnerships we build here at ISS and elsewhere.
While the challenges to those ties that bind us together will never cease, we can-
not allow them to fray under stress. Sailors never do. That’s what makes us unique. 
The head of one of our navies in the world told me several years ago that the dif-
ference between soldiers and sailors is that soldiers look down. They look at maps. 
They look at lines. They look at obstacles. Sailors look out. They look at the horizon. 
They see no obstacles. They see no lines. They see only opportunities. 
This symposium is one of those opportunities. So I encourage you, look to the 
horizon. Do what is possible through partnerships. Talk to each other. Get to know 
each other better. As the Chief of Naval Operations said, mix it up. Debate different 
courses of action. Learn our strengths and weaknesses. How can we work together? 
And finally, to all of you, our international partners, the fellowship of sailors, and 
my friends with whom I’ve met so often in so many places around the world, I wish 
you, for the last time in this role, fair winds and following seas. May you remain in 
the years and decades to come, as we say in our Navy motto, semper fortis—always 
courageous. And, as in the motto of the United States Marines, semper fidelis—al-
ways faithful. 
Thank you all very much. 
Global Partnerships: 
A U.S. Coast Guard Perspective
Admiral Paul Zukunft
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
There were many questions on the intersection of law enforcement and nationalsecurity, particularly at sea, about the roles of coast guards and navies, and how 
each of our nations get at that problem.
In the U.S. security system, there’s nobody better to speak to that than our next 
speaker, Admiral Zukunft. He assumed the duties as the Commandant of the U.S. 
Coast Guard in 2014. Our Coast Guard is now the largest component of our Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard has about 88,000 personnel.
Admiral Zukunft is perfectly positioned to lead. He’s been in the Coast Guard for 
thirty-nine years. Paul Zukunft sits in the Tank.1 He sits with the other Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, because his perspective on things is so unique. He interfaces with parts of 
1. “The Tank” is the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room in the Pentagon.
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Admiral Paul Zukunft, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, addresses ISS XXII participants.
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our government, particularly in the interagency, in a different way. He’s got a differ-
ent set of authorities. He interfaces with people that our military normally doesn’t. 
So, he’s always got a unique perspective about how to solve a particular problem, 
always asking, “Did you think about this?” and saying, “Let me tell you how we got 
after that”—always adding a lot of insight.
Join me in a very warm welcome for our twenty-fifth Commandant of the Coast 
Guard, and my good friend, Admiral Paul Zukunft.
Admiral Paul Zukunft, United States:
When you look at the theme for this year’s International Seapower Symposium, 
we’re stronger already. We’re already maritime. We already have a relationship, and 
out of that relationship grows partnerships.
NO ONE NATION
As you heard, I do sit in the Tank. We are, first and foremost, a military service, but 
we’re also a law-enforcement agency. We’re a member of the national intelligence 
community. We’re talking about a broad suite of authorities that are resident in the 
United States Coast Guard. We’re the smallest of the five armed services, and I’m a 
big believer that necessity is the mother of all invention. 
I’m going to talk, later, about the list of partnerships—many are represented 
here today—with whom we have bilateral relationships. We’re not just off the coast 
of every continent and the United States. We have broad authorities when we’re off 
those coasts, as well. 
Alfred Mahan was really the framer of sea power, so much so that President Teddy 
Roosevelt mustered the Great White Fleet. Now, they weren’t Coast Guard cutters, 
but it was a demonstration of sea power back in that era. 
If Alfred Mahan wrote a compendium to sea power in the twenty-first century, 
would it be autocratic, would it be unilateral, cooperative, or multilateral? Because 
he was all about control of the sea. No one nation can control all of what is at sea 
today.
I’m going to focus on some of the nonstate actors. I’m talking about piracy, drug-
trafficking organizations, and transnational organized crime. That’s a $750 billion 
enterprise, bigger than the gross domestic product of most nations.
We’re going to talk a little bit about illegal, unregulated, and underreported 
fisheries.  
I’m looking at the rising sea level. Now, why? Who is the steward of the ocean 
among our armed services? I’ve taken that one on because we protect fish and 
mammals. 
RISING SEA LEVEL
We’d better keep an eye on the rising sea level. I was in Greenland three weeks ago 
with two climatologists and a ranking member from our Senate. We were on the 
Jakobshavn Glacier in Greenland. It’s the largest glacier there. It has retreated over 
twenty-five miles in the last five years.
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Now, why is that significant? If that one glacier alone melts, and by all indications 
it will within the next four to five decades, that alone raises sea level 1.5 feet. 
If you look at the western peninsula of Antarctica, which I look at as well, con-
servative estimates today are that the sea level will rise seven feet by the end of the 
twenty-first century.
What does that mean if you are a low-lying nation? We have seen the village of 
Shishmaref in Alaska evacuated because it is now literally underwater. We look at 
the Marshall Islands, where they’re seeing water inundation, as well. 
If you look at some of the hubs of global trade, what happens if you throw 
seven feet of water on top of that, and then a typhoon on top of it, just to make it 
interesting? 
The Secretary of the Navy said 80 percent of our population lives within one hun-
dred kilometers of the sea. By 2100, that might be fifty kilometers. So, it’s something 
that we need to be mindful of. 
We’ve seen a whole other ocean and that’s the Arctic. This year, we had record 
low sea ice extending into the summer months—the second in history. The last one 
was four years ago. So we’re seeing records repeat themselves every three to five 
years. 
What’s filled that vacuum is human activity in the Arctic. So, how do we ap-
proach this domain? Is it the next military domain? Do we approach it for mari-
time commerce, for the rich natural resources that are up there, or do we make 
that the next front? I think that’s something that Alfred Mahan would want to 
think about as well. 
U.S. COAST GUARD AUTHORITIES AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
We’ll talk a little bit about some of our authorities. [The following photo] is aboard 
the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter (USCGC) Stratton (WMSL 752) in San Diego. That’s 
In August 2015, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a semisubmersible vessel and seized 7.5 tons of cocaine, worth an 
estimated $227 million.
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thirty-two metric tons of cocaine, from sixteen interdictions on one deployment 
over seventy-five days. 
We have forty bilateral agreements with other countries in the source and transit 
zones. If they don’t have a navy or a coast guard, or if they do and are not deployed, 
we are given broad authority to take enforcement action within their territorial seas.
We talk about nonstate actors. They have no respect, whatsoever, for maritime 
borders. Yet, we have oftentimes allowed our maritime borders to be fences against 
cooperation among like-minded nations.
This is the combined effort of interagency and international: last year, we brought 
over 700 smugglers into custody for prosecution in the United States. In some coun-
tries, the prosecution rate is 2 percent. In the United States, it’s 99 percent. Those 
numbers work for us. 
A challenge we see is in the information that we have on drug flows. It’s destined 
for the United States. It lands in Central America in bulk, it’s broken down, and it 
feeds a 300-metric-ton-plus consumption habit in the United States. We own this 
problem as a nation. We can’t be looking down our nose at countries that are sourc-
ing and transiting this. We own a burden of responsibility for the violent crime.
When we look at unaccompanied minors leaving El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and the like, much of that crime—the seeds of that crime—were planted by 
the cocaine that comes ashore, ultimately destined for consumption in the United 
States. We own that piece as well.
ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING:
THE NEED FOR PARTNERSHIPS
We look at fisheries. There are about fifty million fishermen worldwide. About three 
billion of our world’s 7.4 billion population relies on seafood as its only source of 
protein.
A U.S. coastguardsman and a Palauan law enforcement official inspect a foreign fishing vessel.
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Let’s look at the year 2100. The UN estimates that the global population will be 
11.2 billion people. How are we going to feed the masses? Is this source of protein 
going to be around? 
I look at the sustainability of fish stocks and illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing activities. We are on a course for disaster. Throw in rising sea temperatures 
and fish moving farther north and that could be another problem set, as well.
We need to think about how we apply sea power in the twenty-first century. Many 
of those fifty million fishermen are just out to make their boat payment and harvest 
as much fish as possible while they’re out there, with no appreciation for the sustain-
ability of these fish stocks. 
There again, one nation cannot do it alone. It requires maritime partnerships to 
get after this particular problem set. 
MIGRATION: HUMANITARIAN MISSION AND ASSIMILATION
How do we secure our maritime borders? We heard from the Secretary of the Navy. 
We have seen the biggest flow of migration since the 1940s. Many are taking to sea. 
Many are manifestly unsafe voyages that they embark upon. 
They’re fleeing crime-ridden countries. They’re fleeing countries that have no 
governance structure, where there is no regional stability. Within the Western Hemi-
sphere, the abyss between haves and have-nots is growing wider—and in the world 
around us.
You have these push-pull factors that are going to be in play for some time. Can 
we look ten years out and say that we weathered that storm? This is going to be 
generational. We need to think long-term about how we reconcile this movement 
of people.
This is, first and foremost, a humanitarian mission. Panama is holding about 
2,500 detainees. They are trying to work their way up the isthmus and across our 
A Coast Guard crew member from USCGC Kathleen Moore pulls a Cuban man out of the water, 9 
December 2015.
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southwest border. It’s costing millions a month to care and feed for these migrants. 
Those are small numbers compared to what we’re seeing in Turkey, Greece, and the 
Mediterranean right now. It is draining those nations’ economies. 
You know who is paying those bills? Where would those discretionary dollars go 
otherwise? They would probably go to our militaries and our maritime services. This 
is bleeding us. 
But it is indeed a humanitarian mission. We are a nation of migrants. We were 
much like those today, but maybe in [slightly] more seaworthy boats. We need to be 
mindful [of that]. We need to be mindful that we, too, are a nation of migrants. It’s 
not just if they arrive, but how they assimilate. As I look at the world around us, what 
I don’t see is assimilation within these countries. These migrants have voted with 
their feet. If they do not assimilate, then what happens? 
Certainly, we’re seeing what happens in our country with violent extremism, but 
this too is going to be a generational problem. It’s very difficult to just seal off your 
borders, build a wall, and pray that they do not come.
SECURING THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
When I look at global trade, 95 percent of our nation’s global trade moves by sea. 
Below is a picture of the Cheniere liquid natural gas (LNG) facility, where $10 bil-
lion was invested. We were a nation that used to flare natural gas. We sit on 20 per-
cent of the world’s natural gas. We’re just now starting to export it.
When oil was running at about $100 per barrel, two-and-a-half years ago, we were on 
the fast track to being a net-export nation, where our production would far exceed our 
domestic demand, and we would be totally independent when it comes to oil and gas.
What’s important is to start looking at campaign planning, to start looking at 
what happens if there is mining in the Straits of Hormuz. We look at the volume of 
crude oil that goes through. 
A Coast Guard patrol boat patrols near the Cheniere LNG terminal on the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2015.
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I’m just thinking insularly within the United States. The United States can meet 
and exceed its demand for fossil fuel even in a war campaign. Now, maybe we don’t 
worry about oil being at $45 a barrel, and we’re losing money on it. If this is neces-
sary for our existential existence, we can produce that oil, and we can produce it for 
allies, as well. 
You need to secure that maritime transportation system to make sure that these 
commodities get to the market. It is key to our economic security, and if it’s key to 
our economic security, obviously it’s absolutely critical to our national security as well.
U.S. COAST GUARD STRATEGIES DRIVING INVESTMENTS
I’ll talk a little bit about some of our capabilities.
You’ve heard of, maybe, “four-plus-one.” It’s the cornerstone of our national mili-
tary strategy. We have an addendum to that for the Coast Guard. Our four strategies 
address 
• The Arctic
• Western Hemisphere
• Maritime transportation system2
• Cyber
I was a big believer, when I came into this job, that strategy has got to drive your
budget process. Your strategy has got to be relevant, and it has to have connective 
tissue. Each of those strategies connects to our department, and they connect to the 
White House, as well. 
The result of that is what you see in the upper left [of the graphic below]. It is 
a fast-response cutter. We just awarded the final contract. We’re building fifty-eight 
of these. On the lower left [of the graphic] is a national security cutter, USCGC 
Hamilton (WMSL 753); we’re building nine of those types today. [Shown] in the 
2. The U.S. Coast Guard strategy for the maritime transportation system is addressed in the Comman-
dant’s Strategic Intent 2015–2019 and United States Coast Guard Cyber Strategy.
The U.S. Coast Guard is investing in its nautical, aviation, and cyber forces.
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middle: we just awarded the contract for what we call our offshore patrol cutter. It’s 
a 360-foot, fifty-four-foot-beam cutter. It really is an instrument of maritime security, 
as well. And we’re building twenty-five of those.
You have to go back to Alexander Hamilton, when he was our Secretary back in 
1790. He charted the United States Coast Guard. This is the most aggressive recapi-
talization of the United States Coast Guard in our 226-year history.
We’re also modernizing our aviation forces as well [see upper right of previous 
graphic]. We modernized our boat forces [lower right of previous graphic]. What 
you see in the middle right is that we’ve invested in cyber, as well.
We have a cyber strategy because we work very closely with the maritime industry. 
In 2012, 120 ships had their global positioning system (GPS) signals hijacked. As far 
as they knew, they were moving along their point of intended movement, but they 
were actually off course because their GPS signals were hacked.
We had six mobile offshore drilling units operating in over-mile-deep water at 
a drill site. Fortunately, all six had that blowout preventer shut in the well—which 
didn’t happen during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. All of this had a cyber 
nexus to it.
Now the commercial maritime sector is looking to the United States Coast Guard 
for national standards for cyber security. If you push out a standard—if you believe 
in Moore’s Law where technology doubles every two years—you might put a quick 
fix out there, but you need to make sure that you stay current. If you’re going to stay 
current, you need to look at the competencies of the people that you need. 
DEVELOPING AND RETAINING HUMAN CAPITAL
[The following] is a picture of one of our fast-rope teams fast-roping off a Navy 
SH-60 helicopter. Again, we talk about partnerships. 
A Coast Guard member fast-ropes out of a helicopter during a joint training including the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. 
Navy, and Customs and Border Protection as part of a tactical demonstration during the North Pacific Coast Guard 
Forum in San Francisco, California.
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The reason this is significant is that we have bilateral agreements with every flag 
state of convenience that does trade with the United States. That gives us the au-
thority to board these ships anywhere on the high seas if there’s so much as a remote 
doubt—not even reasonable suspicion—that there might be a weapon of mass de-
struction aboard that ship. We can stop and gain positive control of that ship way be-
fore it enters our inland waterways, our ports, where it would do the most damage.
That’s just one aspect of the competency. It takes about four years to grow that 
level of professionalism. We follow the exact same doctrine as our special forces.
We used to be a Coast Guard where you were a jack-of-all trades, and maybe mas-
ter of none. We’re no longer serving in a Coast Guard where you have hobbies. You 
have a profession. You’re going to have a profession as a seagoing officer, as an avia-
tor, as a regulator, as an acquisition professional, as a cyber expert. We’re looking at 
how we manage our human capital for the twenty-first century.
Like all of the armed services in the United States, we are drawing from a well, 
where only twenty-five percent of seventeen- to twenty-four-year-olds meet the bare-
minimum requirements to serve in today’s military. Are we going to dumb down our 
standards to get numbers up? Absolutely not.  Look at the at-risk operations that we 
do day in and day out.
The good news is we’re doing a great job recruiting. We’re bringing people in the 
door. We do a great job training them.
I do not have a force in garrison. They’re all doing front-line operations. I’m not 
lacking for readiness.  
I can recruit, I can train, but what am I doing to retain this workforce of the 
twenty-first century?
We’re leveraging diversity. If you go to our Coast Guard Academy in New Lon-
don, today, you’ll see a corps of cadets, where 40 percent are women and 33 percent 
are underrepresented minorities. This is the fortieth anniversary of when we first 
brought women into the academy—and it was like who broke into the men’s locker 
room? Now they are fully assimilated into our Coast Guard.
But when I look out ten years, what happens to that year’s group of women and 
underrepresented minorities? At ten years, 50 percent of them will have left my 
service. So how do I retain that workforce?
You heard from Secretary Mabus as well. You cannot surge trust. You build that 
trust when you immerse people in this ethos of integrity, of service before self. It’s 
not something you can just grow off the street.
People say to me, “That’s great, Admiral Z. You got everything you asked for. 
You got new ships. There’s $1 billion earmarked in the ’17 budget to recapitalize 
icebreakers. That’s a bonus.” But that’s not what I’m looking for in the remainder 
of my tenure in this job. One is about partnerships. The other is about our human 
capital.
VERY MUCH A JOINT SERVICE
When I look at partnerships, we are fully integrated with our Navy. [Below] is a pic-
ture of one of our national security cutters fully integrated with and commanding a 
surface action group during RIMPAC 2014. 
That’s the USCGC Waesche (WMSL 751). Today, they have eighteen tons of 
cocaine on their flight deck and forty detainees, because they’ve been down there, 
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for about forty days, doing great work. The ship that was down there this year, 
USCGS Stratton (WMSL 752), is now doing Arctic domain awareness. So they went 
from RIMPAC up to the Arctic. Same platform, same crew, but clearly multimission, 
able to do U.S. Code: Title 10 with the world’s navies, but then leverage the many 
authorities that we have as well.3
Today, we have a Coast Guard law-enforcement detachment on a DDG [guided-
missile destroyer] in the Central Pacific Ocean. It’s a concept of operation called 
the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. 
Vice Admiral Nora Tyson, our Third Fleet commander, fully understands that the 
natural resources of many of the Pacific Island nations reside within their exclusive 
economic zones, and there are distant-water fishing fleets plundering those natural 
resources. That is the only source of economic security for some of these nations. 
Lose that, and you’ve lost national security. If you lose it all, what fills that vacuum? 
We’ve seen models time and again. When you lose governance, some form of trans-
national organized crime—and maybe it has a link to terrorism—is going to fill that 
vacuum.
We have had six patrol boats serving under U.S. Naval Forces Central Command 
for the last fourteen years, and will continue to do so for the indefinite future.
Again, very much a joint service in all we do, leveraging the great partnerships we 
have, especially with nations and the world’s greatest United States Navy.
A WORLDWIDE COAST GUARD
We also look at capacity building. I’ve been in a number of countries. They are 
looking for how we leverage the many authorities that the Coast Guard has. We in-
teract with over one hundred nations on an annual basis. As I said, necessity is the 
mother of all invention. It really comes down to partnerships, and outreach such as 
3. U.S. Code: Title 10 are laws that apply to U.S. Armed Forces.
Legend-class USCGC Waesche (WMSL 751) steams alongside HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) and USS Port Royal 
(CG 73) during a 2014 RIMPAC exercise.
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[what we see in the above photo]. It’s the training institutions that we have at our 
Coast Guard Academy and U.S. Coast Guard Training Center in Yorktown, Virginia, 
where we build those relationships that then grow into partnerships. 
We’re literally a worldwide Coast Guard, again, operating off the coasts of all 
seven continents across the globe.
How do we leverage this? The United States will chair the Arctic Council, and 
this next year, turn over chairmanship to the government of Finland. We recognize 
that the Arctic Council does not have a forcing function, if you will. How do you 
operationalize decisions that come out of the Arctic Council? 
Homeported in Yorktown, Virginia, the International Mobile Training Branch is the backbone of the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s effort to provide training worldwide.
Eight coast guard agencies of the Arctic nations sign a joint statement establishing the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 
October of 2015. Membership includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Federa-
tion, and the United States.
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We created an Arctic Coast Guard Forum. In this [preceding] picture, taken at 
our Coast Guard Academy, we’re signing our general statement—the eight coast 
guards, represented in the Arctic Council.
Do you militarize the Arctic, or do you look at safety of life at sea? Is it protecting 
the way of life of indigenous tribes? Is it gaining better domain awareness? We’ve al-
ready established protocols regarding how we share information among these eight 
nations.
We have a very similar model with our North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, with 
representation from the United States, Canada, China, Japan, Russia, and South 
Korea. We do annual operations against IUU activity—a combined operation, not 
an exercise, that has really squeezed down IUU activity in some of the most remote 
portions of the Pacific Ocean.
List of authorities resident within the U.S. Coast Guard.
The U.S. Coast Guard enforces maritime law on behalf of all countries listed here.
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The above graphics are a roll-up of partnerships. [The top graphic identifies] 
the authorities that are resident within the United States Coast Guard. [The second 
graphic] is the listing of every nation with whom we have ship riders, with whom we 
operate within their territorial seas to take enforcement action on their behalf. It 
doesn’t get into the many search-and-rescue agreements that we have. 
This addresses drug-trafficking activity, proliferation security initiatives, and il-
legal fishery activities. We’ve been doing many of these agreements now for twenty, 
twenty-five years, and every year we add a few more countries to this list.
The theme for this symposium could not ring more true, when we talk about 
stronger maritime relationships and partnerships. We have arrived there in our 
United States Coast Guard, but there’s always more work to be done. 
It’s my honor to tell you about what’s happening in our Coast Guard today. I 
thank our Chief of Naval Operations, the President of the Naval War College, and 
especially the many weary travelers who made it here today. Your presence means a 
lot to me, and all of us, especially among the United States delegation, to be able to 
spend this quality time with you.
Thank you very much, and semper paratus. 

Cooperative Strategies and Interoperability
Mr. Chris Trelawny
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization
Dean Thomas Mangold: 
Our first keynote speaker is no stranger to the Naval War College. He’s known bymany in the audience today. He is Mr. Chris Trelawny, he’s a Special Adviser to 
the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and one 
of the world’s leading experts in maritime security operations. He was one of the key 
players enabling the drafting of the Djibouti and the Yaoundé codes of conduct. He 
is also a naval reserve officer with thirty years of experience.
Mr. Chris Trelawny:
Thank you for your very kind invitation to participate in this most important sympo-
sium. It is truly a great honor. 
My name is Chris Trelawny, and I am the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General 
of the International Maritime Organization for Maritime Security and Facilitation. 
I have been at IMO since 2003, specializing in maritime security.
5
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Before that, I spent ten years in aviation security for the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization and for the United Kingdom government, and before that, eight 
years in Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise, primarily on counternarcotics, and at 
sea in HM customs cutters. I’ve also served for thirty years as a volunteer reserve 
officer in the Royal Navy. 
I mention this because we are products of our backgrounds. My views have been 
shaped by experiences on different sides of fences.
So, bearing this in mind, I intend to use my allotted time to mix it up a bit and 
to throw out some ideas and challenges to established thinking—if, indeed, the 
concept of established thinking is allowed at the Naval War College.
Admiral Richardson invited me to contribute to the discussions on how to 
strengthen maritime partnerships and enhance maritime safety and security to 
meet global challenges and advance prosperity.
THE IMO AND MARITIME SECURITY AND SAFETY
I’d like to start by looking at what my organization does and doesn’t do with respect 
to enhancing civil maritime security, and how we can assist navies and coast guards. 
I’ll then look at the work of the IMO in the wider context of the United Nations, 
what we are trying to achieve, and how navies and coast guards have supported or 
can contribute. I’ll also look at some of IMO’s initiatives, and, finally propose some 
ways ahead.
My overall message can be summed up by quoting another giant from history, 
President Harry S. Truman: “It is amazing what you can accomplish if you do not 
care who gets the credit.” I really do believe that joined-up government and break-
ing down silos are key to developing maritime partnerships.
IMO is the specialized agency of the United Nations, responsible for the safety, 
security, and efficiency of international merchant shipping, and the prevention of 
marine pollution by ships. We are a technical, rather than a political, body. We have 
171 member states, working by consensus. The outputs of the organization reflect 
the collective will of those member states.
As mariners yourselves, you will be familiar with many of our conventions, codes, 
and guidance. Some examples are
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, or SOLAS
• International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
• International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue
In the context of security, IMO focuses on what the civil maritime industry can do
to protect itself, and on assisting governments in protecting global maritime trade. 
Our main focus is on risk management, deterrence, and threat transfer, rather than 
on countering terrorism, per se. 
Having said that, IMO is also the competent body for the 1988 and 2005 Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts (SUA) conventions, which criminalize terrorist activity against 
ships and, more recently, allow boarding on the high seas, pursuant to suspected 
terrorist offences. SUA 2005 complements United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 1540 of 2004 and the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
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Through our work on the facilitation of international maritime traffic, we also 
have an interest in mixed migration by sea, prevention of drug smuggling, cyber 
security, and prevention of stowaways. 
I know that cyber security will be addressed on Friday. IMO would certainly wel-
come input from defense on what the maritime sector–specific threats are and, 
more importantly, what the industry should be doing, including practical measures 
to address them. That is a very live issue at IMO at the moment.
You may be aware that this Monday, 19 September 2016, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. IMO’s 
view of mixed migration by sea is that this is a global humanitarian crisis, not just a 
maritime issue. It presents a range of challenges to the maritime sector, quite apart 
from the humanitarian considerations. But using the search-and-rescue system and 
diverting hundreds of merchant ships are not viable solutions to the migrant crisis.
Although governments and the merchant shipping industry will continue rescue 
operations, safe and legal alternative pathways to migration must be developed, 
including safe, organized migration by sea, if necessary. The focus must be on man-
aging migration, so that people do not get placed into life-threatening situations, 
where they need to be rescued at sea in the first place.
That said, the Secretary-General of IMO, Mr. Kitack Lim, is keen to recognize the 
significant contributions of ships from many of the world’s navies and coast guards 
to the rescue of these unfortunate human beings. On his behalf, I thank you all. 
Although we’ve been active in maritime security since the Achille Lauro incident 
in 1985 and the suppression of piracy since before that, it was events of September 
11, 2001, that led to a rethink about how IMO did business.
Migration by sea: a global humanitarian crisis.
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PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTING PORT STATES FROM THREAT SHIPS
[The events of] 9/11 and other terrorist “spectaculars” around that time changed 
the way merchant shipping was perceived. The inherent stability of the Cold War 
had given way to a less- ordered world. The threat posed by rogue states, or at 
least, less-well-disposed states, and transnational actors operating from ungoverned 
spaces, became the key concerns. Essentially, the focus on the protection of mer-
chant shipping shifted to the protection of states from merchant shipping, or at 
least the cargoes they carried. 
The diplomatic conference held at IMO in December 2002 adopted a number 
of amendments to SOLAS, including the development of a new chapter XI-2 on 
special measures to enhance maritime security, and the introduction of the Inter-
national Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which went into force in 147 
states on 1 July 2004. These measures consolidated and added to all previous IMO 
guidance on security, prevention of drug smuggling, stowaways, and port state–
control regimes. 
Essentially, these special measures to enhance security were about reassuring 
port states that the ships entering their waters did not pose a threat, and reassuring 
flag states that ships flying their flag would be protected while in other states’ ports 
and territorial waters. 
Since 2002, further relevant provisions have been added, including the require-
ment for ships over 300 gross tons to carry long-range identification and tracking 
(LRIT) equipment and automatic identification systems (AISs). 
As SOLAS addresses the safety of life at sea, it provides jurisdictional challenges 
ashore, where most preventative security measures are applied. Thus, IMO cooper-
ated with the International Labour Organization to develop a Code of Practice on 
Security in Ports, which effectively expanded the reach of the ISPS Code into the 
wider port area and with the World Customs Organization on container security, 
which led to the development and adoption of the SAFE Framework of Standards 
to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade in June 2005.
We, too, are committed to the concept of maritime partnerships. 
PROVISIONS FOR SECURITY ON SHIPS
It’s a frequently stated opinion that merchant shipping operates in an uncontrolled, 
lawless environment, with grimy old rust buckets operating under flags of conve-
nience that have no respect for the rule of law, carrying contraband and threats to 
good order. I would like to challenge that view. 
As with the safety-related provisions of SOLAS, the responsibility for imple-
mentation of maritime security measures on board ships lies primarily with the 
flag state. Basically, the flag state is responsible for ensuring that ships entitled 
to fly its flag obey the rules. In the context of maritime security, this includes 
the following:
• Ensuring that security plans and standard operating procedures, specific to 
the ship, are developed and implemented
• Appointing suitably qualified ship security officers 
• Training all crew members to the required standard
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• Keeping current all plans and procedures through regular drills and exercises
• Determining policy on the use of armed guards on board.
Governments are responsible for assessing the threat to a ship flying its flag and 
determining the appropriate security level for that ship. An increase in security 
level should trigger the implementation of additional predetermined and approved 
measures, in accordance with the ship’s security program. A decrease in security 
level should lead to an appropriate relaxation of their implementation. 
IMO itself has no policing mandate. However, there are other methods of en-
couraging compliance. The maritime industry is a commercial enterprise and, in 
many ways, compliance mechanisms play to that.
As stated, on the high seas, flag-state law applies. However, when those ships en-
ter the waters under the jurisdiction of coastal or port states, those ships become 
subject to the laws of the state concerned. Clearly, coastal and port states have an 
interest in preventing loss of life, pollution, environmental damage, illicit activity, 
etc., within their sovereign spaces, and thus are entitled to establish a degree of 
control, including over visiting ships. 
Essentially, states are entitled to inspect foreign ships visiting that state’s ports to 
ensure that internationally agreed standards are met and that any deficiencies are 
rectified before the ship is allowed to proceed. For maritime safety and environmen-
tal protection matters, this is referred to as “port-state control.” 
Such controls are generally conducted by civilian maritime safety agencies and 
are technical in nature. 
IMO recognized the need for a similar approach to be taken for maritime se-
curity, but that the national agencies responsible for maritime security were more 
The responsibility for implementation of maritime security measures on board ships lies primarily with the flag state.
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likely to be coming from military, intelligence or law-enforcement agencies, rather 
than civilian agencies. 
The term “control and compliance” was adopted for what is, essentially, security-
related port-state control. The legal basis for this is detailed in SOLAS chapter XI-2, 
Regulation 9, on control and compliance, and IMO has developed guidance on how 
to implement such measures. 
A number of mechanisms for international cooperation have evolved to enhance 
the effectiveness of port-state control. As no one state can realistically inspect all 
ships, groups of states have agreed to share information on ships inspected and de-
ficiencies identified, with a view to providing more effective coverage over a wider 
geographical area. Ships identified as being compliant in one port need not be rein-
spected in other ports; however, those found to be deficient are likely to be further 
inspected in other ports.
Traditionally, these agreements have been formalized through the signing of a 
memorandum of understanding. These effective systems for regional cooperation 
could readily be adopted as vehicles to enhance maritime security.
The economic driver generally compels compliance, as witnessed by the reduc-
tion in the number of accidents, oil spills, and other incidents at sea over the last few 
years—years that have seen an increase in the size of the maritime sector.
Ship owners operate ships in order to make money. Simple as that. Ship owners 
may choose the state of registry for their ships, and will generally do so in a way 
that protects their economic and competitive advantages. A flag administration’s 
revenue depends on the number of ships registered. 
However, a flag state that develops a reputation for not enforcing adequate stan-
dards will see ships flying that flag being subject to increased scrutiny by port state– 
control authorities, with subsequent delays for ship movements. Ships not moving 
don’t make money. So, owners of compliant ships may elect to reflag, thus reducing 
the revenue for nondiligent flag administrations. 
This logic can be applied to maritime security control and compliance measures. 
IMO regulations ensure that ships provide a range of information that may be of 
use to security forces and intelligence services. When the keel is laid, it’s allocated 
an IMO number that is permanently and overtly marked on the ship, and remains 
with it until the ship is recycled.
This number can be tracked through the IMO Global Integrated Shipping Infor-
mation System, or GISIS, website. Equasis and other programs,1 coupled with the 
mandatory Continuous Synopsis Record,2 can provide details of ownership, ship 
history, and other details that can be cross-checked against other records. 
Control and compliance regulations also require ships to provide details, such as 
last points of call and cargoes, to port facility officers, to help in their risk-assessment 
1. The Equasis website states, “Equasis aims at collecting and disseminating quality and safety-related
information on the world’s merchant fleet provided by holders of such information . . . by providing
factual information, its users will be able to build their own opinion on a ship or a company and to
act accordingly.”
2. IMO Format and Guidelines for the Maintenance of the Continuous Synopsis Record states, “SOLAS
Chapter XI-1, regulation 5 requires all passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and
above engaged on international voyages to have on board a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) . . .
Only the ships’ Administration can issue a ships CSR document to a ship . . . The primary purpose of
the CSR is to provide a history of the ship which can be inspected by appropriate officials.”
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process. LRIT and AIS data can also help establish credible white pictures of 
shipping. 
Perhaps the answer is not to seek the aviation control model, based on pre-
ordained courses from A to B, with preauthorized routing plans and controlled 
airspace. Ship owners and operators have very good commercial reasons for not 
wanting the competition to know where their ships are. 
The global economy is enabled and served by merchant shipping, and it works. It 
may not be as neat, tidy, and transparent as naval operations, but it works. Let’s not 
mess it up with a disproportionate response. 
However, you need to be clear on what threats you are trying to address. Are you 
looking for a particular ship, or a ship that fits a particular profile, or something 
that’s transported as cargo? 
Ships are quite easy to find. During a recent spate of incidents, old cargo ships 
and livestock carriers were filled with fare-paying migrants, set on autopilot and sent 
to crash into the Italian coast. A fairly cursory check of Lloyd’s List and other trade 
media would identify similar vessels likely to be used, basically old rust buckets fly-
ing less reputable flags, standing by near ports in the area of departure. If control 
authorities so wished, these could have been investigated further and deterred. It’s 
a matter of political will to act rather than capability.
Similarly, there are many commercial systems on the market that can interro-
gate AIS signals, establish patterns of life, and highlight anomalies. Such systems 
could be useful tools to assist in the suppression of illegal fishing and smuggling 
operations, thus contributing to food security and sustainable development as well 
as maritime security. 
The challenge is that fishing vessels are exempt from many aspects of SOLAS and 
come under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. But if navies are going to be part of the national maritime security process, 
in its widest sense, perhaps you need to talk to your national fisheries departments, 
and get them to promote a carriage requirement for LRIT and AIS at the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
NEEDED: MORE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION FOR PORT SECURITY
National maritime security committees? Interagency cooperation for wider strategic 
goals? I’m getting ahead of myself. In terms of the implementation of SOLAS chap-
ter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, I think it’s fair to say that the weak point is port facilities. 
Unlike on ships, where an existing safety culture was relatively easy to evolve into 
a security culture, security in ports is far more complex, involving many players from 
different governmental, law-enforcement, and private entities.
Many countries view ports as critical infrastructure and port security as a facet of 
national security. However, without clear national and local legislation, policies and 
direction, coordinating the activities of all stakeholders, security responses in ports 
are, at best, fragmented. 
Critical to the success of port-facility security regimes—be they for protecting 
port infrastructure against terrorist attack, or countering theft and other criminal 
activity, or preventing access to ships by terrorists, drug smugglers, and stowaways—
is a well-coordinated, risk-based preventive strategy. 
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Although IMO has no mandate to assess the compliance of port facilities with 
SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code per se, it’s readily apparent that the absence 
of port-facility security committees is an indicator of a lack of interagency coopera-
tion, and thus poor port-facility security. 
The active promotion of such coordination mechanisms—consistent with the 
International Labor Organization / IMO Code of Practice on Security in Ports and 
other guidance—forms the cornerstone of the organization’s work on promoting 
better compliance with those regulations. 
COOPERATIVE RESPONSES TO PIRACY
Protection of ships at sea is largely addressed either in the context of countering 
piracy or through the reassuring presence of naval forces in conflict zones or areas 
of high political tension. This is particularly important in the vicinity of major choke 
points through which significant proportions of the world’s trade and energy needs 
are carried by merchant ships. 
We sincerely hope that this presence will continue. 
It’s interesting to recall that IMO started to address piracy and armed robbery 
against ships over thirty years ago in response to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. 
This led to the collection of incident reports and the development of a comprehen-
sive range of guidance for shipping and governments; [this collection] included mod-
el regional agreements on suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
As attacks increased in Asia and the Pacific, the regional responses were a tripar-
tite agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore and the development 
of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia, or ReCAAP. 
The lessons of ReCAAP were reflected in the Djibouti Code of Conduct to ad-
dress piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia; this 
became the model for the new Code of Conduct for West and Central Africa. Now 
the states in the western Indian Ocean are looking at expanding the scope of the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct, taking into account the lessons from West and Central 
Africa.
At the same time, the African Union is encouraging a whole-of-Africa approach, 
with a summit planned for 15 October this year [2016]. The intention is to adopt a 
Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa. As an aside, I 
wonder how many African navies have provided input into drafting that document.
It’s important not to get sidetracked by the debate of whose responsibility it is to 
protect merchant shipping from pirates and the whole “arms on board” issue. The 
important issue is the protection of global maritime traffic, upon which the world 
economy depends. National interests are far wider than the flag that the ship is 
flying. In a global economy, as well as in the articles of United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, all states have an obligation to suppress piracy. 
That said, naval efforts to suppress piracy in the western Indian Ocean have been 
deeply appreciated by the merchant shipping community. 
The civil-military cooperation to counter piracy is well established. Companies 
intending to operate ships in the high-risk area and voluntary-reporting area are 
strongly advised to preregister with the Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa, 
run by the European Union Naval Force, so that a vulnerability assessment can be 
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carried out and more effort given to protecting vulnerable ships. Ships entering the 
area are then expected to
• Apply IMO guidance and best management practices for self-protection3
• Report to the UK Marine Trade Operations in Dubai, run by Royal Navy 
reservists to assist
• Follow the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
• Improve their situational awareness by listening for warnings from the following:
• UK Marine Trade Operations
• NATO Shipping Centre
• European Union Naval Force
• IMO’s Regional Information Sharing Centers
• National naval authorities 
Naval forces—supported in part by voluntary provision of LRIT data by flag 
states—have been effective in encouraging uptake of best management practices, 
through “naming and shaming” those not complying. 
This, coupled with naval coordination through the Shared Awareness and De-
confliction process, or SHADE, and proactive action by naval forces to disrupt pi-
rate action groups, both at sea and ashore, have been very effective. SHADE is a 
shining example of how pragmatic actions by naval personnel, cooperating with 
each other for a common good and free from political interference, can achieve 
excellent results.
Piracy is a symptom of wider, land-based problems and will never be solved at sea, 
but naval forces and coast guards, acting in a law-enforcement capacity, can have 
3. Refers to Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia-Based Piracy, version 4, August 2011.
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden
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a significant effect. This was proved in the Asia Pacific, most notably in the Straits 
of Malacca and Singapore, by the littoral states working together, and the ReCAAP 
initiative. It’s being demonstrated again with Somalia-based piracy, which hasn’t had 
a successful attack on a SOLAS ship for over four years. It’s also showing positive 
results in the Gulf of Guinea. 
GREATER STRATEGIC THREATS
I would argue that, although important, piracy and armed robbery against ships are 
less significant maritime threats. Greater strategic threats include IUU fishing, drug 
smuggling, terrorism against oil and gas installations and transport systems, and 
above all, failure to develop the maritime sector. 
All of these issues have similar solutions—namely,
• Political will at the highest level
• Adequate legal frameworks
• Maritime situational awareness
• Law-enforcement capability ashore
• Interdiction capability at sea
• Adequate training and logistic support
• Interagency cooperation
We need to approach maritime security in its widest sense. 
There’s an expression that says “when you’re surrounded by crocodiles, it’s dif-
ficult to remember that your mission is to drain the swamp.” With the current focus 
Naval forces and coast guards acting in a law-enforcement capacity have had a significant effect against piracy and 
armed robbery at sea.
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on terrorism, unsafe mixed migration by sea, piracy, armed robbery against ships, 
and other maritime crimes, it’s difficult to remember these are symptoms of bigger 
issues that, if untreated, will continue to get worse. 
The population of the world has topped seven billion. The populations of many 
developing states are set to double by 2050. The ten countries with the youngest 
populations and the ten countries with the highest fertility rates are all in Africa. 
Universities are turning out ten graduates for every one graduate job. Food security 
and gainful employment are becoming increasingly important and increasingly dif-
ficult to achieve. 
The gross domestic products of these countries are not growing fast enough to 
meet the demands of the increasing population. Economies are based largely on 
the export of raw materials, with no value added. The profits are being made out-
side of the countries of supply.
But by developing trade by sea, improving port infrastructure and efficiency, 
nurturing national shipping lines, promoting seafaring as a career, managing and 
protecting fisheries, securing offshore energy production, and creating stable 
conditions that encourage investment and tourism, we will be able to help ensure 
sustainable economic growth, food security, employment, prosperity, and stability 
throughout the developing world.
MARITIME SECURITY ENABLING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Our aim is improved economic development, supported by sustainable maritime 
development and underpinned by good maritime security. This will support the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda and complement UN initiatives on the prevention 
of violent extremism. It will also address some of the stress factors that lead to insta-
bility, insecurity, and uncontrolled mixed migration.
Maritime security is the enabler for this. It’s a means to an end, not an end in 
itself. The usual reaction is “that’ll take years.” My response is “we don’t have any 
choice, so best we crack on as soon as possible.” 
As a specialized agency of the United Nations, IMO has, for a number of years, 
been working with our member states, globally, to enhance maritime security, 
maritime law enforcement, and maritime security capabilities—both bilaterally and 
regionally—in cooperation with the United Nations agencies, offices and programs, 
regional bodies, national development partners, and other organizations. Our 
program of tabletop exercises is aimed at getting the twenty to thirty government 
departments with a stake in maritime security to work together, as a national 
maritime security committee, to develop national maritime and maritime security 
strategies. 
One of the challenges is that maritime security and maritime law enforcement 
are seen as departmental issues—for the navy, coast guard, police, or maritime au-
thority, with those agencies competing for scarce resources—rather than being part 
of a national, multiagency response to developing the maritime sector. 
In many countries, security is about regime security rather than creating stable 
conditions for trade to flourish. Few governments feel threatened from the sea, and 
the maritime sector is resourced accordingly. 
This needs to change. A joined-up approach is needed at both the national and 
the regional levels. Regional threats require regional solutions.
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Another challenge is the way navies and other government departments operate. 
In order for a junior officer to sit in your seat at the Thirty-Second International 
Seapower Symposium, he or she will probably change jobs every couple of years, 
in order to gain the experience necessary to become a chief of naval operations or 
head of coast guard. To get noticed and picked up for promotion, they will need 
to achieve things. Whereas this is great for producing fighting admirals, it can be 
a bit counterproductive. What is actually needed is the comparatively mundane, 
sustained effort over a number of years to prevent violent extremism, conflicts, and 
wars. 
Political will is the key to success. Generating revenue is a great way to develop 
political will. Look at the maritime sector as a business, with navies as partners in 
that business. If individual states and regional bodies develop credible action plans, 
outlining their intentions and clearly identifying their needs, then they are more 
likely to attract investment—financially, politically, and through capacity building. 
GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION
I reiterate the need for member states to establish their own national organizations 
and legal frameworks and to develop their capacity, in order to benefit from the 
maritime sector. This is a precursor for successful regional cooperation.
The relationship between states and regional economic communities is complex. 
Regional strategies will only work if individual countries believe in them and take 
action to enforce them. Regional bodies represent and reflect their membership. 
Regional economic communities—and alliances, for that matter—do not have 
any assets of their own. They will not be able to allocate sufficient resources to the 
maritime sector until their member states provide the impetus and the assets to do 
so. 
On the opportunities side, we need to look at the benefits that will come from 
development of the exclusive economic zones. Those countries that understand the 
value of their marine resources—fish, oil, and gas—and invest in them, will make 
money and provide opportunities for employment and stability. Selling the exclu-
sive economic zone as a business opportunity, and investing in it, is the basis for 
getting presidents engaged in the maritime sector. 
I’d encourage those countries that have strong maritime policies and can dem-
onstrate the value of maritime investment to pressure their regional economic 
communities to promote development of credible maritime strategies to other 
governments in the region, based on their own successes. 
Civil-military cooperation is also very important. I agree with Admiral Lanba 
[India]. We need to break down the silos between government departments, in-
cluding the navy. Avoiding duplication, sharing personnel and equipment, and 
standardizing approaches will benefit all.
However, there does seem to be an almost existential crisis about what navies are 
for. Indeed, we’ve just reopened the coast guards–navies debate, earlier.
Politically, there does not seem to be much evidence of grand strategic thought 
and planning. Certainly, many states are hampered by “government-by-accountant,” 
a lack of joined-up thinking, and dealing with the here-and-now, rather than longer-
term solutions to the world’s problems.
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At a time of increasing instability, the need for navies to maintain the deterrent 
capability of their high-end war-fighting skills remains critical. Agreed. However, in 
these times of pressure on budgets and resulting interservice rivalries, there can be 
a natural tendency to focus on the navy as an independent service and the survival 
of the naval role in its current form as an end in itself. 
It’s worth remembering that whereas an army is basically a kinetic weapon system 
occasionally to be fired at coastlines by the navy, navies are so much more than that. 
They’re essentially diplomatic tools of government with the capability to project 
power and influence globally. Their ability to deliver kinetic effect, although essen-
tial, is secondary to that purpose.
To follow on from Admiral Lloyd’s [Canada] earlier statement, the question 
really should be what does the whole-of-government want to do in the maritime 
context and in the wider security context, and how can the navy support that?
The focus is on preventing violent extremism, the threat posed by rogue states, 
and transnational actors operating from ungoverned spaces. Perhaps the sustain-
able solution would be to assist less-developed states to overcome what Admiral 
Girardelli [Italy] referred to as their “sea blindness” and to focus on developing na-
tional maritime business plans, supported by national maritime security strategies, 
and maritime law-enforcement capability, in its widest sense. Indeed, this is what 
IMO is aiming to achieve.
The focus should be on developing national capacity to perform what are some-
times referred to as “coast guard functions,” or what the French Marine Nationale 
refers to as “L’action de l’état en mer.” These are tasks mandated by various interna-
tional conventions to which states have committed themselves, and then established 
an integrated network so they can be applied regionally. These coast guard func-
tions include the following: 
• Search-and-rescue capabilities
• Prevention of pollution 
• Protection of the marine environment
• Maritime- and energy-supply security
• The countering of piracy and armed robbery against ships, illegal migration, 
and trafficking of drugs, weapons, and people 
Such a system could also play a major role in states’ efforts to unlock the potential 
of their exclusive economic zones and develop and maintain viable fishing industries. 
MARITIME SECURITY FOR STABILITY ON LAND
It’s important to take a strategic, long-term, and whole-of-government view and to 
interpret the enhancement of maritime security as a building block for greater sta-
bility on land. This includes making the fullest use of navies as a diplomatic asset 
within a comprehensive strategy.
Not only are navies very good at capacity building, when allowed, they’re also 
very effective in opening doors and ensuring high-level engagement politically. Vis-
its by warships and senior naval officers are a good vehicle for raising the profile of 
maritime issues to the highest levels of government. These can be followed by con-
tinued contact through defense attaché networks, especially where forward-leaning 
states employ naval officers and Marines in those roles. 
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Ship visits, undertaking national law-enforcement detachments, can provide 
demonstrations of their potential maritime capabilities, and top-down as well as 
bottom-up training. 
The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership program and the Africa 
Partnership Station are good examples of civil-military cooperation for capacity 
building. I’d also like to highlight the excellent support of our capacity-building 
programs that we’ve received from navies and coast guards. This includes the train-
ing teams from the Maritime Security Centre of Excellence in Marmaris, Turkey, 
and the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Centre in Crete.
However, sustainable programs—using small, embedded teams of land-based 
naval and marine personnel to deliver initial training and to train and mentor 
national trainers on a continuous basis—are an effective way of developing national 
maritime capabilities and are significantly cheaper than visits by warships. These 
should not be looked at simply as aid but rather as conflict prevention, and should 
be invested in accordingly.
For those countries requesting development assistance, it’s no good just asking 
for money or equipment without a credible, thought-out, and detailed plan showing 
where the investment will be made and what its benefits will be.
How about a different way of approaching a problem? If I ask what you need, 
some of you will say boats. Be careful what you wish for. Chances are, you will end up 
with some secondhand, worn-out and unsuitable rust bucket that’s only being given 
to you because it’s cheaper than scrapping it. 
 How about rephrasing the request? I have a coastline of so many miles with an 
exclusive economic zone of so many square nautical miles. Within my zone, I have 
the potential to exploit sustainable fisheries to the value of X million dollars and 
Ghanaian marine forces join U.S. Coast Guard law-enforcement specialists aboard a suspected illegally operating 
fishing vessel.
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potential offshore oil and gas to a value of Y million dollars, providing one of my 
ministers hasn’t undersold the rights for a fraction of their worth. To protect those 
assets, I need this number of ships, with a range of that number of miles, with an 
endurance of so many days, a crew of this number of people, fitted with this equip-
ment, with capacity to carry and accommodate law-enforcement detachments from 
other agencies. The cost of these vessels will be X million dollars, which will be offset 
against the expected income.
Because I’m thinking regionally, I know that my neighbors have similar needs, 
and we could go for economies of scale by placing a multiple order. As part of the 
tender process, we’re also going to require that when a prototype is built, engineers 
from my country will be part of the building team. Then subsequent vessels will be 
built in my country, or in my neighbor’s—I’m feeling generous—using my man-
power and materials, sourced locally. 
In addition to providing employment, this will help me develop my national ca-
pacity to build and maintain watercraft, and help develop my wider fishing and 
maritime sector. Please invest in this project.
Isn’t that a bit more of a compelling argument than “we want boats”?
LONG-TERM LEGACY
Finally, chiefs of naval operations and coast guards, you don’t have to generate 
short-term wins any more. You’ve done it. Please give thought to establishing your 
legacies. 
As heads of navies, you have far more political influence than your civilian col-
leagues in transport, fisheries, etc. You can use that influence to shape the future in 
a positive way. 
Instead of expending efforts on turf wars and fights for resources with lesser uni-
formed services, why not use your time to look to the horizon and become champi-
ons of maritime development, underpinned by good maritime security?
Find and task the brightest in your organizations to work with their opposite 
numbers in the twenty-plus agencies that have a legitimate stake in maritime secu-
rity, in order to develop a sustainable maritime security strategy, embracing civil-
military engagement—nationally, regionally, and internationally. Get your head of 
state to sign off on it, and get your people to implement their parts of it. 
You will have achieved a long-term legacy that Harry S. Truman, and even Clause-
witz, Corbett, and Mahan, would respect and embrace.

Panel Discussion One
Cooperative Strategies and Interoperability
Moderated by
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France
Panel Members
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Australia 
Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira, Brazil 
Vice Admiral Ibokete Ibas, Nigeria  
Admiral Muhammad Zakaullah, Pakistan
Dean Thomas Mangold: 
We brought in some of our other regional experts—heads of navy from aroundthe world—to address how we figure out strategies for better and closer co-
operation, regarding these vexing problems that all of our navies and coast guards 
have.
To aid this effort, we’ve a great moderator. He’s the Chief of Staff of the French 
Navy, Admiral Christophe Prazuck. The admiral has a great career. He’s served on 
submarines and service vessels, and commanded a frigate. I might add from his bio, 
6
Panel One members (L–R): Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira, Vice Admiral Ibokete Ibas, 
Admiral Muhammad Zakaullah, and Admiral Christophe Prazuck assemble on stage.
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he has a doctoral degree in physical oceanography from the U.S. Naval Postgradu-
ate School in Monterey.
He was head of the French Navy commandos, and then later, the navy military 
personnel command. So he has a very varied portfolio, and is a testament to great 
skill.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
Thank you very much.
We are going to talk about cooperation, interoperability, and maritime security. 
I’m honored to moderate this first roundtable. My intention, though, in this short 
introduction, is not to give you an all-inclusive plan about the best cooperation 
strategy at sea.
A Few Paradoxes for Comment. I may have an idea or two about it, but I would 
find it more productive to throw out a few paradoxes, a few difficult questions, that I 
can’t quite get my head around and listen to your opinions and feelings about them.
The Clint Eastwood Paradox. Sometimes my commanding officers feel as frustrated 
as Dirty Harry. They are at sea to conduct operations in order to enforce the inter-
national law of the seas and freedom of navigation. They find the bad guys—they 
could arrest them, they could seize their ships—but the exact law that they have to 
enforce prevents them from doing so.
The Alice in Wonderland Paradox. How is it possible that you can see and follow 
small things but don’t know anything about much larger objects? Why is it that you 
can track a DHL Express parcel from Kiribati to Namibia but still can’t permanently 
track and find much larger objects, like ships and aircraft, when they are in the 
middle of the oceans?
The Godzilla Paradox. It’s no use having the best picture in the world if you cannot 
act on it [relating to] the quality-versus-quantity debate. Warships are designed to 
do what it says on the tin: fight wars. When they don’t, they contribute to maritime 
security. But as our ships become more technologically advanced, we order fewer of 
them. How does that translate to their secondary roles in maritime security, where 
quantity has a quality of its own?
Terrorism. I want to wisely allocate scarce resources. I mention the various, gen-
eral links between maritime crime and terror. Should I look for drugs or weapons? 
Should I protect ports or high-value units?
The Four Paradoxes Explained. Let me explain a little bit more, in detail, about 
what I mean with these four paradoxes, and then I will introduce each of my distin-
guished counterparts. 
The Clint Eastwood Paradox. Many of us have been involved in international op-
erations to protect sea lines of communication against Somali pirates. The “Clint 
Eastwood” paradox was at its climax when Somali pirates found safe protection in 
Somali territorial waters, just a few hundred yards off one of our frigates. To avoid 
such frustrating and inefficient situations, we designed special legal tools. Some 
examples are
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• Vienna Convention for drug traffic at sea1
• San Jose counternarcotics agreement in the Caribbean2
• United Nation Resolution on arms smuggling to Libya.3
The Alice in Wonderland Paradox. This refers to building the picture. Satellites can-
not see everything, especially at sea. We all remember the tragedy of Flight MH370. 
We all have sensors, eyesight, radars, ARS [advanced radar sensor], and cover sev-
eral areas. We all have different national maritime security organizations, navies, 
coast guards, border forces, customs. Sometimes the information we have is sensi-
tive, legally and commercially speaking. How can we best overcome these barriers, 
changing our fragmented pictures to a unified picture of all maritime activity, in 
order to protect freedom of navigation?
The Godzilla Paradox (or Quality versus Quantity). More advanced technology, fewer 
ships—is that the inescapable horizon? Should warships be designed with maritime 
security in mind? Should specific sea lanes be protected and patrolled, like the In-
ternationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Aden, or should we focus on 
the littoral? Would choke points be better defended from land? We all have in mind 
the example of the Strait of Malacca.
Terrorism. What is your current perception of terrorist risk against ships in the 
high seas, in the littoral? What effect do drug seizures have on terror? Is it direct, is 
it indirect? Does catching weapons at sea make any difference?
As you can see, there are many questions, but so little time. Maritime security is 
an evolving subject, but the answers we’re seeking in this panel have very practical 
implications for the lives of many. We have a duty to think about them and to try 
hard to resolve them. We need to look at our navies going beyond war-fighting 
responsibilities and to complex constabulary duties. 
A former commander of the Border Protection Command and, most recently, 
Commander, Australian Fleet—it’s a real pleasure to welcome Vice Admiral Tim 
Barrett, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, to discuss this subject.4
A MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Australia:
Admiral Richardson, Rear Admiral Harley, I would like to pass on my thanks, as 
every other speaker has, on behalf of my delegation, for the opportunity to be part 
of the International Seapower Symposium—my third, I now discover.
I’ve been asked to briefly discuss cooperative strategies and interoperability, and 
how we collectively address these aspects for emerging challenges.
Australia’s Strategic Context. I’m going to show a uniquely Australian perspective 
that I hope will lead to questions and then answers to some of those paradoxes that 
1. Refers to United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, done at Vienna, 20 December 1988, and entered into force 11 November 1990.
2. Refers to the. Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Traffick-
ing in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area, opened for signature at San
Jose on 10 April 2003.
3. Refers to United Nations Resolution 2292 (2016), adopted by the Security Council at its 7,715th
meeting on 14 June 2016.
4. The Border Protection Command is now called Maritime Border Command.
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were so eloquently [spoken of]. But I would like to start with a little bit of context 
around Australia and the circumstances as to the maritime challenges that we face.
Firstly, Australia is, indeed, the largest island nation in the world, with a coastline 
of more than 20,000 nautical miles, but with a population of only twenty-five million. 
Ten percent of the world’s sea trade passes through Australian ports. Australia’s 
shipping task is about the fifth-largest in the world. This is easy to understand when 
considering our significant raw commodities, our major offshore oil and gas indus-
tries, particularly in the northwest, and the lengthy coastline that we have to protect. 
We rely on the sea for about 99 percent of our exports for a substantial propor-
tion of our domestic freight. About 90 percent of our trade by volume, about 60 
percent by value, comes by sea. Ninety-five percent of our communication—slightly 
less than the average for the world—comes by undersea cable.
Australia as a Global Player. The Indian Ocean is now—as we heard from the 
Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy—the globe’s busiest and most strategically sig-
nificant trade corridor, carrying two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments and a third 
of the world’s bulk cargo.
This is very important because the broader Indo-Pacific region—from the Indian 
Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia—is central to Australia’s 
national security and economic prosperity.
We are a large country [with a] small population. We must think big about our 
challenges. Australia has a significant maritime responsibility for an area of the 
world’s oceans twice the size of our vast landmass. It’s about fifty-four million square 
nautical miles—about 10 percent of the world’s area—when we look at our search-
and-rescue responsibilities and our security forces’ authority area.
The Indo-Pacific region is central to Australia’s national security.
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As an island nation, Australia’s strategic thought is profoundly shaped by the 
maritime environment. It connects us to the world, and the world to us. But we 
understand that this environment is shared, a global commons where we all share 
responsibilities. That is why cooperation in this environment is so important. It’s not 
a choice—it is essential.
But what are the challenges? We have discussed some of them this morning, but 
let me just talk through the usual suspects:
• Transnational migration
• Climate change
• Proliferation of critical seaborne trade, which may lead directly to terrorism
• Criminal trade
• Uncertainty generated by regional disputes
• Threats of state-based armed aggression.
Now, these issues are not unique to Australia. I’m not here to say that. All coastal 
states or island nations host similar concerns, in varying degrees. But in Australia’s 
case, the combination of these factors, and, ironically, the relative isolation we have 
Down Under, have driven a strategic outlook that has Australia committed to a role 
in the international arena, with the navy an ever-increasing part of that role.
Australia’s Defense White Paper. This year, the Australian government released 
its defense white paper to explain how it is investing in defense capabilities to 
strengthen its security in an increasingly complex strategic environment. This de-
fense white paper sets out a comprehensive, responsible, long-term plan to enhance 
Australia’s defense capability, deepen our international security partnerships in sup-
port of shared security interests, and collaborate with industry partners to support 
our nation’s security. 
The white paper has cemented our future force structure, while providing a new 
emphasis on industry to support naval capability through a continuous shipbuilding 
strategy. The paper has set the basis for how defense is to move forward: principally, 
this is the defense of Australia and our national interests and establishes our mean-
ingful contribution to nonlethal effects of creating stability in the region.
This will manifest itself in greater humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
capability within our region. We recently sent our newest ship, an LHD [landing 
helicopter dock], to Fiji to assist in a crisis, following a cyclone that went through 
that region.
Australia: large country, small population, big maritime responsibility
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We’ll engage more frequently, and on a larger scale, in international military 
exercises. Many of the navies represented here have just finished RIMPAC. We’ll 
also be extending the range and frequency of our international engagement. 
Australia’s international engagement is an important part of the government’s 
approach to building international partnerships, which includes trade, diplomacy, 
foreign aid, and economic capacity building in a range of government and 
nongovernment sectors. 
Defense will increase its investment in international engagement over the next 
twenty years to help reduce the risk of military confrontation, build interoperability 
with key partners, and improve the coordination of responses to shared interna-
tional challenges, including terrorism and humanitarian assistance.
Our Defense Cooperation Program, part of this international engagement, cur-
rently provides defense assistance to twenty-eight countries in our region. It will 
be enhanced in the future to build the confidence and capacity of our important 
regional partners. 
I use one small example, the Pacific Maritime Surveillance program, where we 
will replace a successful patrol boat program with new, enhanced forty-meter patrol 
boats. We are building twenty-one of these patrol boats for our Pacific partners. 
We’re not just providing patrol boats. We also 
will provide maritime surveillance advisers, 
all maintenance, and refit for those vessels for 
the period of their lives. We are doing this so 
that they can maintain their own maritime se-
curity. More importantly, it’s about persistent 
support, not just occasional support.
The navy will participate more regularly 
in multinational exercises, and overseas pres-
ence of defense personnel will gradually in-
crease over time. These are all measures we 
feel are distinctly important within the new white paper. This includes making ef-
fective and meaningful military contributions to strengthen our regional and inter-
national partnerships and to meet shared security challenges.
Our consistent regional engagement will help the Australian Navy transition to a 
task group–oriented navy. This will better prepare us to operate in a combined force 
with like-minded nations and to operate more effectively across the region.
RIMPAC, as I just mentioned, is an excellent example of one of these interna-
tional engagements. It reflects the closeness of our alliance with the United States 
but also the strength of our relationships with other regional partners. This year, the 
Australian Navy committed a greater tonnage to RIMPAC than ever before. Interna-
tional exercises are vitally important for us, particularly because they prepare us well 
to contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support our collective 
interests in a rules-based order.
As part of defense white paper’s strong focus on shared security challenges, the 
Australian defense force will be undergoing a major investment to modernize and 
enhance the potency, range, and capability of our maritime forces. For the Australian 
Navy, this will include a new generation of submarines, surface warships, surveillance 
The choice to cooperate and to 
collaborate, to collectively and 
consistently maintain good order 
at sea, is a choice to preserve 
and promote the security and 
prosperity of all nations. 
—Vice Admiral Tim Barrett,  
Australia
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aircraft, and support aircraft. All of this has been agreed to by government—to a 
surprising outcome for many.
There will be more emphasis placed on joint and combined force operations. 
It will bring together different land, air, sea, intelligence, electronic warfare, 
cyber, and space capabilities, so the Australian Defense Force can apply more 
force, more rapidly and more effectively when called on to do so. It will ensure 
that we are best placed to make a meaningful contribution to security and sta-
bility on a global scale, with long-range capabilities available for employment 
around the world.
Common Security Interests and Cooperation. As I said, the Australian govern-
ment seeks not only to deter, deny, and defeat threats to Australia, it also recognizes 
the responsibility that we have to contribute to the global commons.
I am confident that the countries represented here share common interests in 
the maintenance of an international system, based on the rule of law—a rule of law 
backed up by dialogue and cooperation, and a transparent approach to strategic 
interests, particularly in the maritime domain. 
With ever-increasing regional and global interdependence, no country—and 
we’ve heard this already—can alone solve the challenges to security, either across 
each other’s regions or across the globe. The concept of working together to pro-
vide good order at sea and protection is not new. But cooperation increasingly is 
becoming the normal mode of operations. It means that strategic dialogues—in-
cluding the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting–Plus Experts’ Working Group on Maritime Se-
curity—are all critical to ensuring we remain open, connected, and supportive in 
addressing our collective maritime security concerns.
Maritime cooperation is indispensable. It must be practiced, frequently and rou-
tinely, for it to be refined and enhanced. The habits of cooperation are developed 
over many years. It’s time that builds relationships and trust, which in turn enables 
more rapid and effective cooperation. Building mutual confidence, through trans-
parent and predictable maritime arrangements, helps to overcome the risk of mis-
communication and miscalculation.
The Australian Navy is committed in the years ahead to working ever more closely 
with other navies, as we collectively provide maritime security in our region and 
[around] the globe. We have the opportunities to build the habits of cooperation 
through routine activities, and not just when the emergencies occur. 
The choice to cooperate and to collaborate, to collectively and consistently main-
tain good order at sea, is a choice to preserve and promote the security and prosper-
ity of all nations.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
As I alluded to, a significant obstacle to building a maritime security picture is the 
diversity of actors and formats. Allow me to introduce the head of a navy recently 
responsible for such a complex task as organizing the littoral protection for the Rio 
Olympics—Commander of the Brazilian Navy Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira. He 
has had numerous commands, serving recently as director of the Ports and Coast 
Directorate and as commander of the 7th Naval District.
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COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIPS IN MARITIME OPERATIONS CENTERS
Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira, Brazil:
I thank Admiral Richardson for hosting us and for the warm welcome to Newport. I 
also thank Rear Admiral Harley for the organization of the symposium and the top-
ics under discussion. I salute Admiral Prazuck, the moderator, and my colleagues, 
Admiral Zakaullah, Admiral Ibas, and Admiral Barrett.
It’s a great pleasure to be in front of such a distinguished audience and to have 
the opportunity to share experiences about cooperative partnerships in maritime 
operations centers.
Brazil’s Strategic Context. To understand what’s coming next, it’s important to 
put in context how we see the maritime surroundings in the South Atlantic. The blue 
economy, a field that considers the impact of the main activities of maritime, waterways, 
and port areas, is important to all countries present in this symposium. Several activities, 
such as those listed in the [below] graphic, provide us with great economic prospects. 
As a case study, I will address the most relevant for Brazil: oil and gas exploitation 
and seaborne trade. Oil is one of the great treasures of the Blue Amazon.5 Brazil pro-
duces, at sea, almost 93 percent of its oil and 75 percent of natural gas from 814 off-
shore wells, with a combined production of 2.6 millions of equivalent barrels per day.
More of this production now comes from the presalt fields, located more than 
one hundred miles from the coast and at sea depths over 3,000 meters, requiring 
high technology expertise.
5. In addition to the link, see briefing by Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira, entitled “Protecting the Blue 
Amazon,” presented to U. S. Naval War College, Regional Alumni Symposium, 13 May 2015.
These activities provide Brazil with great economic prospects.
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Another important component impacting the Brazilian economy is seaborne 
trade. Just a note: out of the ten billion tons of cargo that are transported per year 
in the world, one billion either comes or goes to Brazilian ports. It’s a lot of cargo, 
although the value is not much. A lot of iron and grains.
Geopolitically, the quadrilateral—formed by the four main financial and production 
centers in South America: Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago—is far 
from the United States, Europe, and Asia. No one is as far away from those power cen-
ters as we who constitute the Southern Cone of South America. As Pope Francis said, “I 
come from the end of the world,” and so do we South Americans in the Southern Cone. 
This requires us to have extremely competitive sea-based logistics. On one hand, the 
distance from the main consumer markets impairs us in the global process of trade. On 
the other hand, it protects us from major conflicts in other regions. It’s a great paradox.
The national defense against foreign threats remains the core role of navies, but 
other factors and actors tend to gain relevance in an increasingly globalized and 
unequal world. In a wider sense, we may expect that situations that downgrade hu-
man security will require the presence of the state and deployment of naval forces.
Maritime Operations Centers. Overcoming the challenges in the maritime 
environment has no other solution but intense international cooperation. 
Traditionally, most of the navies and coast guards here have always acted in the 
areas of cooperation. 
I will focus this presentation on maritime operations centers because that’s the 
subject I’m supposed to speak to, although others are equally important. The core 
activities and benefits provided by the maritime operations centers is the appropriate 
Its distance from the main consumer markets impairs Brazil in the global process of trade but also protects it from major 
conflicts in other regions. It’s a great paradox.
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identification of vessels of interest; that will be shown in some of the maritime op-
erations center initiatives in the South Atlantic.
The first one is the Inter-American Maritime Traffic Defense Coordination Plan, 
with the general purpose of establishing rules and procedures, consolidating the 
lessons about security, and defending the maritime traffic.
The area outlined in the [following] graphic is the South Atlantic Maritime Area, 
known as SAMA. We are very proud to say that it bonds Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay in a solid and long-lasting arrangement that will celebrate its fiftieth 
birthday in 2017. It also is responsible for the standard procedures of naval control 
of shipping in the area.
The Trans-Regional Maritime Network was instituted to enhance the exchange 
of maritime information on transregional levels. Now, it’s composed of thirty coun-
tries, such as all the member states of the wider Mediterranean community, plus six 
other countries: Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, and South Africa. This 
was possible by creating an interface that allows the integration of three different 
maritime traffic information systems of navies. Italy is the leader, and Brazil and 
Singapore also work as technical leaders.
 The LRIT system provides global identification and tracking of ships. It’s a very 
effective tool for naval control of shipping and search and rescue. The Brazilian Re-
gional Data Center is part of this system, and now Uruguay, Namibia, and Paraguay 
are members of the center. We are working for the adhesion of other new navies, 
and we are able to offer technical and operational support to them. 
South Atlantic Maritime Area (SAMA) bonds Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The Trans-Regional Mari-
time Network is the integration of Brazil, Italy, and Singapore’s maritime information systems.
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Since 2012, the Brazilian Navy has been part of the Pacific and Indian Ocean 
Shipping Working Group, which brings to all participants the opportunity to act 
in the regional working-level forum in reviewing NATO and other relevant Naval 
Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping doctrine.
As a consequence of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio, the Brazilian Navy gained 
a new expertise, which allowed the exchange of maritime traffic information, with 
a strong focus in counterterrorism and preemptive actions. We had a very strong 
relationship with the United States Coast Guard, Netherlands Coast Guard, and 
the Maritime International Center in England. Working together, these provided 
us with a lot of information about vessels of interest. It was a very important tool 
we had during the whole process of the Olympic Games. Thanks to God, nothing 
happened.
Also in the Olympic Games, the Marines that belonged to the navy of Brazil had 
about eighty-nine suspicions of bombs. All were backpacks that tourists had forgot-
ten somewhere in public, and we had to act as if they were bombs. The success of 
the event and high level of security we achieved says a lot about the importance of 
exchanging information between operational centers of international partners.
Enabling Interoperability. Interoperability is very important for maritime opera-
tions centers, so we do conduct some exercises with all these organizations. Interna-
tional exercises for the maritime operations centers are efficient tools for interoper-
ability. In 2016, the Brazilian Navy took part in profitable ones like Bell Buoy, held 
in Portsmouth, UK; Transoceanic in Asuncíon, Paraguay; and CAMAS [South At-
lantic Maritime Area Coordinator], which will be held in Uruguay.
Brazil’s other maritime information-sharing partnerships 
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Also, the last three years, we have taken part in the Obangame Express exercise 
with naval assets in maritime interdiction operations training, directly contributing 
to increased maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
Finally, despite the uncertainties, the Brazilian Navy is aware and watchful of its 
responsibilities in maintaining and developing a force capable of facing the chal-
lenges of the twenty-first century. We consider, as a capital factor, the continuity, and 
if possible, the expansion of a cooperative environment. 
The Brazilian Navy believes that being prepared and building an environment 
based on partnership, trust, and information sharing is the best and maybe the 
only way to preserve the maritime domain as a safe environment. We believe that 
together we are strong. The sea has no borders. Instead of separating, it should link 
us together.
Thank you very much.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
Let me introduce Vice Admiral Ibas, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Nigerian Navy. 
His career includes roles as Naval Provost Marshal through Flag Officer command-
ing the Western Naval Command, making him the ideal expert for regional coop-
eration strategies. 
MARITIME CAPACITY BUILDING
Vice Admiral Ibokete Ibas, Nigeria: 
It gives me great pleasure to associate with this international gathering of astute 
minds and with this universal mission. I express sincere appreciation to the U.S. 
Chief of Naval Operations for inviting me to join other naval leaders at this forum. 
Thank you for the perfect hosting and the great care accorded my delegation since 
our arrival. I remain impressed with the level of interest generated by the Interna-
tional Seapower Symposium. The relevance of such an international forum of naval 
leaders derives from the imperatives in the global maritime space. 
Firstly, the increasing opportunities provided by the seas and oceans have contin-
ued to attract diverse threats, as we have witnessed in recent decades.
Secondly, contemporary experiences indicate that the emerging trend of threats 
to peaceful and secure use of the seas and oceans is increasingly cross-border and 
transnational in nature. Inevitably, navies were called to meet the growing demand 
for operational collaboration and credible maritime policing capacity. 
In this regard, I gladly identify with the theme of this symposium, “stronger mari-
time partners,” as well as the topic “maritime capacity building” I have been invited 
to discuss. In discussing the topic, I will share our experiences in maritime capacity 
building in Nigeria and, indeed, the Gulf of Guinea. They underscore how coopera-
tive maritime operations could positively impact maritime security. 
Strategic Frameworks for Cooperation. I start by acknowledging recent political-
level efforts that have culminated in the development and adoption of strategic 
frameworks, such as 2050 African integrated maritime strategy, Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS) integrated maritime strategy, and code of 
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conduct concerning the repression of piracy and other illicit maritime activities in 
the Gulf of Guinea.6 
These frameworks have facilitated cooperative capacity building with defined ar-
chitectures, such as the zonal mechanisms for maritime security operations among 
the Gulf of Guinea states. 
I also acknowledge the capacity-building effort of the friends of the Gulf of Guin-
ea nations, particularly the U.S. government and U.S. Africa Command, and their 
faithful sustainment of the Africa Partnership Station and the annual iteration of 
Exercise Obangame Express.
On the part of the Nigerian Navy, I wish to restate our commitment to the afore-
mentioned maritime security frameworks and associated capacity-building ini-
tiatives. In addition to playing a key role in the development of the 2050 Africa’s 
Integrated Maritime Strategy and ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategies, the Ni-
gerian Navy has been fully involved in the activation of the ECOWAS Pilot Zone E 
for maritime security operations, along with Benin, Niger, and Republic of Togo.7 
Under the Africa Partnership Station, the Nigerian Navy has sustained its partici-
pation in the annual Obangame Express exercises since 2011. 
Building Capacity in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. In further consolidation 
of the gains of these engagements, the Nigerian Navy organized, in May 2016, a 
Regional Maritime Awareness Capacity Conference and its first regional maritime 
exercise, essentially for the Gulf of Guinea navies, with an extended invitation to 
extraregional navies.
The productive outcome of the conference—in terms of commitment to capacity-
building efforts as well as the desire among the Gulf of Guinea states to sustain 
such a forum—was well noted. For instance, I have been informed that member 
states and partners have increased practical commitment to meet capacity-building 
requirements for the Multinational Maritime Coordination Center, Zone E.
On the home front, the Nigerian Navy remains founded on the recognition of 
harmonized regulatory frameworks, closer collaboration, and operational coordi-
nation with other national maritime agencies and stakeholders. 
For instance, the Nigerian Navy recently opened discussions with the Nige-
rian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency toward strengthening existing 
6. Also known as the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against
Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, and
Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
7. ECOWAS Pilot Zone E is detailed in Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security and Criminal Justice Primer, Appen-
dix VII, p. 68.
Left: Snapshot of the 2016 Regional Maritime Awareness Capacity Conference in Nigeria. Right: Several vessels 
participated in the Opia Toha Exercise held in May 2016. 
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collaboration on maritime domain awareness, information sharing, maritime law 
enforcement, and training. Both agencies are equally sustaining the drive for expe-
ditious passage of the Anti-Piracy Bill by the National Assembly.
Similarly, the Nigerian Navy—in conjunction with ministries, departments, and 
agencies—has jointly developed a harmonized standard operating procedure for 
the arrest, detention, and prosecution of owners and crews of vessels that have in-
fringed on national maritime laws.
Capacity building for maritime domain awareness in Nigeria also received a sig-
nificant boost with the acquisition of a national network known as the Falcon Eye, 
complementing the U.S. government–assisted Regional Maritime Awareness Capa-
bility facilities. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian Navy—while attending the Tenth Regional Seapower 
Symposium of the Mediterranean and Black Sea hosted by the Italian Navy in Venice 
last October [2015]—signed a note of accession to formally join the Trans-Regional 
Maritime Network. The Nigerian Navy hopes to benefit from induction [into] this 
large information source provided by this global maritime partnership to improve 
its domain awareness and positively impact good order at sea.
As part of an initiative to build local and regional capacity in shipbuilding, the Ni-
gerian Navy has continued its construction program of seaward defense boats. The 
second indigenously constructed thirty-nine-meter boat was recently completed at 
the naval dockyard in Lagos. The naval shipyard in Port Harcourt has also com-
pleted the construction of model tugboats. Within the past year, the Nigerian Navy 
Control center for Nigeria’s Falcon Eye over-the-horizon maritime surveillance network
Nigerian-built seaward defense boats (left), tugboats (middle), and gunboats (right)
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partnered with local shipbuilders to construct over eighty gunboats, all of which 
have been put into operational use. 
Operation Tsare Teku. As we intend to sustain the budding, local capacity of 
shipbuilding, the Nigerian Navy remains open to partnership within and outside 
the Gulf of Guinea toward developing more cost-effective construction capacity, in-
cluding joint production with neighboring Gulf of Guinea navies. All efforts have 
combined to deliver improved offshore security at a reduced cost.
Regrettably, the renewed spate of militancy, laced with outright criminality in the 
Niger Delta area of Nigeria, has continued to pose a significant threat to shipping 
and oil and gas infrastructure. The upsurge in attacks on shipping and offshore gas 
installations in the first quarter of this year was particularly worrisome. 
In response, the Nigerian Navy activated an antipiracy operation, Operation 
Tsare Teku, in April 2016. Consequently, the number of attempted offshore at-
tacks remarkably declined, much as the number of successful attacks also declined, 
significantly.
A high point was the rescue of MT Maximus, manned by eighteen crew members, 
laden with over 4,000 metric tons of automatic gas oil, and hijacked by pirates in 
CÔte d’Ivoire waters. After three days of tracking with indispensable assistance from 
our partners and the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability systems, the criminal 
convoy was intercepted at the fringes of São Tomé and Príncipe waters, with six pi-
rates arrested and one killed in action.
The major lesson from the operation is that there is an increasing need to devel-
op capacity for information sharing, security awareness, and joint coordination with 
the oil and gas installations and vessel owners. Specifically, the experience brought 
to the fore the [importance of] profiling vessels, owners, and crew. This line of ef-
fort has assisted greatly in mapping and checking the trend of criminality and com-
plicity of crew members in some of the attacks.
The hijacked MT Maximus was tracked by Nigeria’s Regional Maritime Awareness Capability system, enabling rescue 
by the Nigerian Navy.
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The difficult terrain in the Niger Delta, characterized by thousands of nonnavi-
gable creeks, has evidently challenged our capacity to contain the upsurge in sabo-
tage, theft, and damage to the network of pipelines and hydrocarbon infrastructure 
by militants and criminal groups. Nevertheless, the recent introduction of a choke 
point management and control concept by the Nigerian Navy, with prepositioned 
houseboats and organic gunboats along key routes in the area, has helped in stem-
ming the tide of attacks, crude oil theft, and illegal bunkering. 
Similarly, the joint operations in the Niger Delta have been restructured for a 
maritime lead, with stronger synergy amongst the cooperating agencies. These ef-
forts are continuously complemented by political-level engagements with the Niger 
Delta communities and associated groups. The resolve to contain the challenges in 
the Niger Delta remains a key priority of the government at all levels. From a strate-
gic perspective, the Nigerian Navy is determined to grow its capacity, through rapid 
expansion of the choke point concept.
I should, at this juncture, express appreciation to the U.S. government for the 
continued support through the transfer of offshore patrol vessels to the Nigerian 
Navy under its Excess Defense Articles program. The additional collaboration on 
technical support with the U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command is a particularly wel-
come development, which the Nigerian Navy is committed to sustaining. I also wish 
to indicate the readiness of the Nigerian Navy to continue and deepen its participa-
tion in the U.S. International Frigate Working Group.
No Other Viable Option. On a concluding note, no opportunity must be missed 
to emphasize the imperative of capacity-building programs at national and regional 
levels among the Gulf of Guinea states. 
As recent forecasts suggest, there will be no letup in the foreseeable future of the 
stringent economic conditions in the Gulf of Guinea region. The combination of 
asset inadequacy, maintenance cost, and persistent maritime threats will leave local 
states and their navies with no viable option other than prudent capacity building 
on a collaborative model. 
Among other expectations, I look forward to efficiently strengthening zonal 
maritime security architecture, patrol capability, maritime domain awareness 
expansion, improved information sharing, and profiling of maritime activities. 
Achieving these will require renewed and sustained capacity-building efforts. They 
must emphasize coordinated, synchronized, cross-organizational, and multinational 
The recent establishment of Nigerian Navy houseboats patrolling key choke points in the Niger Delta has helped stem 
the tide of attacks, crude oil theft, and illegal bunkering in that area.
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cooperation among relevant regional and international actors and partners, with 
asset and burden sharing being a principle.
Once again, I thank the organizers of this symposium for inviting me and providing 
a valuable opportunity to share thoughts and experiences with other naval leaders.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
The Pakistan Navy has commanded Combined Task Force 151 six times and Com-
bined Task Force 150 nine times, contributing one or two ships every year. The 
Pakistan Navy presently commands Combined Task Force 150, and has since the 
beginning of August 2016. It will relieve the French of command of the Combined 
Task Force in August 2017.
It therefore gives me great pleasure in introducing Admiral Zakaullah, Chief of the 
Naval Staff of the Pakistan Navy. As former commander of the 25th Destroyer Squadron 
and Combined Task Force 150, he is particularly well placed to discuss our subject.
COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES AND INTEROPERABILITY: ANTIPIRACY
Admiral Muhammad Zakaullah, Pakistan:
Admiral Richardson, Admiral Harley; heads of the navies, coast guards, and mari-
time security agencies; ladies and gentlemen. It is an immense pleasure to be 
amongst this distinguished gathering. I thank Admiral Richardson for inviting me 
and affording me this opportunity to share my thoughts with this august gathering. 
Mr. Chris Trelawny very comprehensively covered various aspects of maritime 
security, including piracy, which is my subject. However, I shall attempt to give my 
perspective.
Due to the unique features of freedom of navigation and right to innocent pas-
sage, both enable opportunities as well as threats, especially transnational crime 
at sea. Benefiting from this global common depends on the effectiveness of our 
individual and collective efforts to maintain good order at sea. Hence, collaborative 
maritime security has emerged as a compelling matter for all nations.
I shall focus on one such transnational crime, that being piracy. Countering it is 
an excellent example of cooperation, based on singleness of purpose. The results 
speak for themselves.
Piracy Statistically Declining. Talking about Somalia, in a matter of a decade, 
the pirates that audaciously threatened the lifeblood of the global economy—its 
maritime commerce—have been forced to scale down. However, increased hijack-
ing of regional shipping, about five dhows in 2015, could be an indicator of change 
in pirate strategy.
Similarly, in Southeast Asia, collaborative efforts by regional partners have effec-
tively controlled the outbreak, although sporadic incidents continue to be reported.
Notwithstanding phenomenal success in these two regions, continued piracy-
related incidents rears the specter of an underlying malaise. A matter of particular 
concern is the comparatively larger number of piracy incidents on the West African 
coast.
I am keenly aware that everyone in this august house is well informed of the 
genesis of the problem and cognizant of the popular argument that we are merely 
fighting the symptoms and not dealing with the root causes effectively.
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There is also increasing evidence that pirates continue to maintain their capabil-
ity as well as their intent, which are main ingredients in the threat matrix. I will, 
therefore, argue in today’s talk that unless we fully imbibe the lessons of the success 
of global antipiracy efforts and evolve a sustainable, broad-based mechanism, piracy, 
being a cyclic phenomenon, is bound to resume again.
History is a witness that piracy has always receded when tackled decisively. In the 
current era, effective collaborative maritime security initiatives have resulted in a 
significant reduction in piracy. Core reasons for that success are naval deployments, 
self-defense measures adopted by the shipping industry, prosecution of piracy 
suspects, and declining support by local communities.
I shall now touch upon some of the latest trends. According to a recent Interna-
tional Maritime Bureau report, in the first half of 2016 piracy and armed robbery 
at sea have fallen to their lowest levels since 1995. The high-risk area in the Western 
Indian Ocean region was reduced in December 2015. Merchant vessels are again us-
ing prepiracy shipping routes close to the east coast of Africa. This also corresponds 
with a sharp decline in the use of armed guards by merchant ships. The presence 
of coalition and independent deployments engaged in counterpiracy activities de-
creased by 15 percent during 2015.
Graphics from Oceans Beyond Piracy’s report, “The State of Maritime Piracy 2015” illustrate the recent decline of pirate 
attacks as a result of international efforts.
93
Conditions that nurture piracy 
The Gulf of Guinea has seen the rise of piracy and violence across the years. 
However, increased law-enforcement patrols by regional navies have forced pirates 
to expand their range, beyond coastal waters, in search of targets.
Dormant Piracy. It is likely that international naval deployment will further drop. 
Presumably, compliance with best management practices by international shipping 
will decline, owing to heavy costs involved.
The drop in the naval deployment is a cause of concern, and carries the risk of 
resurgence of piracy, in some form or other. In the words of Puntland Counterpi-
racy Minister Mr. Abdullah Jama Saleh, “The pirates are not dead, but dormant. So 
they come, definitely . . . straight away. No question about it [as soon as the warships 
leave].”
This graphic from Oceans Beyond Piracy’s “The State of Maritime Piracy 2015” illustrates the dangers posed to 
seafarers in the Gulf of Guinea.
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Another cause of concern has been the reported apprehension of Somali fisher-
men. They still regard the international naval forces deployed off Somalia as being 
in league with and protecting the interests of IUU fishing, as the naval vessels do 
nothing against IUU in Somali waters, in their perception.
Another challenge is sustaining successful international initiatives, forging ef-
forts on multiple planes like the UN Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of 
Somalia, the Djibouti Code of Conduct, and ReCAAP.
Expand the Mandate of Cooperative Maritime Forces. The decline in piracy in-
cidents around the Horn of Africa has triggered a debate on extending the contact 
group’s functional and regional domains, or altogether transferring its functions to 
other institutions. I emphasize that not only continuing the contact group, but also 
its functional extension, would act as strategic messaging in the fight against piracy.
I reckon that there is also a need to institute a more robust and flexible collab-
orative mechanism for major maritime forces and states to preclude resurgence of 
piracy and, should piracy reemerge, allow a rapid increase in force flow to effec-
tively contain its threat. A possible solution could be to build on the collaborative 
arrangements among various maritime forces and independent deploying ships, 
providing an enhanced mandate for prevention of IUU fishing and other transna-
tional maritime crimes.
I shall contextualize the Pakistan Navy’s role in maritime security and antipiracy 
operations. Besides conducting regular counterpiracy patrols in our exclusive eco-
nomic zone, the Pakistan Navy has been part of Combined Task Force 150 since 
2004 and Combined Task Force 151 since 2009, conducting operations as part of 
Combined Maritime Forces.
Multipronged Strategy Needed. To comprehensively eradicate piracy, it needs 
to be tackled at the grassroots level. To do so, the international community 
needs to adopt a multipronged strategy that addresses sociopolitical issues on 
land. maintains deterrence at sea, enacts requisite legislation, disrupts the finan-
cial trail, and undertakes efforts to build on the existing collaborative maritime 
forces and structures, with enhanced mandates to prevent transnational mari-
time crimes.
The trend of piracy, though statistically declining, still remains a reckonable 
threat. While the grassroots remedies will take time, the world navies need to con-
tinue playing their roles in deterring and suppressing piracy, and maintaining good 
order at sea.
I assure and renew Pakistan’s continued commitment for combating piracy for 
the common good of the world community.
The high-risk area of the West Indian Ocean Region was reduced by late 2015.
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DISCUSSION
Question: 
I really appreciate the admiral’s leadership and efforts to keep open and stable seas. 
I am very impressed with the presentation from the Australian Navy. Your navy con-
tinues to contribute to the peace and maritime security in both the Pacific Ocean 
and the Indian Ocean as well, conducting several other missions and hosting several 
joint exercises. For example, your country dispatches ships and aircraft for counter-
piracy and antiterror operations, as well.
How do you prioritize missions with restrictive personnel, equipment, and re-
sources? Your country’s missions are increasing now. You face some challenges now.
Response:
How do I prioritize, was the question. I ask the government for more ships is my 
answer. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t.
I use that question to express a little more of what I was saying. There is a view 
that a nation and a navy would seek to prioritize only within its borders, only within 
its region. The reality is that for us to have an effect globally, we have to contribute 
further afield rathen than only our own waters. In Australia, that is a distinct govern-
ment policy.
So, I regularly confide with our government as to what their priorities are, along-
side all of their other attributes for national interests—their diplomatic, economic 
views. We direct the actions of our navy around those stated government priorities.
But what it does mean, to some extent, is taking the same ships, preparing our 
crews to do a number of different missions, regularly having ships prepared to de-
ploy, and being capable of conducting what might traditionally be constabulary 
roles. So, I have sailors who are proficient throughout the spectrum of their opera-
tions. That is one way I can meet government’s changing priorities, rapidly.
It comes at a cost. It comes at a cost of individuals who have to train across a raft 
of skills. It comes at a cost of keeping a level of ships, a level of preparedness, for 
longer periods of time. My constant battle is to remind government that it costs 
them critical resources that they have to provide.
So, the answer is quite simple. I always ask for more, but then I have straight-
forward discussions with my government as to what can be achieved against their 
national interests.
Question: 
I’m really interested in the antipiracy discussion. Admiral Zakaullah, you men-
tioned that one of the solutions is to tackle piracy at the grassroots level. I want 
you to elaborate more on that. From my own experience back home, I agree with 
you. We need to tackle piracy at the grassroots level. Very, very important. From the 
quote you gave us, pirates are not dead. They are dormant. 
In the Gulf of Guinea, they are not dormant. They are not dead. They are active. 
If piracy is dead in the Gulf of Aden, it is still active in the Gulf of Guinea. Now what 
happens is, once ships leave, [the pirates] come back again. But for us, we don’t 
have the ships. I’m amazed at the statistics you have given about the Gulf of Guinea. 
It is clear you will continue to have such statistics, as long as we don’t have ships.
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We are talking of partnership, collaborative effort. It is very, very clear from 
all the discussions we’ve had so far that the collaborative effort is not evident in 
the Gulf of Guinea. And as long as we have that, it may be far away from getting 
a solution. 
That is why I agree with you. One of the ways for us to tackle piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea is to deal with piracy at the grassroots level. I want this gathering to think of 
how to deal with piracy at grassroots level. 
We have to take the war to them. We must look at ways of getting them to stop in 
the backwaters and preventing them from going to sea. If that can be achieved, we 
can begin to see a sharp drop of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
From the Niger Delta map, you saw we have close to 5,000 creeks. That is chal-
lenging, and that is why I want to make an appeal. For us, the assistance we are look-
ing forward to is not just in capital ships, but craft that can help us contain pirates 
at the grassroots level. We are looking at hovercraft and pontoon vessels that can 
operate in the creeks. These are some of the challenges we face.
We can increase our efforts that address pirates at the grassroots level. I assure 
the audience and the world that we can bring down piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Response A:
 I made the point about the Gulf of Guinea a little mild. From the literature, it is 
becoming apparent that it is the most dangerous place. It is always coming up as 
the most dangerous place for seafarers, but there is very good effort by the regional 
countries.
I agree, it is a very serious problem. A comprehensive solution needs to be worked 
out. Certainly, the area needs the support of international organizations as well as 
the international community, which is in a position to provide a supporting hand. I 
totally agree. Capacity building is required.
As to what do I mean by addressing the issue at the grassroots level, I mentioned 
a number of things I said act as incubators for piracy. Those are the conditions we 
have to tackle, which include the socioeconomic aspect, the political aspect, the 
insecurity in that area. So, all those things have to be addressed, but that is easier 
said than done. It takes a lot of effort. Naturally, nations have to get together and 
do that in the long term. But there is no easy solution. If it were easy, piracy in the 
Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden could have been taken out at the grassroots level.
Response B: 
I thank the speakers of this panel on cooperation strategy. What we can note is that 
the objective of cooperation takes into account, to a certain extent, the security in-
terests of the various countries. That’s a given. But sometimes we forget the interests 
of the least-developed countries, it seems.
In the Mediterranean region, we talk about the western basin or the northern 
shore, but we never talk about the southern shore of the Mediterranean, and we 
consider it, at the same time, a source of threat and insecurity. We need to protect 
these areas to the benefit of all neighboring countries. 
How can we improve cooperation amongst the various navies? How can we take 
into consideration the interests of developing countries, because they are actually 
not developed countries? How can we take their interests into account?
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Response C:
Looking at the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, you’ll agree that they all have the 
same economic problems, same infrastructural problems, as well as socioeconomic 
and political problems. What are we looking for from some of our partners out 
there?
The last question addressed part of what you just mentioned. In the East, in the 
Horn of Africa, the challenges we had in keeping the sea lines of communication 
open were what prompted interests. In the Gulf of Guinea, we also have the inter-
ests of other partners there—the oil and gas infrastructure, which belongs to those 
who have invested there heavily. It is left for these interests to be protected. If you 
are to do that, it means you have to provide enablers for the countries of the Gulf of 
Guinea. They don’t have the means to protect the oil, gas, and other interests within 
the Gulf of Guinea.
In terms of building capacity, we’ve had several exercises that we have talked about 
and that are being facilitated by partners. A continual aspect of this is something that 
we’re looking at from other partners we’ve had, even support by way of the Excess 
Defense Articles, [a U.S. program] that has been made available to countries. These 
are the areas that we believe can facilitate the operations of those countries.
I also want to talk on maybe providing training and training support, as well as 
areas of human capacity building of which there are many. There are really a lot of 
areas [in which] the developing countries of the Gulf of Guinea can be provided 
support to enable them to carry out their mandate of keeping the maritime space 
for legitimate economic business.
Response D:
I was just going to refer to that example in my presentation under a defense co-
operation program. I mentioned persistence, not just occasional support. That is, 
providing it even when the crisis doesn’t exist to ensure that the receiving nation is 
able to react when the crisis does eventuate.
The point is, under a defense cooperation program, Australia is providing patrol 
boats and also a package of aerial surveillance that goes with that to a number of 
Pacific nations we work with very closely. The engagement is to provide the vessel 
but also a package of maritime surveillance advice and an enduring level of support 
for that vessel throughout the life of that vessel, which goes to about twenty years.
It needs to be a comprehensive support. It needs to be relevant to the need. Im-
portantly, it needs to abut the jurisdictional requirements that have been set in the 
country that’s to receive it, so they can actually use those vessels to operate under 
their own domestic laws. It needs to be a comprehensive package, rather than just 
a nonpersistent, isolated incident. I agree with you that in some cases it needs to be 
the right support and doesn’t only need to be provided when there is a crisis.
Response E:
I think that any partnership has to be a win-win game. Once two different partners 
decide to work together for some goal, each one has to have a clear idea of what 
they want from that partnership.
The problem is when third parties, who are not directly involved in a partner-
ship, may be affected by what’s happening. That’s when things like what you said 
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may occur. Countries that are not directly involved in a certain partnership end up 
being affected by what’s happening. I think this must be considered in any partner-
ship. 
When you decide to establish an operation or a coalition for some of the threats 
that we have, we have to consider that other countries, which are not directly involved 
in that operation, may end up being affected. That must be considered. They must 
be sort of put into the game, in order to avoid the prejudice that we end up having.
Question:
As mentioned by Admiral Zakaullah about the piracy and the operation against the 
piracy, as you know, piracy is becoming less [frequent] this year, almost zero. But, 
as they say, it has not died. It is still on the shore waiting for international navies or 
antipiracy operations to head back home.
I would like to share with my colleagues and also ask their opinion. As you know, 
piracy is not active on the coast of Somalia. But terrorists are extremely active from 
the south to the middle of Somalia. They have started moving from the south all the 
way down to the middle of Somalia, especially in Puntland, by sea.
There is a maritime authority in the Horn of Africa. The real threat today is ter-
rorism. It is becoming bigger and very active. [Terrorists] can recruit, giving a lot of 
money, and they can send [the recruits] to sea to attack the ships, not for money or 
ransom but to make explosions against the ships.
I would like to ask the admirals on the panel, what do you think the best strategy 
is to stop the terrorists that may come soon?
Response:
I agree with you that it looks like a zero level of piracy. But the threat is still there, 
and can reemerge any time. In fact, even the International Maritime Bureau has 
been cautioning that we should continue to be careful, because even one success-
ful hijacking or pirating of a ship could actually give an incentive, and they could 
become active again.
But as far as the terrorism aspect is concerned, I suggested that we need to broad-
en the demand. Forces can be carrying out maritime security operations, not only 
focusing on piracy. Terrorism comes into it. Illegal, unregulated, and unreported 
fishing comes into it. 
But that is not an easy thing to do, because the mandate will have to come from 
a concerned UN instrument. The mandate also has to be accepted by the players 
who are operating there, and the mandate also has to be agreed to by the concerned 
nations. The solution I proposed is whatever forces are operating in the area need 
to collaborate with the littoral states and have a bigger mandate to be able to check 
all the illegal activities in that area.
Utilizing International Law to 
Enhance Transparency
Admiral Nirmal K. Verma, Indian Navy (Ret.)
CNO Distinguished International Fellow
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Our second keynote speaker is Admiral Nirmal Verma, Indian Navy (Ret.). TheAdmiral is a true gentleman and Renaissance man. He’s no stranger to most 
of the folks in the International Seapower Symposium. He has participated here 
before. 
Admiral Verma had a brilliant career in the Indian Navy for forty years, culmi-
nating in Chief of the Naval Staff. After retirement, he became a diplomat in Can-
ada for two years as the High Commissioner of India in Ottawa. Then, we are very 
pleased to say, he came back to the Naval War College. He’s a class of ’93 Naval Com-
mand College graduate. Here he assumed the position of Chief of Naval Operations 
Distinguished International Fellow. 
As our fellow, he has had a chance to research, teach, write, and serve as a men-
tor to both international and American officers. We’ve been very blessed to have 
Admiral Verma on the staff. 
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Admiral Nirmal K. Verma (Ret.), India:
Admiral John Richardson, United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations; chiefs of 
navies and coast guards; ladies and gentlemen: I am acutely conscious of the fact 
that I address an audience that represents a cumulative experience of hundreds of 
years at the apex level of steering its respective navies and coast guards. Your leader-
ship and efforts make the global maritime commons safer in the face of complex 
security challenges.
I’m grateful to the International Seapower Symposium for giving me this op-
portunity to share some thoughts on international norms and standards. They are 
built on the foundation of international law, which is indispensable in our quest for 
transparency and the conduct of maritime security operations. The following will 
be the focus of my remarks:
• History
• International law—interpretation and implementation
• Maritime security challenges
• International law and maritime boundary disputes
• International law—instrument for rule-based order. 
HISTORY
International law emerged from an effort to deal with conflict. Some see it as begin-
ning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which asserted the “sovereign equality” 
of states, later followed by the rules for conduct of war, enshrined in the Geneva 
Conventions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The earliest maritime laws, dating back to the Roman era, essentially dealt with 
regulation of commerce. Later, medieval Europe witnessed claims over sea areas 
and the dictum “might is right” prevailed. The decline of city-states and the emer-
gence of larger empires signaled the growth of ever-increasing claims.
The first recorded instance of arbitration for conflict prevention is the Treaty of 
Tordesillas, brokered by Pope Alexander VI in 1493. The treaty divided the world, 
including the oceans and navigation routes, between the two Catholic empires of 
Spain and Portugal. Then, in 1603 a Dutch court, adjudicating on the capture of 
Portuguese merchant ship Santa Catarina by a Dutch privateer, sought the advice of 
a bright young lawyer, Hugo Grotius, to deliver his opinion on the morality of this 
action. Drawing on principles and writings stretching back to biblical texts, the as-
sessment of Grotius, in essence, espoused the liberty of the oceans and limits to the 
jurisdiction of coastal states. Grotius’s thesis, published later as a book, signaled the 
beginning of a long debate on the law of the sea.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is essentially based on treaties and customary law. Treaties are 
agreements between states that are legally binding, while customary law is derived 
from continuous practice of states and a sense of legal obligation on their part.
There is a third body of law, referred to as “soft law,” that has developed rap-
idly over the last few decades. The fact that it is not legally binding is perhaps its 
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strength, as states are often apprehensive of the provisions of a treaty on their sover-
eign rights. By declaring to abide by soft-law provisions, a state becomes acquainted 
with the embodied standards, while there is time and room for discussion and con-
sensus formation. 
Once states develop this confidence in the provisions of soft law, it is possible 
that it may later be accepted as a treaty, or at least take the shape of customary law. 
Hence, the option of soft law could be considered an interim first step when there 
is urgency in addressing a complex problem that requires multilateral consensus on 
legislation. States, particularly smaller states, have long relied on treaties and other 
international agreements and a rule-based order for their security. 
`We could also have other legal mechanisms like bilateral, regional, and inter-
national frameworks, apart from soft-law options like conventions, regulations, and 
guidelines for supporting maritime security and safety. These are equally important, 
considering the role they play in maritime governance, and lead to the creation of 
trust among nations and predictability in interstate behavior.
Yesterday we had an excellent presentation by Mr. Chris Trelawny, Special 
Adviser to the Secretary-General of the IMO, on IMO’s wide-ranging measures for 
promoting maritime safety. I will, therefore, not be covering international ship and 
port-facility security, and the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the flag state.
INTERNATIONAL LAW—INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Global institutions, set up over time to interpret international law in the maritime 
domain, include the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea. For arbitration of disputes, there are options: the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration as well as the Special Arbitration Court under Annexure VIII of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The mere existence of law does not imply that conflict resolution would be a 
routine process. Implementation of law comes with its own set of challenges. As far 
as nonstate actors are concerned, there is no law at all. Unlike domestic laws that 
have a mechanism for enforcing them, such is not the case for international law. In 
situations of noncompliance, the major powers shoulder an important responsibil-
ity toward ensuring adherence, through the UN Security Council, and an equal 
responsibility for self-compliance, when it applies to them.
The laws and frameworks that govern what nations can and cannot do at sea are 
exceedingly important. The efforts [made] since the 1920s toward institutionalizing 
an agreed mechanism have been met with little success. 
We owe a debt of gratitude to His Excellency Arvid Pardo, Malta’s ambassador 
to the United Nations, who, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1967, 
pressed the urgency for an effective international regime over the seabed and 
ocean floor, beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction. What started as an 
exercise to regulate the seabed turned into a global diplomatic effort to regulate 
and write the rules for all uses of the ocean areas and their resources. The suc-
cessful conclusion of UNCLOS has been described by the UN Secretary General 
as “one of the most significant and visionary multilateral agreements of the twen-
tieth century.” 
102 Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium
What stands out is that the convention was accepted as a package deal, to be ac-
cepted as a whole of all its parts, without any reservation. A signatory to UNCLOS 
cannot cherry-pick provisions for compliance.
MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES
Let us now look at the influence of international law on maritime security. 
There is no international consensus on the definition of maritime security. The 
maritime security challenges in the following list are drawn from the relevant UN 
document, as well as documents from a cross section of navies represented here: 
• Piracy
• Drug trafficking
• Migrant smuggling/human trafficking
• Arms trafficking
• Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
• Maritime terrorism
• Maritime boundary disputes
The hierarchy of challenges would differ from one nation to another.
Piracy. In the challenges listed, I put piracy at the top, as it is an excellent ex-
ample of a challenge successfully tackled, only due to outstanding multinational 
cooperation, backed by provisions of international law. Supplementing Articles 100 
to 107 of UNCLOS, a series of UN Security Council Resolutions authorized the use 
of force in Somali territorial waters to combat piracy, in cooperation with the Tran-
sitional Federal Government of Somalia.1 
This paved the way for the participation of nations, where the leadership man-
dates legal sanction as a prerequisite for employing force. Concurrently, soft-law 
options ushered in the deployment of privately contracted armed security person-
nel (PCASP) on board merchant ships, which also had a major impact in warding 
off piracy attempts. Gaps have since been observed in the deployment of PCASPs, 
requiring further regulation, for instance, in the relationship between the master of 
a ship and PCASP on the rules of engagement. 
Another development has been the concept of floating armories as offshore sup-
ply services for PCASP. They aim to circumvent existing regulations of a state on the 
transit of firearms through the state’s territorial sea. What if the concept of floating 
armories is employed by elements inimical to a coastal state, by masquerading as a 
PCASP support ship? 
Such issues are being addressed at the International Maritime Organization, but 
there is no consensus yet.
Drug Trafficking. Drug trafficking is of singular concern due to the immense 
profits it generates, leading to its nexus with terrorism, human trafficking, and illicit 
small-arms trade.
The annual value of drug trade is estimated at US$322 billion, and involves elabo-
rate money-laundering services. Over 50 percent of terror organizations, designated 
as such by the United States, are involved in one or more aspects of the global drug 
trade. And the maritime route is the predominant conduit for the transit of drugs.
1. Articles 100 to 107 are pp. 60–62, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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International legislation has greatly helped in coordinating multilateral efforts to 
combat this menace. Three major international drug-control treaties include
• The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, which focuses on establishing measures to com-
bat illicit drug trafficking and related money laundering, as well as strength-
ening the framework of international cooperation in criminal matters, such
as extradition and mutual legal assistance.
• UNCLOS Article 108, which addresses drug trafficking, and a number of IMO
guidelines encourage international cooperation in tackling this menace.2
• Regional soft-law initiatives have resulted from successful state cooperation
on anti–drug trafficking measures. These include the Caribbean Regional
Maritime Agreement, the fifty-five-nation Paris Pact Initiative, and the Organi-
zation of American States Model Procedures for Counter-drug Operations.
Migrant Smuggling / Human Trafficking. Smuggling of migrants fleeing from perse-
cution in their countries, or economic migrants, has become a US$30 billion industry. 
While this figure may seem a distant second to drug smuggling, the cost of human suf-
fering and exploitation and the numerous poignant stories of migrants who perish at 
sea just cannot be quantified. The tragic case of Alan Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian 
boy whose body washed ashore on a beach in Turkey, reverberated across the world.
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and 
also the 1967 Protocol Related to Status of Refugees provide the legal foundation 
for nations to work together. The Migrant Smuggling Protocol, in conjunction with 
UNCLOS Articles 92 to 94 concerning flag states’ responsibility for ships that fly 
their flags, requires states to cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and 
suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea. The International Maritime Organiza-
tion has also issued various guidelines on this subject.3
Yesterday, Mr. Trelawny touched on some innovative methods to detect suspect 
ships involved in migrant smuggling. These enabling provisions need to be utilized for 
??  Article 108 is on p. 62, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
??  Articles 92 to 94 are on pp. 58–59, United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. 
The annual global drug trade is estimated at US$322 billion and involves elaborate money-laundering services.
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formulating concrete, multinational joint action plans, as can be seen in Africa, for 
example.
Complemented by the UN Office of Drug and Crime initiative, “Regional Strat-
egy for Combating Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in West and 
Central Africa,” the European Union is working closely with the African Union and 
with certain other countries in Africa at the bilateral level.
The Rabat Process and Khartoum Process are some of the other endeavors to 
counter this menace. 
Arms Trafficking. In the twenty-first century, arms trafficking is a global opera-
tion, with illegal annual sales amounting to US$3 billion. It is a major source of 
regional instability. Illicit arms consignments are largely funneled via the sea route 
on flags-of-convenience vessels. No single nation can address this problem. 
In 2001 the United Nations initiated the non-legally-binding international agree-
ment “Program for Action,” which outlined a range of measures to counter illicit 
arms trade; unfortunately this was met with limited success. Renewed efforts were 
made in 2012 to shape it into an international 
legal instrument in the form of the UN Arms 
Trade Treaty. Even though 130 countries have 
signed the treaty to date, its effectiveness is 
handicapped, as certain key arms exporters 
are not on board. What must be noted is that 
weapons are not branded as “illicit” at the 
time of manufacture but could end that way. 
The treaty helps in tracking of weapon sales.
The need of the hour is that states must con-
tinue to further develop mechanisms for the 
exchange of information, at the regional and 
subregional levels, to assist agencies engaged in the control, tracking, and seizure of 
illicit arms, and eradicate this menace.
The illicit transport of weapons of mass destruction materiel by sea combines terror-
ist and proliferation threats with maritime shipping realities to form a serious security 
“The illicit transport of weapons 
of mass destruction materiel 
by sea combines terrorist and 
proliferation threats with 
maritime shipping realities to 
form a serious security challenge. 
The problem is real.”
—Admiral Nirmal K. Verma, 
Indian Navy (Ret.) 
Arms trafficking: a major source of regional instability
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challenge. The problem is real. Considering that global cargo theft exceeds US$50 bil-
lion a year, illicit articles would likewise be inserted into the transportation system. 
The challenge is to obtain information and intelligence at one end, and carry out 
maritime interdiction at the other. The United States launched the Proliferation 
Security Initiative in 2003 as a multilateral effort to tackle the challenge of inter-
diction. Over a hundred countries have signed the Proliferation Security Initiative 
since it was launched.
However, there are differing views on the legality of mounting an operation 
outside the territorial waters of a participating coastal state. The alternate view is 
that such action was permitted, inferred from existing norms that include the right 
to self-defense under the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 
1874, 1925, and Article 4 of the 2005 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention.4
Ideally, a UN Security Council Resolution that factors in various actions under 
the Proliferation Security Initiative would help reconcile the different legal inter-
pretations and bring all states onboard. This challenge is serious when we factor 
in the pace of North Korea’s nuclear program and the possibility of clandestine 
exports by it to tide over crippling economic sanctions.
IUU Fishing. IUU fishing came up in much discussion yesterday as well and figures 
high on the priority of challenges for many developing nations. It is not difficult to un-
derstand the reason for the same. Hundreds of millions depend on fish as a primary 
source of protein and livelihood, with fisheries creating 260 million jobs worldwide. 
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is estimated to represent 20 percent 
of all catch worldwide, with an annual value of over US$23 billion. More worrisome 
is the fact that IUU fishing cannot be factored into the management of fish stocks. 
Consequently, 53 percent of the world’s fisheries are fully exploited, and 32 percent 
overexploited.
Interestingly, apart from government-led initiatives to mitigate this problem, 
there is participation from the industry and nongovernmental organizations. For 
example, FISH-i Africa consists of technical collaboration and real-time information 
sharing, and has already won some large prosecutions against fish criminals since its 
launch in the waters of East Africa in 2013.
Other initiatives employing modern technology include the Global Fishing Watch 
and Project Eyes on the Seas that both deploy satellite technology for maritime sur-
veillance, with support from private-sector partner Google and Satellite Application 
Catapult, respectively, and conservation nonprofits Oceana and Pew Charitable Trust. 
What is required is far more synergy in interfacing these efforts with those of 
the maritime law enforcement agencies and better state control. Additionally, in 
nations where the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s nonbinding Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of 1995 has been incorporated into national law, 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing has, indeed, decreased. 
Maritime Terrorism. Incidents of maritime terrorism account for less than 1 per-
cent of all terrorist attacks, but that should not detract from the potential to inflict 
massive casualties and cause economic havoc. Terror groups known to have mari-
time capability are shown in the following graphic. 
4. The convention’s full name is Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation.
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The al-Qa‘eda–affiliated group responsible for the attacks on USS Cole and MV 
Limburg drew up a four-pronged strategy that included suicide attacks on vessels, hi-
jacking of vessels to be used against ports or transportation infrastructure, attacking 
supertankers using explosive-filled aircraft, and underwater saboteurs.
The sea route has also been used to transport weapons and terrorists for transna-
tional attacks ashore. While Articles 39 and 51 of the UN Charter could be implied 
under certain circumstances, what is essentially required is a treaty that deals specifi-
cally with terrorism.
India proposed a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in 
1996. Unfortunately, it got deadlocked because of differences over the very defini-
tion of “terrorism.” This has since been modified and is currently before the UN 
General Assembly. Meanwhile, in 2006, the UN General Assembly unanimously ad-
opted a resolution on a Global Counterterrorism Strategy that has been described 
as a “major development against terrorism.” Since then, there has been greater 
regional and international cooperation, capacity building, and intelligence sharing. 
Furthermore, the 2005 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention holds great prom-
ise as a national guide for states to enact laws and develop the capacity to prevent 
terrorist or weapons of mass destruction attacks from the sea.
Maritime Boundary Disputes. Perhaps the maritime security challenge of great-
est complexity and concern involves maritime boundary disputes, particularly where 
we have different perceptions of sovereignty of land features. Territorial disputes 
overlaid on notions of historical injustice further complicate a difficult situation by 
whipping up extreme nationalistic passions. 
The challenge requires enlightened political leadership that is able to work out 
a modus vivendi with the other state involved in the dispute and convince its own 
populace on the merits of such action.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES
Let us take a brief review of some cases where nations have been able to peacefully 
handle differing perceptions of the maritime boundaries, including taking recourse 
with the dispute resolution mechanisms of UNCLOS.
Terrorist groups with known maritime capabilities
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Arctic. Let us start with a region that is closest to where we are present today—the 
Arctic. It is a region that is estimated to hold 25 percent of the world’s current oil 
and natural gas reserves, and where the ownership of a large part remains unsettled. 
The first of the claims dates back to early twentieth century. Meanwhile, there 
have been isolated incidents where nations indulged in peaceful demonstration, in 
their own inimitable way, in support of the claims. 
Adopting a multilateral approach for Arctic issues, the foreign ministers of Can-
ada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States, which border the Arctic, met 
in Ilulissat, Greenland, on 28 May 2008. They committed to the existing legal frame-
work and to the orderly settlement of any overlapping claims without the need to 
create an extensive international regime to govern the Arctic Ocean. 
The Arctic Council, established in 1996, has also played an important role in the 
dialogue process. On 15 September 2010, Russia and Norway successfully negoti-
ated the maritime boundary in the Barents Sea, thus ending a forty-year bitter dis-
pute. The Barents Sea Treaty showcases the benefit of abiding by international law 
and diplomatic courtesy. According to some experts, the overall income generated 
from the implementation of this treaty might reach $200 billion. 
Days after this agreement, the then–Foreign Minister of Canada was urging the 
United States to reach a compromise in a similar dispute in the Beaufort Sea. The 
key legal issues that remain are the status of the Northwest Passage, the Beaufort 
In 2010, Russia and Norway successfully negotiated the maritime boundary in the Barents Sea.
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Sea, Hans Island, and the Lomonosov Ridge. What is important is that there is dia-
logue, and the region has remained conflict-free.
Latin American Maritime Disputes. Latin America has also managed its maritime 
disputes well, though there have been situations of near-conflict. 
The good offices of the Pope were sought, once again, in 1978 by Chile and 
Argentina to resolve the Beagle Channel dispute in the Strait of Magellan. War was 
averted at the last moment. While supporting an earlier ruling under UNCLOS 
that the disputed islands belonged to Chile, Argentina was allowed full navigation 
Left: The International Court of Justice established boundaries for Colombia and Nicaragua. Right: The same court 
granted Peru part of the Pacific Ocean and awarded Chile some fishing grounds.
Chile and Argentina almost went to war over which country had rights to the Beagle Channel. Ultimately, UNCLOS 
ruled that the islands belonged to Chile, but Argentina was allowed full navigation rights to the area.
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rights and permission to build navigational safety aids on the islands and a Chilean-
Argentinian economic zone was created.
In another instance, the International Court of Justice ended a long-
running territorial and maritime dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua. It 
unanimously ruled that Colombia has sovereignty over a group of small islands 
in the western Caribbean, while Nicaragua was accorded control over a large 
amount of surround-ing sea and seabed.
Yet again, the International Court of Justice established a new maritime bound-
ary between Peru and Chile in January 2014. In the process, the court granted Peru 
some parts of the Pacific Ocean formerly controlled by Chile, but left Chile the 
prosperous coastal fishing grounds.
Bay of Bengal Disputes. Another region that has witnessed peaceful resolution of 
maritime boundary disputes under the provisions of UNCLOS is the Bay of Bengal. 
This involved Bangladesh and Myanmar in one case, and Bangladesh and India in 
another.
Both Myanmar and India favored delimitation of the maritime boundary based 
on the equidistance principle, which has been wrong as far as UNCLOS is con-
cerned. On the other hand, Bangladesh maintained it was disadvantaged, due to 
the concavity of its coast, which is similar to the case of Germany in the North Sea. 
This concavity restricted Bangladesh’s exclusive economic zone to less than 200 
miles, and completely denied it an extended continental shelf. Bangladesh, there-
fore, sought delineation on the basis of equity, which led to an impasse.
The following right graphic encapsulates the different perceptions of the claim-
ants. The maritime boundary in India’s perception was based on the equidistant 
principle, and likewise, from Myanmar’s. What was happening with Bangladesh is 
that it was being boxed in. Bangladesh propounded that the area encapsulated by 
the two vertical lines coming down, was based on the straight-lines principle.
The Myanmar-Bangladesh maritime boundary dispute gained urgency in 2008 
when there was a near clash due to Myanmar contracting oil companies for explora-
tion. As bilateral efforts at resolving the maritime boundary dispute were not yield-
ing results, the matter was eventually brought before the International Tribunal 
Left: Bangladesh’s concavity issue; Right: Differing perceptions of maritime boundaries
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for the Law of the Sea. The tribunal adopted a three-step method that had been 
adopted by the International Court of Justice in some earlier cases:
• It first drew an equidistant line, the principle espoused by Myanmar and India,
• The tribunal then checked its “equitableness,” in light of the relevant circum-
stances, essentially the concavity of the Bangladesh coast.
• Finally, [following] proportionality, it checked that the areas of two states 
were in proportion to the lengths of the coastlines. The boundary was 
adjusted accordingly.
The most innovative part of the decision was the delimitation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The process created a gray zone that was within 
the economic exclusive zone of Myanmar, in which Bangladesh has rights to the 
seabed for resource exploitation, Myanmar has title to the superjacent waters (that 
is, the waters above) and the tribunal left it to the parties to determine the practical 
arrangements for the exercise of their respective rights in the gray zone.
Another challenge thrown up was the impact of St. Martin’s Island, which be-
longed to Bangladesh, and which was located directly in front of Myanmar. The 
tribunal awarded St. Martin’s Island its own twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea, but 
did not allow for its own relative exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Do I see some nodding in the audience, relating this with somewhere else as well? 
Before I touch on the Bangladesh-India dispute, I must first share a few thoughts 
on India’s Neighborhood Policy, which will explain the rationale behind India’s 
actions in this case. The priority for India is economic development, and this predi-
cates a stable, secure, and peaceful neighborhood. This brief passage, from India’s 
Prime Minister Modi’s address to the Sri Lankan parliament on 13 March 2015, 
sums up the essence of India’s Neighborhood Policy:
I am convinced that the future of any country is influenced by the state of its 
neighborhood. The future that I dream for India is also the future that I wish 
for our neighbors. . . . My vision of an ideal neighborhood is one in which 
The International Tribunal created a gray zone and awarded Bangladesh’s St. Martin’s Island its own twelve-nautical- 
mile territorial sea.
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trade, investments, technology, ideas and people flow easily across borders; 
when partnerships in the region are formed with the ease of routine.
[As a result of] considerable political and diplomatic efforts since the 1970s, In-
dia’s maritime boundaries have been delineated in all but one case.
In the instant case, India accepted arbitration, as a solution could not be arrived 
at bilaterally. The arbitration panel adopted a three-step process similar to that in 
the Myanmar case. It also created a gray zone with similar stipulations.
In this case, another development was the emergence of an island off the river 
boundary between Bangladesh and India, following a cyclone in the 1970s. It im-
pacted the maritime boundary, as both nations claimed sovereignty over the island.
By the time the arbitration process commenced, the island was reduced to a 
low-tide elevation through erosion and did not play any role in the delineation 
process. Neither Bangladesh nor India had anything to do with changing this fact 
on ground.
The following right graphic shows the maritime boundaries (indicated by line 
with tick marks) finally delineated by the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This is the maritime boundary 
between India and Bangladesh, and likewise between Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh now has the extended area, which gives it access to the seabed, and 
there is a gray zone [black area in graphic]. 
To complicate matters further, there’s overlap of the gray zones between Myan-
mar and India, but with our Neighborhood Policy, I am sure we will find ways to 
work something out. This award opens up the region for exploitation of undersea 
India’s push for the delineation of its maritime borders has been very successful.
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resources, and fishermen will no longer face any harassment. Though the award 
went largely in favor of Bangladesh, India viewed it as another positive step in con-
solidating its Neighborhood Policy.
These cases provide an excellent precedent for the peaceful settlement of mari-
time boundary disputes and show how states can depoliticize sovereignty issues and 
cooperate to achieve political and commercial certainty. 
Southeast Asia Disputes. Admiral Scott H. Swift, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 
made an interesting observation on this region at the last Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium, held in Padang, Indonesia, in April this year: 
If I stood in the Straits of Malacca, and look east into the Western Pacific, 
I saw protracted maritime disputes and a lack of transparency in contested 
waters. Looking west, into the Indian Ocean, I saw neighboring nations, large 
and powerful such as India, as well as smaller and more vulnerable, such as 
Bangladesh and Myanmar/Burma, working together in international fora to 
resolve similar types of disputes peacefully and promote cooperation at sea. 
By admitting longstanding disputes to international institutions, and agreeing 
to honor the outcomes, these nations demonstrated the responsible applica-
tion of a seventy-year old model, forged in war, tested by time, modified by 
consensus decisions, and adjudicated in accordance with international law.
Southeast Asia and East Asia are indeed mired in maritime boundary disputes. At 
the same time, it is encouraging to see instances where nations of the region have 
come together to find mutually acceptable solutions.
After twenty years of negotiations, Philippines and Indonesia successfully delin-
eated the maritime boundaries in the overlapping of the Mindanao and Celebes 
Seas in southern Philippines in 2014. [See following top left graphic.]
Left: Competing maritime claims; Right: Line with tick marks depicts maritime boundary determined by arbitration 
panel
113
In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a rare joint submission to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in which they extended claims to the seabed 
in the southern part of the South China Sea but agreed to pursue joint development 
in the disputed area. The Philippines objected that the submission might infringe 
on its own extended continental shelf. This shows the difficulty of bilateral discus-
sions and agreements in a multilateral dispute. In another case, in 2008, the Inter-
national Court of Justice resolved a decades-long dispute between Malaysia and Sin-
gapore on certain features, awarding Pedra Blanca to Singapore, the Middle Rocks 
to Malaysia, and the South Ledge to the “State in the territorial waters of which it is 
located,” as it required further delimitation of territorial waters. 
In the year 2000, there was an agreement between China and Vietnam that de-
lineated the maritime border in the Gulf of Tonkin. An accompanying agreement 
to share fisheries on both sides of the boundary was the key factor that helped this 
resolution to go through. Difficult issues like oil and gas rights were shelved to fa-
cilitate an accord. [See previous lower-right graphic].
These instances give hope that the intricate issue of drawing mutually acceptable 
maritime boundaries, and mechanisms for resource sharing in the South China Sea 
can be satisfactorily addressed if the claimants take a similar approach in the spirit 
of mutual accommodation.
Joint Development in Disputed Areas. Joint development offers an interim solu-
tion to the problem of maritime boundary disputes. Rather than trying to delin-
eate contested maritime borders—a process that may stretch over decades without 
Although Southeast Asia and East Asia are engaged in several maritime boundary disputes, mutual agreements have 
been reached among several nations in that region.
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Joint development zone agreements, wherein countries simply agree to work together, are a good solution in situations 
where maritime boundary disputes are difficult to resolve.
resolution—a joint development zone agreement, which is simply an agreement to 
work together in a disputed area, is an attractive option. 
This concept is working well elsewhere, too. In the case pertaining to Saudi Ara-
bia and Bahrain, the border was positioned to avoid crossing the Fasht Abu-Sa`fah 
oilfield, which, as a result, ended up wholly within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia. 
In return, Saudi Arabia was obliged to grant Bahrain 50 percent of the net revenue 
earned from the oilfield. 
In another case, Iran and Sharjah entered into a memorandum of understand-
ing in relation to Abu Musa, an island in the Persian Gulf. The memorandum had a 
provision for half the oil revenues earned by the company prospecting for oil in the 
territorial sea to be paid to Iran and Sharjah. 
There have also been cases where joint development agreements did not require the 
benefits to be split evenly. In the case of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, there is an 85:15 
split in favor of Senegal for petroleum resources, but a 50:50 split for fishing rights. 
In the case of São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria, there is a 60:40 split in favor 
of Nigeria for resources extracted.
Australia agreed to a 90:10 split for petroleum resources, in favor of Timor-Leste, 
in an agreement in 2002. There are many more similar cases.
INTERNATIONAL LAW—INSTRUMENT FOR RULE-BASED ORDER
You would have observed that tremendous benefits accrue to nations, big and 
small, when nations comply with provisions of international law, which facilitates a 
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transparent, rule-based order. The law also authorizes various measures that can be 
taken to counter challenges to maritime security. The degree of success achieved 
depends entirely on how nations frame supporting domestic legislation, nations’ 
navies and maritime services work alongside other concerned agencies, and nations 
convert these provisions under law into implementable action plans. 
Increasingly, the maritime strategies of navies across the world are emphasizing 
the importance of multilateral and coordinated responses to emerging challenges. 
This development is indeed encouraging.
There are many mechanisms through which the navies can meet and find ways to 
work together. In some cases, the platforms offered are in the form of navy-to-navy 
staff talks and other bilateral fora. In other cases, opportunity could be available in 
bilateral and multilateral politico-military fora. Yet other opportunities are sympo-
sia, such as the one in which we are currently participating. 
Yesterday we were privileged to be briefed on various regional symposia and learn 
about the excellent work being done. The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, 
or CUES, which was endorsed at the Fourteenth Western Pacific Naval Symposium, 
is an example of an important deliverable. 
Legally not binding, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea is an excellent 
example of soft law. Its immense utility came in for mention by many a panelist 
during the sessions yesterday. Other regions of the world are also taking a cue from 
CUES.
 In the final analysis, international law is a great enabler that ushers in a transpar-
ent, rule-based order, which is a source of strength and security for all nations. Most 
importantly, it has time-tested, dispute-resolution mechanisms. Adherence to interna-
tional law lays the foundation for a stable, predictable, and conflict-free world order.
Thank you.
DISCUSSION
Question: 
Thank you very much for a tremendous presentation.
My question is about maritime disputes and the Law of the Sea applicability in in-
cidents or operations below the threshold of traditional armed conflict, sometimes 
referred to as gray-zone operations. 
Certain countries are using quasi-military organizations to achieve their national 
objectives in the maritime domain. While perhaps, technically, they are using unarmed 
civilian vessels, these vessels are being employed as state instruments, nevertheless. 
In your opinion, what are the implications for the rules of engagement for 
employing navies to respond to this very unconventional threat in these maritime 
disputes?
Response:
In my opinion, we have to put in every effort to ensure that a conflict situation does 
not escalate. I find that when things are worked out, in similar situations, it has been 
through dialogue. In this process, I think the greater responsibility lies with the 
stronger power, because they are in the position to defuse a situation. 
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And global opinion has to prevail and influence has to be brought about on a 
power, which is leading to a situation which may cause conflict or escalate conflict. 
Question:
The United States is approaching its one-hundredth anniversary of the Jones Act. 
It’s a U.S. legislative mandate on how merchant shipping is used inside the United 
States and its territories. 
Can you address the pros and cons, or the costs and benefits, of how that law has 
contributed to American sea power, and what we can learn from it for international 
sea power?
The law definitely impacts sea power, merchant shipping, commerce and trade. 
It impacts the standards of how those are done. 
What can we learn from that, where the standards would be more common across 
the international trade, which would help sea power, overall?
Response:
I’m not very familiar with this law. So I will not be able to make a comment which 
would really answer your question. 
There’s only one point I’d like to say. During my presentation, there were a num-
ber of areas where I talked about what is expected from the political leadership. 
When one says that, it’s not that it’s a different compartment working somewhere 
else. 
I think as senior military leadership, like that represented here, you have a great 
role in molding political opinion in some of these cases. I’m sure that with the right 
sort of briefing, it should be possible to put forward a convincing argument which 
can mold the political opinion in a country. 
Question:
Thank you so much for your comments. 
Along the line that you were just talking about, cyberspace has changed the way 
we live our lives and the way we will deal with future conflicts, including those that 
you spoke of in the maritime security challenges, likely in ways that we don’t even 
know yet. 
Despite a lot of discussions around creating international law and standards of 
behavior in cyberspace and cyberspace operations, we have not made much prog-
ress, globally, in adopting any type of international law here. 
I think Westphalia and the physical boundaries that you talk about in resolving 
disputes may not help us in the maritime security challenges that all of our nations 
and navies could face in the future, because of the dependencies on cyberspace, 
international shipping, and traffic, along those lines.
With your experience in watching international law and conflict resolution 
evolve in the maritime domain, do you see any hope—even in the next decade—for 
international law that would help us in the maritime domain deal with the threats 
that we are facing?
Response:
As far as cyber laws are concerned, today that is the most urgent topic on everyone’s 
mind, and major nations are grappling with the issue. One thing that has to be 
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factored in is [that] cyber gives an opportunity for escalated warfare, if you ask me. 
You do not have to be a major nation [to use cyber], in the traditional sense that we 
have known in measuring military power. 
Even a big nation, high up on the ladder with respect to the order of battle cer-
tainly as far as cyberspace is concerned, is equally vulnerable as the weakest nation. 
So it is an urgency which has to be understood by all nations. 
In my presentation, I talked about soft law and options, because when you talk 
about treaties, there is this reluctance. That’s why you find negotiation of treaties 
takes an endless amount to time. We could perhaps start with a soft-law option. Look 
at the low-hanging fruit. 
The major nations should be as concerned about it. Nobody is the strongest, as 
far as cyberwar is concerned. You know, a few smart mines and some small nation 
can do havoc. 
Question: 
Thank you very much for your very comprehensive presentation. 
My question goes in this direction: we’re living in a century where the power of 
nonstate actors is growing. We witnessed this for many decades. But on the other 
hand, they have little say in the international legal system. In this case, if you have 
power, and there is no legal way to exercise this, it’s obvious that this is the shortcut 
toward illegal actions.
How can we incorporate nonstate actors in the international legal system so that 
we can favor, in a good way, their power and influence? 
Response:
 Nonstate actors are outside the system. It’s a great challenge. Where nonstate actors 
are involved, there are nations that are trying to tackle this group, and I would say 
with a reasonable amount of success, in different parts of the world. 
What should really be happening is that you cut off the pipeline, in terms of the 
human resource that goes into this. That, I think, is the essential requirement. Oth-
erwise, you tackle a threat, and there are replacements that come in. So the channel 
for replacements is, in fact, a social issue. That is where much work will have to be 
done by the global community. 
Question: 
I commend you on your presentation. 
The last question interested me in connecting it with your admonition of us as 
practitioners in the maritime domain, helping inform our policy makers as to the 
challenges that we face, and how they may be able to support that. 
I spend a lot of my time “unpacking” freedom of navigation, because the sense 
is that the challenges we face—that you’ve outlined here so eloquently—really re-
side almost entirely at sea. Each one of them, as you’ve described, has a significant 
impact ashore, as well in all of our traditional shore-based institutions—economic, 
diplomatic. There are many of them. 
Reflecting on your experience as a chief of navy, ambassador, and now scholar 
at the War College, how might we better inform the constituency that’s ashore and 
that has equities at sea, but yet doesn’t understand the significance of these chal-
lenges that you describe?
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Response A:
We just have to put in much more effort to ensure that people ashore understand 
the maritime challenges that the maritime services face. 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Navy League does a great job in edu-
cating the public. Of course, they have a maritime tradition. It’s just a question of 
an outreach program to make it as effective as possible. I see it happening in the 
United States, also. I suppose the effort could be multiplied many ways. When I talk 
about such effort, it operates at different levels. 
Firstly, we have to educate those involved in the decision-making process, and 
actually get them to buy into your way of thinking. Equally importantly is reaching 
out to the civilian populace, so they’ll become supportive of the maritime services. 
Response B: 
It’s a great question. It has relevance to what I would ask you to consider for your 
feedback and comments regarding the conduct of the International Seapower Sym-
posium, and the role of the media and its interplay at the symposium. 
We had a good discussion at lunch yesterday about what the media could contrib-
ute to the International Seapower Symposium. We have a fairly sparse media pres-
ence here. Most of our discussions are conducted without media present, but that’s 
on purpose, so that we can have these discussions in private, per se. 
But on the other hand, there’s a role for external messaging. The media can help 
us address this exact point. A lot of naval and coast guard leaders met here. We dis-
cussed this thing, and this has implications for all of you, ashore, in your livelihoods. 
If we want to move the needle, and correct what might be phrased as sea-blindness 
in our societies, there might be a role for the media at the International Seapower 
Symposium, and other fora like this in the future. 
I’d ask you to think about that, as you fill out your critique forms and you shape 
the next manifestation of this symposium. Is there a greater role for the media in 
some of the venues, and to be present as we have some of these discussions? We have 
to do that consciously, but it can be used positively to help inform our people of the 
importance of the sea, as it affects life on land. 
Question:
Thank you very much for your presentation. 
I have a question which may [result in] another case study. In 2014, the neighbor-
ing nation of Ukraine, Russia, annexed the Crimea Peninsula. This fact is not rec-
ognized internationally. However, currently they claim twelve nautical miles of ter-
ritorial sea and their portion of the exclusive economic zone. For this purpose, they 
used their military units, naval units, regular ships, and, of course, border guard 
ships. 
What should be done in this case? What do you think, from your experience?
Response:
At the start of my talk, I said international law compliance is a problem. When I 
talked about major powers having a role in ensuring compliance through the UN 
Security Council, I emphasized that there’s a great responsibility on the major pow-
ers for self-compliance with respect to the rule of the law. 
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This is the weakness in our world. Except for the international community com-
ing together as one block, and perhaps ostracizing a country, which is not doing 
things as expected by the rule of law, I can’t really think of anything else. 
These are challenging situations for smaller countries. We just hope that major 
powers conduct themselves as expected by the global community. 

Remarks
The Honorable Robert O. Work
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
It’s my pleasure to have the honor of introducing someone who really needs nointroduction. Our next speaker is our Deputy Secretary of Defense. His presence 
here, again, gives an indication of the import of this group—the very highest levels 
of our Defense Department are here to talk to you. 
Our current Deputy Secretary is no stranger at all. In fact, he’s an expert in the 
maritime. He’s currently serving as our Deputy Secretary of Defense, but he’s also 
served as our Under Secretary of the Navy, and before that served for twenty-seven 
years as an officer in the United States Marine Corps. He knows our business. He is 
a strategic thinker. He’s driving the direction, in a forceful way, for our department. 
Join me in a warm welcome for our Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable 
Robert Work.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work, United States:
It’s really great to be here in Newport with all of you incredible men and women, 
who lead the world’s navies and coast guards. 
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The Chief of Naval Operations tells me that this meeting marks the largest gath-
ering of naval leaders in the world, with representatives from about 108 countries 
and about 180 leaders. That is no small thing. It’s indicative of our collective desire 
to discuss the benefits of, and the challenges to, international sea power.
I thank Chief of Naval Operations Richardson for inviting me to speak. This 
group’s efforts to advance our shared interest in collective security are absolutely 
central if we are to address the most important challenges we face together, in this 
increasingly complex and ever-more connected world. 
PRINCIPLED INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Coast guards and navies are key enablers of global security, global stability, and most 
importantly, global prosperity. 
International maritime cooperation on issues—such as piracy, illicit traffick-
ing, terrorism, national disasters, refugee problems, proliferation and smuggling 
of weapons of mass destruction, and a range of other potential threats—enhances 
security for all of our nations. 
We’ve all come to realize that no nation, regardless of how large it is, has the 
resources or capacities to meet all of these challenges alone. 
The need for cooperation, collaboration among states, among their navies, has 
never been more urgent. Success will require collective and maritime partnerships.
We’ve seen the achievements that can be realized through these partnerships. 
Two shining examples are the international counterpiracy efforts in the Strait of 
Malacca and the Gulf of Aden –[both] models we should aspire to in many different 
types of crises or problems. 
We’ve seen collective responses for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
be it in the response to Haiti’s earthquake, or Japan’s tsunami and earthquake, or 
the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. All of these responses were much more 
effective when the navies and coast guards of the world operated together. 
We can make them more so. One of the key themes of this symposium is mari-
time operations in accordance with the norms of international laws. Let me briefly 
address this subject, as it is of enormous importance to the United States and, I 
would imagine, to many of you as well. 
The United States throughout its history has stood up for freedom of the seas 
around the world. It is, literally, why we first built our Navy. It’s why our sailors and 
Marines have helped uphold free and open maritime access to the world’s water-
ways since the birth of our Republic. It’s one reason why we continue to fly, sail, and 
operate wherever international law allows, so that all other nations are able to do 
the same. 
The United States Navy is a war-fighting instrument to be sure, without question. 
But it also exists to control the seas for the prosperity of our nation and all like-
minded peaceful nations, and to deter those who would subvert the global com-
mons, limit global prosperity, and challenge the peaceful use of the seas.
Since the end of World War II, the United States Navy, along with many of the 
navies here, has provided the ingredients for a principled, international order 
based on the rule of law, which is designed to allow every nation to rise and prosper 
together. Increasingly, however, we see that principled international order being 
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tested. This is an era of great change in that regard. Some states are trying to play 
by their own rules, undercutting the very principles that have benefited our country 
and the rest of our world, in our view. 
None can overturn this international order completely, but some are intent on 
undermining its cohesion, questioning its effectiveness, and assailing its legitimacy. 
UPHOLDING CORE PRINCIPLES
So we’re pushing back. For example, to shore up this principled order in the Asia 
Pacific region, Secretary Carter has led an initiative to create and secure a network of 
what he called “a principled and inclusive security network.” Principled and inclusive.1 
This approach is focused on building an advanced security architecture, a law 
around maritime security that reflects the geography as well as the unique politi-
cal, economic, sociocultural, and historic dynamics of the region. It does so in ways 
that hopefully will ensure that every nation has the opportunity to rise and prosper, 
which I think is the goal of all nations.
This growing and inclusive Asia Pacific security network weaves everyone’s re-
lationships together—bilateral, trilateral, multilateral—to help all of us do more, 
over greater distances, with greater economy of effort. It enables us to take coordi-
nated action to respond to contingencies like humanitarian crises and disasters or 
to meet many of the common threats I referred to earlier, such as terrorism. It is 
also designed to ensure the security of, and equal access to, the global and regional 
commons, including all vital waterways therein. 
We believe strongly that the establishment of this principled, inclusive security net-
work would be a very positive change for the entire region and all nations within it. 
But we have some work to do, if we are to have any hope of really constructing it. 
Indeed, in the South China Sea and elsewhere, there’s a growing risk to the region’s 
prosperous future—even though it’s a future that many in the region have chosen, 
and have told us that they want to pursue, and are working toward together. 
As President Obama said in the UN General Assembly, just this week, “In the 
South China Sea, a peaceful resolution of disputes offered by law will mean far 
greater stability than the militarization of a few rocks and reefs.”
The United States is determined to stand with our partners in the region in up-
holding core principles like freedom of navigation and overflight, free flow of com-
merce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes— and most importantly, the peaceful 
resolution of disputes through legal means, in accordance with international law. 
As Secretary Carter said, we’re committed to ensuring these core principles ap-
ply equally in the South China Sea as they do everywhere else. Only by ensuring 
that everyone plays by the same rules can we avoid the mistakes of the past, where 
countries challenged one another in contests of strength and will, with disastrous 
consequences for those who lived in the region, as well as around the world. That is 
why the United States is never going to waiver in our determination to uphold these 
core principles. 
That said, let me make something perfectly clear, and I hope it is already clear to 
all of you. Our freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, the East 
1. The “principled and inclusive security network” was addressed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter at the ASEAN Defense Informal, 30 September 2016.
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China Sea—they’re not statements about sovereignty or preferences over any coun-
try’s claims. They are not new to the last year. They are not confined to the South 
China Sea. 
We routinely conduct these operations the world over. Each is a principled act, in 
our view, meant to uphold the rights of all nations—the United States, China, and 
every other state—to freedom of the seas. That’s what they’re all about. We see these 
efforts as being for the benefit of all nations. 
THE THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY 
Unfortunately, however, if history is any guide, collaborative, cooperative efforts are 
never going to completely eliminate the possibility that some countries may try to 
exert control of their nearby seas. 
More often than not, the means by which they will do so are advanced, antiship 
cruise missiles and increasingly, antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). As our naval 
strategist—or probably better said, tactician—Wayne P. Hughes says, “The world’s 
navies are in a new age where antiship missiles are the most influential weapon 
shaping tactics.” 
Today, we’re seeing such nations as China, Iran, Russia, and even North Korea 
developing such weapons and exporting them globally. As a result, even nonstate 
actors have these weapons. The Hezbollah recently fired a C-802 missile against an 
Israeli corvette. 
The net result is that every navy—regardless of how big or small—may be faced 
with the prospect of being attacked, suddenly, by these advanced weapons from the 
sea, land, or air. 
Now, antiship cruise missiles and antiship ballistic missiles are not the only grow-
ing threats to all navies. Advanced mines are proliferated widely. Diesel-electric 
submarines are proliferating widely. North Korea’s unprovoked sinking of South 
Korea’s ship, Cheonan, in 2010 should give everyone in this room pause—an unpro-
voked, sudden attack. 
Some naval analysts have posited that the proliferation of mines, diesel subma-
rines, antiship cruise missiles, antiship ballistic missiles is going to create a no-man’s 
land along the littorals and will extend the littorals far beyond the shores to the 
maximum range of these advanced missiles. This is a growing threat that impacts 
every navy, regardless of whether it’s small or large. 
We are taking deliberate steps to ensure our Navy can sail wherever it needs to 
go, fight if necessary, and prevail if attacked. One of these deliberate steps, you may 
have heard, is what we refer to as an Offset Strategy. I’d like to take a couple of sec-
onds to tell you what I mean by this term. 
During the Cold War, the United States pursued innovative technological, 
operational, and organizational constructs to offset the Soviet Union’s numerical 
conventional advantage. We didn’t want to try to match them tank-for-tank, or 
plane-for-plane, or ship-for-ship, or submarine-for-submarine. 
Our First Offset Strategy asked how do we improve conventional deterrence. 
Ironically, the threat of tactical nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet attack on Western 
Europe was the first offset. 
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Then in the seventies and eighties, when that no longer became credible because 
the Soviet Union had achieved strategic nuclear parity, we again changed our game 
by pursuing precision-guided munitions and the battle networks that employed them. 
This is a very important theme I’ll pick up on in just a few minutes. By so doing, we 
bolstered conventional deterrence and made it unlikely that a collision between these 
great powers—the Soviet Union and the United States—would ever occur. 
The offsets were all about making sure war would never happen, and not neces-
sarily about making sure that we would prevail if one did—although that certainly 
was an aim also. But because of this proliferation of advanced weapons like ASCMs 
(antiship cruise missiles), ASBMs, advanced mines, cruise missiles, and submarines 
we think it’s time to pursue a Third Offset Strategy. 
It’s based on the premise that artificial intelligence and autonomous systems are 
going to allow new types of joint and combined battle networks, or collaboration 
networks or constabulary networks, that will operate advanced, new machine col-
laboration of extremely great power. It’s going to allow delegation of authority when 
we operate together and when we operate with ourselves. These battle networks are 
going to allow new means, by which manned and unmanned systems are going to 
become common. 
That’s one of the themes I really wanted to get across with you. Generally we now 
think in terms of sending patrol aircraft or frigates of patrol ships into a certain 
area. In the future, there will be more unmanned systems that operate with us and 
among us.
This past spring, I had the honor of speaking at the commissioning ceremony for 
the Antisubmarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel, ACTUV for short. 
It was developed by our Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, in partnership 
with the Office of Naval Research. This is a fully autonomous warship: twelve knots, 
10,000 nautical mile range, able to follow all the COLREGS [International Regula-
tions for Preventing Collisions at Sea]. You literally could push a button on the ship 
in Norfolk and it would wind up in Bahrain on its own accord, safely. 
It brings a whole new thought about how navies might operate together. I can eas-
ily imagine a future U.S. Navy, in which a littoral combat ship is the leader for a flotilla 
of active ships, operating as either antisubmarine warfare (ASW) pickets, counterpi-
racy pickets, ASW wolf pack, a mine warfare flotilla, or a distributed sensors after a 
major earthquake devastates the area, and providing communications to the land. 
U.S. NAVY’S DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS AND ITS THREE PILLARS
But even machine combat teaming is just one of the characteristics of the advance-
ments in naval warfare. I want to give a shout-out to Admiral Phil Davidson and the 
conceptual Third Offset thinking that they’re doing, under the rubric of what the 
U.S. Navy calls Distributed Operations. Distributed Operations has three key pillars. 
Now, this may change over time as the Navy experiments, but for right now their 
conception is [as follows].
First Pillar. [The First Pillar] is what I would call—they may not call it exactly 
this—distributed multidomain and multifunctional networking. All of the prob-
lems, that we are going to face, are multidomain. Space may play a part, and so may 
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air, land, naval surface, undersea, and cyberspace. It will be multidomain every-
thing. You see this happening every day. 
And multifunctional—some things will be offensive in nature, some will be de-
fensive, some will do effects to allow us to respond to a certain threat, like illicit 
trafficking and putting up a network to stop that. 
It is this multidomain, multifunctional battle network that is so exciting. Just 
this month, the Navy took an F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and had it act as an elevated 
sensor. It utilized its state-of-the-art, distributed aperture system to detect a stealthy 
cruise missile target. It then passed that quality targeting data to an Aegis Ashore 
site, which then finished the engagement with an SM-6 missile at a range far beyond 
the range of today’s SAMs [surface-to-air missiles]. 
This short vignette tells you the power of this multidomain, multifunctional bat-
tle networking. It also shows why the F-35 is a stupid designator for that platform. In 
my mind it should be called the BN-35, for Battle Network 35. It is an exquisite node 
that can plug into any battle network on land, over sea, and in the air. 
As more countries start to operate this platform together and start to understand 
the power of the network that it brings, I am confident it’s going to change the way 
we operate together in any number of activities. 
Second Pillar. [The Second Pillar] is what the Navy calls Distributed Lethality. As 
the battle network starts to distribute itself over wide areas, with every single node in 
the network, you would like to achieve some type of effect, be it electronic warfare, 
delivering supplies, or firing a cruise missile. This represents the right way, in my 
view, to address future war-fighting challenges at sea. It is a fundamental concept of 
the Third Offset. 
It also draws on the historical lessons of the value of war gaming, and things like 
these symposia, where we come together, talk through problems, establish a cycle of 
learning that feeds back into fleet exercises or to combined exercises. And we feed 
that back into further war games and refine it. 
Vice Admiral Rowden, in partnership with the fleet, conducted dozens of war 
games that are leading to fleet experimentation that demonstrates that our fleet 
will be able to do not only distributed multidomain, multifunctional networking but 
also Distributed Lethality. 
Third Pillar. [Our Third Pillar] is what I’ll call multidomain maneuver. The Navy 
is saying you’ve got to be able to maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum just as 
easily as you can maneuver on the sea and from the sea.
I picked these three concepts because I think they’re extraordinarily innovative 
and very, very promising for the future that the U.S. Navy sees, operating with navies 
of all stripes. 
The Third Offset is not just about technology. It’s not even about the technolo-
gies themselves. It’s about smart strategists and operators putting together opera-
tional and organizational constructs, enabled by these technologies, which allow 
them to do new things in different ways. 
COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS
This leads me to my final point. The key thing we learned in the Second Offset was 
the importance of allied participation. Immediately after the United States adopted 
127
an operational concept called AirLand Battle, we went to NATO and NATO ad-
opted a very similar operational concept called Follow-on Forces Attack. 
We’re going to be discussing with all of you the Third Offset, which is appli-
cable across the full range of military operations—how we’re going to be pursuing 
collaborative innovation with allies and partners. The growing challenges to naval 
operations—whether they are constabulary, counterpiracy, counterproliferation, or 
high-end warfare—are ultimately going to affect every single navy on the planet. 
That is why the Navy is way ahead of the game in having symposia like this, where 
we talk about ideas that affect all of us. We figure out how best to collaborate and 
how best to interoperate. We must coordinate and collaborate on all of these prob-
lems, avoid duplication of effort, hopefully look for navies with specific niche capa-
bilities and not duplicate them, and push our establishments to innovate in tech-
nologies and concepts, and do experimentation and war gaming. 
We see this type of thinking bearing fruit already. The United Kingdom recently 
announced that it is going to buy the P-8 network, which is another battle network. 
It’s not the P-8; it’s the Battle Network 8. It will allow any navy to plug into a battle 
network, just like the F-35 will allow any air force or navy to plug into the battle 
network. 
Given increased Russian submarine activity, which is a concern to NATO, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway are once again collaborating ex-
tensively on theater antisubmarine warfare, stretching from the GIUK [Greenland, 
Iceland, and United Kingdom] Gap all the way to the North Cape [in Norway]. 
The same thing is happening in the Baltics, which is one of my top priorities. I’ve 
been there twice. I’m going there again, trying to work out rules of the road.
The United States Navy has a long history of adapting to changing threats, iden-
tifying new approaches, and pitting our enduring strengths against the weaknesses 
of our adversaries. But the key strength—and it is central to our national defense, 
national security, and national military strategy—is that we desire allies. We want to 
work collaboratively through allies. That is the true strength of naval operations. 
The greater the number of navies involved, the greater the overall output we see. 
That’s a legacy that I know Chief of Naval Operations Richardson, Admiral Da-
vidson, and all of the leadership of the Navy are committed to, and the Department 
of Defense supports them all the way.
So, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for traveling here. It’s an extraordinary state-
ment of how important we, as navies and coast guards, see the problems facing us. 
DISCUSSION
Question:
I gave special attention to your statement about remotely operated ships, your proj-
ect that will have a ship operating far away from base, without any humans on board. 
Would you say that we lose the added value of a human eye from the total evaluation 
of operations, when we go to such projects?
Response: 
That’s a great question. If I had had more time, I would have made this point myself. 
I’m glad you asked the question. 
128 Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium
The United States is not trying to create killer robots or independent robotic 
ships that go off on their own. Our concept for our battle network is that the human 
will always—always—be in the loop. 
Now, there will be some times where you’re going to have to push the button on 
a machine and trust it, like if you’re under cyber attack. We believe that will happen. 
When you’re being attacked at machine speeds, human speeds just simply aren’t 
enough. So you will press the button and trust your cyber defenses to fight off cyber 
attacks in real time. 
Same thing in electronic warfare: you’re going to have to have machines. We call 
it cognitive electronic warfare, machines that can sense new and novel waveforms 
and will be able to reconfigure their attack in real time. 
In missile defense, as early as the 1980s when the Soviet Union was targeting our 
carrier battle groups with missile raids of up to sixty vampires, there was no way that 
the humans inside the combat information system would be able to keep up. That is 
why the Aegis Combat System has an automatic mode, which once saturation point 
occurs, you press the button and trust the machine. 
In all other cases, especially anything remotely offensive, there will be a human 
in the loop. What it can do is independently navigate safely under the COLREGS 
system at sea. Right now, we’re trying to figure out if, when it’s close to the shore, it 
is able to operate safely among sailboats and fishing boats. 
 But there are sensors on that ship. So remote humans will know exactly what 
that ship is seeing and doing. Regardless of the mission, [for example] establishing 
a cordon to keep pirates from coming into an area, it will be the human that decides 
what type of action to take.
These unmanned systems will allow even small navies to control areas much larg-
er than they could ever conceive. They will allow the commanders of the navy to 
have better situational awareness and to figure out plans.
I am not worried at all about unmanned systems. I am worried about unmanned 
systems where countries might design and say, “Go automatic. Decide who you at-
tack, when you attack, what you attack.” We don’t see that happening, though, and 
we certainly won’t be going that way.
Question:
You mentioned that the Baltic was one of your top priorities. Would you please 
elaborate?
Response:
Right now, we believe that the Russians are operating unsafely and unprofessionally 
on the seas and in the air over the seas in the Baltic region. We believe that we have 
to address this problem. Actually, Russia and some of the Baltic nations have said, 
“Should we get together to talk about this?” I know that it’s now a subject for NATO, 
as well. 
The United States constantly seeks confidence-building measures in all seas that 
are close to a great power, or even a regional power, where their interests are very, 
very high. We want to have confidence-building measures, so that we can operate 
where international law allows everyone to operate, so it’s very safe. 
Russian aircraft are operating in airspace without their transponders on and have 
caused diversion of civilian airliners. It’s extraordinarily dangerous. So one of the 
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things we have been working on with our Baltic partners is what are some of these 
rules of the road that we might be able to work out with Russia to make sure that it 
is safe for all nations to operate in the Baltics. 
The second thing we’ve talked about is [whether] there are areas that we all 
agree are unprofessional behaviors. Right now, as professional navy officers, you 
know that if something happens, going up the political chain to get a political de-
cision on how to respond and what to say sometimes takes longer than you might 
otherwise like. 
So one of the things we hope to do is say, let’s agree on a list of behaviors that, if 
they occur, we automatically condemn without having to go through a large number 
of steps. We believe that will help bring down tensions. 
It really is trying to encourage the Baltic-Nordic countries to act together. Swe-
den is doing Northern Flag, which is bringing together all sorts of air components 
in that region, in a very, very innovative air exercise. 
We’re all working together. The most recent Baltops, I think was one of the 
big-gest ever, in the number of ships. 
So operating together in that sea—operating so that we interoperate together, we 
understand what each one is doing—that’s very, very important.
And we’re doing the same thing in the Western Pacific with Australia, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea. We are also trying to establish as many confidence-building 
measures as we possibly can with the People’s Republic of China. 
Again, from our perspective, whenever you heard us talking about Third Offset 
or these things, we strongly believe that military confrontation is the absolute last 
thing you want to do. So everything we try to do is to lower temperatures and make 
sure that an inadvertent accident, or something like that, does not spiral out of 
control. 
That is why we emphasize over and over, whenever there’s a dispute, let’s handle 
it through international law. Let’s do it peacefully. Let’s do it through negotiations. 
Let’s try to keep the temperatures from rising. In this way, we think that we can pre-
serve the peace. In my view, that is really what navies around the world are about: 
preserving the peace, enforcing the peace, and if necessary, compelling the peace, 
if our political leaders tell us to do so. 

Panel Discussion Two 
International Norms and Standards
Moderated by 
Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Norway 
Panel Members 
Captain Sten Sepper, Estonia 
Rear Admiral Kofi Faidoo, Ghana 
Rear Admiral John Martin, New Zealand  
Rear Admiral Lai Chung Han, Singapore 
Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Norway
Dean Thomas Mangold: 
On the heels of our great talk by Admiral Verma is this panel on internationalnorms and standards. It is going to be led by Admiral Lars Saunes from the 
Royal Norwegian Navy. Many of you know him already. He has been in command of 
the Royal Norwegian Navy for about two years. He’s held a number of senior staff 
positions in Norway as well as in NATO. I am proud to say he is a graduate of the 
U.S. Naval War College. We’re honored to have him lead this panel.
Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Norway:
Thank you very much. 
9
Panel Two members (L–R): Captain Sten Sepper, Rear Admiral Peter Kofi Faidoo, Rear Admiral John Martin, Rear 
Admiral Lai Chung Han, and Rear Admiral Lars Saunes.
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On behalf of this panel, I recognize all the admirals, generals, distinguished 
guests, ladies, and gentlemen. Thank you also to the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Richardson, for arranging this great event and putting this team on the 
agenda. I think it’s a very important team. I also thank the President of the Naval 
War College, Admiral Harley. It’s a special treat for us to come back to Newport. We 
love it. We’d like to be invited again.
A Small State’s View: We Love Laws and Regulations. It’s an honor to be the 
moderator of such a competent and distinguished panel on international norms 
and standards. Looking at my fellow panel members, we clearly represent the small 
navy and small state. That’s a voice that needs to be heard. That will be my lead into 
the topic today.
I start with providing a little bit of background, just to enlighten [you] on the 
challenges seen from small states. In a way, it is sort of the secret of why Norway 
became such a prosperous nation. 
Norway is sort of a strange country, consisting of five million people, approxi-
mately the same as Rhode Island. And we are the thirteenth biggest maritime nation 
in the world. We have a huge maritime area from the North Sea all the way to the 
Arctic. Most of our wealth comes from the maritime, 80 percent actually. And we are 
really spoiled. Someone actually called us the spoiled brats of Scandinavia. 
The reason for this—and this is the secret—we love laws and regulations. We love 
norms and standards. It’s to such a degree that when the European Union, which 
we are not part of, decides on a new regulation, Norway will be the first one to adapt 
it. We do that with the UN, the IMO, everyone. We love rules and regulations. 
That is why we are so rich, actually. As a small state, you need to adapt to the 
world. You have to plug in, wherever you can, and you need the bigger nations to 
protect you. 
So we have a modern navy and coast guard—combining both military and coast 
guard functions in one navy. In addition to the military role, the coast guard function 
is taken care of, managing our territorial waters and exclusive economic zones and ex-
ecuting national police authorities in all our waters, in accordance with national law. 
Why do I tell you this? I think there is sort of a Norwegian model. We do this be-
cause we are a small country with huge responsibility as a coastal state. 
We are also in NATO. The Norwegian Navy is the NATO Navy on the northern 
flank of NATO. We are situated on the northern fringes of the Eurasian continent, 
with a common border to the Russian Northern Fleet’s major strategic military bas-
ing. And we are operating together—low tension, high tension. We use the Inci-
dents at Sea Agreement to sort of moderate how we behave, like you have the Code 
for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in Asia. 
As a navy from an Arctic nation with a huge maritime area of interest and respon-
sibility, we work very closely with the IMO to regulate Arctic standards and norms. 
We practice them when we have a global shipping fleet all over the globe. Coastal 
states are responsible for managing resources and the global environment. Yester-
day’s discussion was about the fight against illegal, unregulated, unreported fish-
ing. This is clearly an issue that has reduced the prosperity of coastal regions. The 
coordination of regional and national laws in Europe dealt with this issue efficiently 
and banned all these fishing boats from entering any port in Europe. It also banned 
them from being sold in Europe. What we did, to a certain degree, was export this 
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problem to other regions. However, I believe the regional approach is the only solu-
tion to take care of this crime. 
The international legal framework and regional regulations, or norms, are guid-
ing our operations day by day. They are recognized by our neighbors, providing 
stability and prosperity in our region. 
Global Changes. We are now facing the century of the oceans. The strategic land-
scape is shifting and we are facing more uncertainties. Competition in the maritime 
domain puts more stress on international law and regulations, increasing the poten-
tial for conflict. 
At this time in history, I underline the need for good order at sea, nations that 
believe in cooperation and commitments to maintain peace and stability, and na-
tions that seek joint development with their neighbors as their primary strategy for 
prosperity. 
This morning we had the pleasure of listening to the CNO’s Distinguished In-
ternational Fellow, Admiral Verma, who shared his thoughts about the successful 
application of international norms and standards that have enhanced maritime op-
erations to avoid misinterpretation. 
There are other global changes that we need to take care of in the future in the 
maritime domain. And cyber—the admiral was mentioning it earlier. Who is taking 
care of our cyberspace? We all have Internet. We all have mobile phones. We all lis-
ten to music; download movies; and go to operating theaters that are dependent on 
the global communication, Internet, and submarine cables. Cyber is a submarine 
cable. Who is responsible for protecting that and the global infrastructure? Those 
are issues that are not really taken care of by the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea today. 
The Panel. For the panel today, we are delighted to welcome four chiefs of navies 
from different continents, different cultures, and different histories. All represent 
rather small nations, and this is probably not coincidence. Small nations are more 
dependent on international law, as we are equally dependent on bigger nations for 
protecting international law. 
I will introduce my fellow panelists. I start with Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral 
Peter Kofi Faidoo from Ghana. Admiral Faidoo served as a commanding officer of 
several ships during his career. During command of GNS Sebo (P27), as part of the 
West African Defense Alliance Naval Task Force, his ship almost single-handedly 
foiled the rebel invasion of Freetown harbor in January 1989. He was awarded a 
medal for leadership in action and made an honorary citizen of Sierra Leone for 
his effort.
Admiral Faidoo was promoted to rear admiral in January 2016 and appointed Chief 
of Naval Staff. He will his share his thoughts about standardizing international law. 
We also have the Singaporean Navy Admiral Lai. He’s a graduate from Cam-
bridge, Harvard, and the U.S. Naval Staff College. He has a background in missile 
corvettes, [and experience] as a commanding officer. His ship, RSS Valiant (91) 
won the Fleet People’s Excellence and Unit Excellence Award. In 2011, he was ap-
pointed Fleet Commander and after different positions, he was promoted to rear 
admiral in July 2014 and assumed the appointment as Chief of the Navy.
From New Zealand, we have Admiral John Martin, Chief of the Royal New 
Zealand Navy. He holds a master’s degree in strategic studies and a postgraduate 
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diploma in business and administration. One of his career highlights was command 
of the HMNZS Te Kaha (F77), 2001 to 2003. He undertook a number of deploy-
ments, among others, the Gulf of Oman for maritime interception operations. He 
was appointed the Chief of the Royal New Zealand Navy in 2015. 
And we have, from Estonia, Commander of the Estonian Navy, Captain Sten 
Sepper. Captain Sepper is a former commanding officer of minehunters and com-
mander of the Baltic Naval Squadron, consisting of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithu-
anian vessels. He became the Commander of the Estonian Navy in July 2012. He will 
be first, giving a presentation of emerging historical threats. 
EMERGING HISTORICAL THREATS
Captain Sten Sepper, Estonia:
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Richardson, Rear Admiral Harley, heads of the 
navies, heads of coast guards, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, and dear 
friends, it’s a privilege to be here at that International Seapower Symposium and 
give you a perspective of the coastal navy from Estonia. 
Admiral Nirmal Verma and Deputy Secretary of Defense gave very comprehen-
sive overviews and set the scene for our panel. I will go forward in their keel water. 
Old Habits Emerge Again. When looking at the threats, one always starts with the 
examination of the surrounding environments. There are still some factors, namely 
geography, that have not changed significantly. They could be considered one of 
the most prominent constants, that dictates the choices of all parties involved, and 
channels our actions. 
However, based on the developments in the South China Sea, as an example, one 
could speculate that, perhaps, we have entered an era where even geography can 
be manipulated. Hence, we have lost all anchor points, making the environment—
where we need to make choices—extremely volatile and dynamic, on a constant 
basis. This would have a significant impact on how we see our operating environ-
ment in the future.
Discussing the changes that have taken place in the geopolitical arena, we see 
that the boundaries, at least in Europe, have changed significantly. Some former 
alliances have faded into history. Others are doing well and expanding. 
For a while during the last two decades, it seems that a fragile balance had been 
reached and the world was settling down. This, however, was an optimistic illusion. 
The threat related to geopolitical aspirations of some states never faded com-
pletely. It was merely suppressed due to the unfavorable political and economic 
environment. Once the conditions improved, the old habits emerged again. 
To an extent, it has been ironic. Today, those who need to deal with these so-
called changes in the security environment and tackle the emerging historic threats 
have themselves, either knowingly or unknowingly, contributed to the enabling con-
ditions for those threats.
With some liberty, one could say that we’re all facing yet another self-inflicted 
problem, caused mostly by our unfiltered, naïve optimism and lack of sound mili-
tary judgment based on learning from our own history. 
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Technological Developments in Coastal Defense. When looking at the threat 
from the operational and tactical perspective, major change has occurred in the 
technological development of capabilities available. The operational concept and 
tactics have not changed significantly. 
The proven concept of layered coastal defense in depth has constituted a signifi-
cant military challenge in the domain where we most likely will be operating in the fu-
ture—the littoral. Developments have occurred in anti-air capabilities and the range 
they provide. In parallel, the evolution of conventional submarines: small, fast, and 
agile surface combatants; and the missile payload that both subsurface and surface as-
sets are capable of carrying multiply the conventional coastal defense bubble by tens, 
in the context of a modern anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) architecture. 
Developments during the last two decades in many Western navies, due to various 
reasons, have shifted the focus toward out-of-area, expeditionary missions. Hence, 
we have lost a lot of know-how and expertise in how to fight the war at sea and in 
the confined and shallow littoral areas. Our assets are usually not suited for that type 
of tasks. Even if we would manage to shift the focus toward more balanced fleets, it 
would take decades to reach the actual results. 
As a consequence, we have lost volume in assets. Our navies keep shrinking. We 
have lived it with the idea of uniting the air force based on the European example. 
Even the idea of the European defense forces, or similar, has been discussed, but we 
have not been extremely successful in this aspect. 
Currently, we do not have a sound and solid solution for how to tackle the mod-
ern A2/AD threat in the confined and shallow littoral domain.
Developments in the South China Sea
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Conclusion. Our societies do not believe in the possibility of an armed conflict, 
at least not in Continental Europe. We believe that peace is eternal and hence, we 
do not need to prepare ourselves and our societies.
There are a number of other, more acute problems to deal with, for example, the 
refugee crisis, the economic crisis, etc. We do not think what our course of action 
would be for the worst-case scenario. 
The relative absence of threat, during the last decades, has been a well-cultivated 
illusion. The threat has always been present and lurking around. It was hiding in 
the shadows, due to the unsuitable environment for it to emerge. As the conditions 
improved, the threat surfaced again, this time being more evolved. It caught us by 
surprise. All our guards were down. 
Developments in conventional coastal defense
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Our current arsenal has no real effective means to deal with the threat in the 
littorals. Even if we decide to take it seriously, it will take decades to achieve any 
actual results. In the meantime, the threat continues to evolve and will keep one 
step ahead. 
Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Norway:
Thank you, Captain Sepper, for sharing your insights with us.
And our next panel member is Rear Admiral Faidoo. Admiral, I’m sure your 
background from operating in the Gulf of Guinea will aid nations bordering the 
great maritime space. 
STANDARDIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ENHANCED MARITIME
CURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
Rear Admiral Kofi Faidoo, Ghana:
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson, and our host, Rear Admiral Harley; 
distinguished admirals; heads of navies and coast guards; my fellow panelists; and la-
dies and gentlemen, let me express my appreciation to the government of the United 
States and the U.S. Navy for giving me the opportunity to stand before such an august 
audience and make a few points about issues of importance in the Gulf of Guinea. 
The “Hows” for International Law. Per my invitation, I have been asked to talk 
on standardizing international law. Recognizing that I am not a lawyer but just an 
operational practitioner, I have taken the liberty of rephrasing and tweaking it a 
little bit. I have decided to call it “Standardizing International Law for Enhanced 
Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea.” 
The reason is that our interests in international law as navies is in what I call the 
“hows.” They include [the following]:
• How can international law serve as an enabler to our operations? 
• How may international law hinder or limit the operational space and spec-
trum of maritime enforcement? 
• How can the challenges of international law be addressed?
Clarity for these questions may be attained when the discussion is conducted 
within a realistic context. 
So my aim is to discuss the topic, standardizing international law for enhanced 
maritime safety and security, with a view to proffering a way forward, using the Gulf 
of Guinea as a case study. I intend to cover the following: provide an overview of the 
strategic environment of the Gulf of Guinea, discuss the maritime security situation 
with a focus on piracy, use two case studies to highlight the legal challenges to mari-
time security enforcement, and share my thoughts on the way forward. 
Strategic Environment of the Gulf of Guinea. There are several definitions of the 
Gulf of Guinea. Geographically it is the Atlantic coast, stretching from Senegal to 
Angola. Institutionally, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, created in 1999, includes 
eight members: Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São Tomé and Príncipe. The 
coastline is about 9,500 kilometers and a vast maritime space that projects into the 
Atlantic Ocean system. 
138 Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium
The maritime profile of the Gulf of Guinea presents enormous opportunities for 
delivering positive human development for the citizenry. As developing countries 
that depend primarily on the export of raw material for foreign exchange, the sig-
nificance of keeping sea lines of communication safe cannot be overemphasized. 
The fishing industry provides employment for coastal communities and income-
earning opportunities, especially for women across the country, thereby positively 
impacting poverty alleviation. The sea route is the means through which critical 
imports for domestic and industrial consumption are brought into both the littoral 
and neighboring landlocked states. Offshore oil and gas resources have also con-
tributed favorably to the economy of the region and increased capital inflows. 
In the global context, the maritime space of the Gulf of Guinea connects mari-
time traffic of multiple continents.
Maritime Security Situation with a Focus on Piracy. While these positive elements 
underscore the value of the maritime domain, organized crime undermines the 
maritime potential of the region. Decades of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs fuels 
crime and imperils governance institutions. Food security is being threatened by 
illegal fishing activities and unsustainable fishing practices. And enduring piracy in 
the region endangers the safety and security of global shipping.
I listened with great anxiety as Mr. Chris Trelawny gave a grim appraisal of the 
African situation. Earlier, Admiral Verma also gave a long list of challenges in the 
maritime domain, all of which apply to the Gulf of Guinea. He rightly placed piracy 
first. I will now highlight piracy as one of the major challenges facing the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has posed a significant threat to international trade 
and commerce for over a decade. This is epitomized by the spread of incidents 
across the region. Since 2010, reports from both the IMO and the IMB repeatedly 
rated the Gulf of Guinea as the most dangerous marine space in the world. Indica-
tions in 2015 and 2016 suggest that the piracy threat is not in decline, as pirates 
continue to imperil the safety of ships and seafarers in the region. 
An example is the hijacking of the fishing vessel Lu Rong Yuang Yu 917 off the 
coast of Ghana in February 2015. The hijacking resulted in the death of a crew 
member and multiple injuries to others.
While the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime profile presents positive activity such as fishing and exportation, organized crime 
undermines the region’s potential.
139
Global attention is focused on addressing the piracy situation in the Gulf of Guin-
ea. This has led to the adoption of Resolutions 2018 and 2039 in October 2011 and 
February 2012, respectively, by the United Nations Security Council. 
In between these two resolutions, the UN Secretary General, in November 2011, 
dispatched a special mission to the Gulf of Guinea to assess the piracy situation. 
Broadly speaking, the resolutions can be summarized in four key points. Namely, 
they
• Highlighted the implications of piracy in the region for global shipping and 
the safety of seafarers, 
• Highlighted the negative impact of piracy on the development of the Gulf of 
Guinea region, 
• Called on Gulf of Guinea states to undertake effective measures to suppress 
the piracy situation, and
• Called on the global community to support counterpiracy measures in the 
Gulf of Guinea region, through bilateral and multilateral initiatives.
In response to these Resolutions, the heads of states and governments of the 
Gulf of Guinea adopted the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, 
Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Activities in West and Central Africa, oth-
erwise known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, in June 2013. 
The reality, however, is that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea remains a threat to the 
safety and security of sea lines of communication, evidenced by the multiple inci-
dents of hijackings in 2015 and 2016. 
This prompted another debate in the Security Council in April 2016, resulting 
in an official statement of the President of the Council on 25 April this year. It said, 
“The Security Council reaffirms its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, and recognizes the primary responsibility of States in the eradication of piracy 
and armed robbery at sea.” 
The statement expressed deep concern regarding the implications of piracy for 
the stability and development of the Gulf of Guinea. It also underlined the impor-
tance of determining the existence of any possible or potential links between piracy 
and terrorist groups in West Africa and the Sahel region. Finally, it urged states in 
the region to counter the threat of piracy and address the underlying causes, in 
close cooperation with organizations in the region and their partners.
Two Case Studies Illustrating Inadequate Legal Framework. Having given an 
overview of the Gulf of Guinea maritime situation, I will now proceed with the thrust 
of the presentation on standardizing legal framework by examining case studies on 
the legal security gaps in the Gulf of Guinea. 
One of the major challenges confronting counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of 
Guinea is an inadequate legal framework, including lack of harmonization of do-
mestic and international legal instruments. This point is better illustrated by two 
case studies. 
First Case Study: The MT Mariam Incident. In January 2015, the Ghana Navy dem-
onstrated operational readiness, capability, and boldness by successfully tracking, 
boarding, and arresting pirates onboard the MT Mariam. It is one of the few ex-
amples, in the global context, where pirates have been arrested at sea. 
The vessel was hijacked by pirates off the coast of Nigeria and sailed into deep 
sea, where its oil cargo was transferred. The vessel then remained under the control 
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of the pirates, who, as subsequent investigations revealed, intended to use it as a 
mother ship to conduct further piracy attacks. 
Upon receiving information of the piracy incident, a Ghana Navy ship sailed in 
search of MT Mariam, which was located and boarded by the Ghana Navy in the 
exclusive economic zone of Ghana. Eight pirates, with weapons and other gadgets, 
were arrested. 
Despite the success of the operation and the availability of evidence for prosecu-
tion, the pirates remained in detention for over a year in Ghana and were finally 
repatriated to Nigeria. This is because the Criminal Offences Act of Ghana does not 
provide for the offense of piracy under international law. 
In other words, although international law, codified in the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of Sea, has expressly defined the crime of piracy, and also vests 
universal jurisdiction over the crime, this has not been incorporated into Ghanaian 
domestic law. Thus, there was no legislation under which the pirates could be pros-
ecuted by Ghanaian authorities.
Second Case Study: The Hijacking of the MT Maximus. The MT Maximus and its crew 
of eighteen were hijacked on 11 February, this year, off the coast of Abidjan. The 
vessel was renamed MT Elvis V at sea, and at some point sailed into Ghana’s exclu-
sive economic zone. 
The hijacking of MT Mariam and MT Maximus highlighted the current legal gaps in the Gulf of Guinea.
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USNS Spearhead (T-EPF 1) was in the region and played a critical role in support 
of the collaborative efforts of Benin, la Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo. 
That eventually led to the boarding and arrest of the pirates by the Nigerian Navy, 
after days of surveillance and pursuit. 
From the operational point of view, as was the case of MT Mariam, there are a 
number of positive elements in the MT Maximus incident. 
The operation showed the importance of intelligence sharing. The intelligence 
originated from the French and was shared with Gulf of Guinea states. The incident 
also saw a good level of collaboration between the regional navies, especially Benin, 
la Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo, as well as collaboration with multilateral 
partners, in this case, the U.S. Navy and French authorities. 
The Nigerian Navy, in particular, deserves commendation for successfully under-
taking an opposed boarding. This is a capability that many navies in the world lack, 
including those in the Gulf of Guinea. 
At the same time, there were a lot of challenges with the MT Maximus counterpi-
racy operation. I will highlight only those relating to the scope of this presentation. 
First, there is no framework that allows the pursuit of criminals at sea, across ter-
ritorial seas of neighboring states. 
Second, member states in the region have no clear legal regime, regulating the 
transfer of arrested pirates from one state to the other.
Third, there is no legal framework that provides a legal basis for operations with 
multilateral partners. Thus, for instance, had the USNS Spearhead arrested the pi-
rates, the captain would have been saddled with legal issues, with all the attendant 
complications.
The Way Forward. I have used the two case studies to highlight the legal gaps 
in the Gulf of Guinea that must be addressed. What should we do going forward? 
What are the responses and structures that should be put in place? I have identified 
four areas. 
Piracy Legislation. International law grants universal jurisdiction over piracy. This 
is codified in Articles 1001 to 1052 of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of Sea. The provisions require states to repress piracy at the national level and also 
cooperate with other states in the suppression of piracy at the regional and interna-
tional levels. 
To give practical effect to the first obligation, Gulf of Guinea states are required 
to enact and enforce laws, covering all aspects of the crime of piracy. Currently, how-
ever, most of the Gulf of Guinea states lack piracy legislation. Togo is probably the 
only state in that area with an effective legislation in the region. Piracy laws of Benin, 
Ghana, and a host of states are outdated or inconsistent with the international law 
framework. 
1.  Article 100 of UNCLOS states, “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repres-
sion of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
2.  Article 105 of UNCLOS states: “On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the 
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State 
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine 
the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third par-
ties acting in good faith.” 
142 Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium
I’ve indicated that Nigeria initiated a process for the enactment of a law to com-
bat piracy and other maritime crimes, but this is still under consideration. Ghana 
and other Gulf of Guinea states must, therefore, enact appropriate legislation for 
piracy, supported by effective prosecution and judicial structures.
Ratifying and Incorporating Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Framework. The na-
ture of maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea demands that member states have 
a framework beyond normal antipiracy legislation. Traditional incidents of piracy 
involve hijacking of vessels for economic reasons—the stealing of cargo, money, 
equipment, and demanding ransom. 
What we see in the Gulf of Guinea, however, is a combination of traditional pi-
racy and insurgent activities at sea. Insurgent-type attacks are motivated by reasons 
other than direct economic benefit. 
The framework for countering this threat is in two international instruments ad-
opted in 1988: the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. This 
protocol provides the means for securing offshore platforms and, by implication, 
energy security in the Gulf of Guinea.
These two instruments have been further enhanced by two protocols in 2005, 
bringing the SUA at Sea framework to four reinforcing instruments.
Despite the relevance of the SUA framework, the ratification and implementa-
tion of these instruments by Gulf of Guinea states has been unsatisfactory. Only 
CÔte d’Ivoire is a party to all the SUA instruments, but has not incorporated the 
provisions into domestic law. The rest of Gulf of Guinea states, including Ghana, 
have at best only ratified one or two of the instruments. 
Hot Pursuit and Transfer Arrangements. Effective maritime security in the Gulf 
of Guinea requires that incidents be investigated and the perpetrators of crimes 
promptly prosecuted. As shown by both the MT Mariam and MT Maximus case stud-
ies, piracy incidents in the region often involve transnational networks. 
This calls for regional and multilateral frameworks that will allow the pursuit of 
criminals across maritime jurisdictions and the sharing of information for effective 
prosecution. The framework should provide for the transfer of arrested criminals 
from one jurisdiction to the other.
Tracing Proceeds of Maritime Crime. [Tracing the proceeds of maritime crime] is an-
other needed response. [Editor’s note: Time constraints prevented Admiral Faidoo 
from further elaboration.]
Conclusion. I want to reiterate that the global piracy statistics, for the last couple 
of years, show that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is a major threat. While Somali pi-
racy is noted as the highest threat to maritime safety and security in this century, the 
maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea equally poses significant threats to 
regional states and the global community. 
Robust mechanisms are required to enhance maritime security in the region. 
Some of the lessons that have been learned from counterpiracy efforts in Somalia 
may be equally applied in the Gulf of Guinea. 
This presentation, however, has shown that the Gulf of Guinea presents a set of 
legal challenges that must be addressed. Incorporating the recommendations ad-
vanced may enhance the effectiveness of counterpiracy efforts in the region. 
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Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Norway:
Thank you for an exciting presentation and providing insight into the challenges 
in the Gulf of Guinea. Your effort in enforcing maritime security is truly important 
for all maritime nations.
Next is Admiral Martin, representing a small nation. I also find it interesting that 
New Zealand faces the same challenges as we do on the opposite side of the world.
NORMS AND STANDARDS THROUGH THE LENS OF A COMPACT NAVY
Rear Admiral John Martin, New Zealand:
Admiral Richardson, chiefs, ladies and gentlemen, and colleagues: it’s a privilege 
to be here and an honor to work with you in developing peace and security in the 
global maritime commons. 
Admiral Laurie Carr was here in 1968. He expressed the opinion that coming to 
the International Seapower Symposium gave him an appreciation for dealing with 
maritime challenges, and that, while each country had a different perspective, all 
had the same sorts of problems and were trying to deal with it in similar ways. 
What we’ve heard is a repetition of that. If there’s one thing that U.S. leadership 
in this area gives us, it is the opportunity to get together, every couple of years, and 
discuss these issues and expose them for what they are, which is really common 
problems. 
We have an opportunity to talk about a similar thing, which Admiral Verma laid 
out. I’m going to talk about the standards and norms in the context of internation-
al law, the criticality of international law for operational transparency, and all this 
through the lens of a compact navy. 
A Postmodern Navy and State. The descriptor “compact navy” is an interesting 
one. It sort of sounds a little bit like a mobile home, in terms of navies. We are, 
indeed, the second-largest navy in our region. It’s a reasonably large region with a 
diverse fleet mix, scope of responsibilities, and available resources. 
It’s a navy that Geoffrey Till would call a “postmodern navy,” a navy with a focus 
on protecting, not just our own domestic interests, but the system as a whole. A post-
modern navy has strategic reach and a range of capabilities that cover a spectrum 
of combat. We don’t have all of those capabilities, but certainly, I think, we are a 
postmodern navy. 
And New Zealand is a postmodern state—that is, one that is instinctively collab-
orative and aspires to a cooperative system of openness and mutual dependence. 
New Zealand, therefore, deploys, like all of our countries, its resources—diplomat-
ic, trading, cultural, and military—to promote a system of openness and mutual 
dependence. This is reflected in our own mission statement, “Advancing New Zea-
land’s interests from the sea.”
Given the overarching principle that New Zealand supports a system of openness 
and interdependence, we are strong proponents of international law and accepted 
norms and behavior. 
Our recent defense white paper identified as one of our overarching national 
security objectives the need to strengthen the international order to promote se-
curity. It further identified that our interests are supported by the international 
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rules-based order, which disciplines the exercise of national power through inter-
national law, custom, and convention. It affords the same rights to all countries, 
regardless of size.
Preserving International Law—Our Obligations. Enjoying the benefits of such a 
framework means that New Zealand, like other countries, is obliged to fulfill associ-
ated responsibilities—that is, preventing and supporting the resolution of conflict 
within and between states and abiding by those rules ourselves in order to preserve 
their integrity.
Preserving the international systems of rules and laws imposes obligations on 
us, and, specifically, our navies. If we weren’t so tied to the global system, we’d be 
focused just on our own backyard, but that’s not the case.
New Zealand is a trading nation. Our 
first-world lifestyle is supported by a disag-
gregated, global trading system, based on 
free and open trade routes. It’s based on 
the transfer of information and the free 
flow of funds. We rely not just on the secu-
rity of our own trade routes, but the security 
of everyone else’s trade routes, because, in 
effect, their trade routes are ours. 
None of this, as we’ve heard time and 
time again, happens by itself. It depends on 
international laws, agreements, norms, and 
standards. We have a vital interest in main-
taining those links in our supply chain, even 
if we don’t have the luxury of size and wealth. Like other nations we depend on larg-
er nations adhering to internationally accepted norms and standards of behavior.
Layered Defense. To put it into a strategic framework, we have a layered de-
fense. The outer layer of that defense is the adherence of other countries to inter-
national norms. The next layer is the network of networks, the flow of information, 
the discussion informed by events like the International Seapower Symposium. The 
final layer is the collective security at sea, provided by the cooperative efforts of our 
neighbors and international partners. 
It is critical to us that the outer layers of our defense remain intact, because 
we don’t have the resilience, on our own, to cope with these challenges if they’re 
breached.
Our use of international law, and the exercise of these layers to enhance secu-
rity, can be best illustrated in a recent example, where multilateral solutions were 
achieved with a multilateral approach to a multilateral problem. 
New Zealand, along with a number of other nations, strongly supports interna-
tional agreements around conservation efforts in the Southern Ocean, specifically 
the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.
In 2014, one of our ships conducted a fisheries patrol in the Southern Ocean in 
support of the convention. It shadowed a group of illegal fishing vessels, collecting 
evidence, but was unable to board. As a result of the evidence collected, the New 
Zealand government persuaded a number of regional coastal states, represented 
here, not to allow the vessels to offload their catch. 
Norms and standards provide 
a common framework for 
understanding and for working 
together. They can provide a 
bridge between different world 
views but also, where disagreement 
exists, can provide a framework to 
resolve disagreement.
—Rear Admiral John Martin, 
New Zealand
145
More importantly, based on the ship’s evidence, the European law enforcement 
agencies prosecuted the operation’s organizers and closed it down. Nine compa-
nies associated with Vidal Armadores’ syndicate were fined a total of $19 million, 
disqualified from fishing activities, and banned from receiving European Union 
subsidies. Vidal Armadores himself and members of his family are also facing crimi-
nal charges in Spain.
A symptom of what Admiral Verma and Admiral Scott were talking about was 
a significant, if ill-informed, discussion in New Zealand that we should have been 
more aggressive in our interaction, putting a shot across the bows or using other 
kinetic measures. Such actions would have been illegal. 
Instead, operating within international laws and norms, we achieved our desired 
effect. We upheld international agreement on the Southern Ocean and eliminated 
a longstanding illegal fishing operation, all within the framework provided by inter-
national law.
International norms and standards will be interpreted differently by nations, de-
pending on [each state’s] history, culture, and other factors. However, the great 
thing about this is that norms and standards provide a common framework for un-
derstanding and for working together. They can provide a bridge between different 
worldviews but also, where disagreement exists, can provide a framework to resolve 
disagreement.
As Admiral Verma underlined, international law applies to everybody or it ap-
plies to nobody. Recent events have seen selective application of particular pieces of 
international law, depending on the country and argument needing support. This 
is not unusual, particularly where great powers are concerned. 
Historically, the pattern for small countries is to use the umbrella of international 
law up to the point where it’s no longer needed and can safely be ignored. It may 
suit some states to be selective in their observance of laws. Just as nations use the 
umbrella of international law to grow, they also need it as they inevitably decline. It 
is in their interests to protect the law. 
The test of international law is not just how it supports the weak but how it also 
supports the strong. 
Compact Navies Playing a Disproportionate Role. The ability of compact navies 
to play a role disproportionate to their size should not be underestimated. We can 
and do lead conversations and initiatives. New Zealand was an early proponent of 
CUES. New Zealand has also, along with Brunei, another compact navy, co-chaired 
the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting–Plus Experts Working Group on Maritime 
Security for the last three years. In November, this will culminate in only the second 
field exercise, which will be held in New Zealand.
The challenge for us is to meet our obligations and interests in the international 
community with very limited resources. We have students, trainees, and exchange 
personnel in a number of countries, who acquire experience and learning that, 
quite frankly, they cannot get in New Zealand. They also build valuable contacts; 
give us a “sailor’s eye” view of other cultures and their navies; and hopefully 
create, in return, a better understanding of New Zealand, as well as our norms 
and standards. 
We contribute where we can, perhaps only in ones or twos, or maybe a frigate 
here or an aircraft there. We contribute by assisting in the manning of the Informa-
tion Fusion Center in Singapore, or the UK Maritime Trade Operations in Dubai. 
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And, of course, the government has expectations of our deploying ships and aircraft 
on global maritime security operations. 
We contribute to conferences and symposia, such as this International Seapower 
Symposium, to hear other voices and to maintain the situational awareness of the 
international environment and how it affects us.
Conclusion. New Zealand is a postmodern state, whose ongoing prosperity is 
based on the international rule of law and supported by the norms and standards 
that make them work.
New Zealand’s navy is an instrument of national power that contributes to the 
international defense and the international structure, which keeps our world safe. 
We rely on our partners in that system to make their own contributions and to en-
sure that the norms and standards, which benefit everyone, are upheld, not only for 
ourselves today but also for those who follow in the future.
Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Norway:
Thank you, John. We now look forward to Admiral Lai’s presentation. 
 ENHANCED OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Rear Admiral Chung Han Lai, Singapore:
Admiral Richardson, chiefs of navy and heads of coast guards, fellow panelists and 
moderator, Admiral Lars, and ladies and gentlemen, I thank Admiral Richardson, 
Rear Admiral Harley, and the U.S. Naval War College for hosting the Twenty-Second 
International Seapower Symposium, and for inviting me to speak. 
The Trinity—Maritime Safety, Security, and Stability. Lars has highlighted that 
we are from small nations and small navies. Let me begin with the assertion that it is 
in the interests of both big and small states to uphold an international order, based 
on international law and norms. 
This assertion is not an article of faith but a reflection of the growing interdepen-
dence between states, connected by global 
trade, open borders, and transnational secu-
rity challenges. That interdependence was 
spoken about in the regional symposium 
reports, the keynote address, the first panel 
on cooperative strategies and interoperabil-
ity, as well as in Secretary Mabus’s comments 
about the sea that connects and unites us 
rather than divides us. 
As a small maritime state, Singapore’s 
view is that international law and norms 
help enhance not just maritime safety and 
security, but also the stability of the maritime 
commons. COLREGS and SOLAS [International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea] have made seafaring safer by setting common rules for navigation at sea, as 
well as minimum ship safety standards, while the SUA convention as well as the ISPS 
[International Ship and Port Facility Security] Code have strengthened maritime 
security. 
Our navies need to translate 
and apply these laws and norms 
to what are called “operational 
arrangements” that can guide 
and govern our actions on the 
ground. It is these operational 
arrangements that make us 
stronger maritime partners.
—Rear Admiral Chung Han Lai, 
Singapore
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Most importantly, UNCLOS has contributed to the stability of the maritime com-
mons by clarifying the rights and responsibilities of coastal and user states and es-
tablishing mechanisms for dispute resolution.
I refer to Admiral Girardelli’s presentation, where he outlined safety, security, 
and stability as three sides of a triangle. If you think about it, it really forms a trinity, 
each mutually reinforcing.
Indeed, under UNCLOS the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) has over the past two decades adjudicated twenty-five disputes related to 
the interpretation and application of this UN Convention. Notably, Admiral 
Verma covered the whole survey of case studies. Of note, in 2012, ITLOS 
adjudicated the maritime border dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar, 
which helped to diffuse rising tensions in the Bay of Bengal.
Besides ITLOS, other international judicial bodies, such as the International 
Court of Justice, have also contributed to the stability of the maritime commons by 
arbitrating interstate disputes, in accordance with international law.
And Singapore and Malaysia—we’ve had a decades-long dispute. We decided 
to submit this case for arbitration by the International Court of Justice. We 
committed to abiding by its ruling. The ruling was issued in 2008. It resolved the 
dispute amica-bly with minimal escalation on the ground. 
Translating Laws and Norms into Operational Arrangements. As maritime na-
tions, our respect for and adherence to international law and norms enhances the 
safety, security, and stability of the maritime commons. As maritime forces, our na-
vies need to translate and apply these laws and norms to what are called “operation-
al arrangements” that can guide and govern our actions on the ground. It is these 
operational arrangements that make us stronger maritime partners.
One such operational arrangement is the Malacca Straits Patrol. This arrange-
ment involves the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
The Malacca Strait Patrol was initiated in 2004 to deal with the escalating pirating 
situation in the Strait of Malacca, which had placed a vital waterway on Lloyd’s war 
risk list. This Malacca Strait Patrol was established on three key principles: 
• Primary responsibility for the security of the Strait lies with the littoral states.
• User states and international organizations, such as the IMO, have an impor-
tant and useful role to play.
• And very importantly, any measures taken must be in accordance with inter-
national law and be respectful of the sovereignty of the littoral states.
At its inception in 2004, one potential sticking point was whether each nation’s 
maritime patrol aircraft would be able to operate in each other’s airspace. As you 
know, the narrow Malacca Strait covers the territorial waters of the littoral states. 
Backed by strong political support, we developed a creative solution. Every mari-
time air patrol would embark on what we call a combined mission patrol team, com-
posed of military personnel from all forces. This allows aircraft to fly and operate 
seamlessly over the Strait of Malacca and over the territorial waters, without imping-
ing on the sovereignty concerns of the littoral states.
Earlier this year in Singapore, we celebrated Malacca Strait Patrol’s tenth an-
niversary and agreed that this successful operational arrangement should be ex-
tended to dealing with the emerging threat of maritime terrorism. 
Recently in the Sulu Sea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines also agreed on 
a new trilateral framework to deal with organized crime and militant threats there. 
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Modeled after the Malacca Strait Patrol, the Sulu Sea Patrol Initiative will feature 
intelligence sharing as well as coordinated sea and air patrols.
Beyond maritime safety and security, operational arrangements are also critical 
to enhancing stability of the maritime commons in a manner consistent with inter-
national law. 
This is particularly true of the South China Sea, given the maritime and territo-
rial disputes there. While Singapore is not a claimant state and takes no side on 
the competing territorial claims, we support the peaceful resolution of dispute in 
accordance with international law. 
In July of this year, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled on the maritime 
entitlements of the features in the South China Sea. It’s very important to note that 
UNCLOS or the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling does not address or resolve 
the longstanding disputes over territorial sovereignty. This must be done through 
our foreign affairs colleagues, working toward a diplomatic and political solution. 
But the onus is on our navies to strengthen the operational arrangements on the 
ground, to promote mutual trust, and to prevent miscalculation. 
One way this has been done is through the Code for Unplanned Encounters at 
Sea, which twenty-one navies endorsed and adopted at the 2014 Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium, hosted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. 
During the recently concluded East Asia Summit, ASEAN and China issued 
a joint statement committing to the application of CUES as well as the early 
conclusion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea. Earlier this year, the PLA 
Navy proposed a joint exercise with ASEAN navies on search and rescue, disaster 
relief, and application of CUES.
Singapore is the ASEAN-China dialogue relations coordinator. In that capacity, 
we are very supportive of this proposal from China. At China’s request, the Singa-
pore Navy is facilitating discussions between the Chinese and ASEAN navies to plan 
and conduct this ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise sometime next year.
To quickly recap, as a small nation, as a small navy, our assertion is that inter-
national law, a rules-based maritime order, benefits both large and small states. By 
adhering to international law and norms, and then translating them to operational 
arrangements, this has strengthened maritime safety, maritime security, and mari-
time stability—the trinity that I spoke about earlier.
Safety and Stability Undersea. Thus far, our discussions have focused on the 
maritime commons, on and above the sea. My view is that a neglected domain, espe-
cially with the proliferation of submarines operating in the Asia Pacific, is maritime 
safety, maritime stability under the sea.
Given the shallow waters of the South China Sea, submarines there have, essen-
tially, only a two-dimensional space to operate in. Without the necessary operational 
arrangements in place, a collision involving one or more submarines, in my mind, 
is an accident waiting to happen. 
The consequences are not just catastrophic in terms of life and property losses, 
but they are also geopolitical, given the nature of submarine operations and the risk 
of misunderstanding, mistrust, and miscalculation.
Two years ago, at the International Seapower Symposium in 2014, Admiral Wu, 
Commander of the PLA Navy, spoke on this point. He reflected that when it comes 
to submarine rescue, what we need is not just an investment of resources and coop-
eration between navies. What we need is to build trust. I think he was right.
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Since that time, we’ve been in discussion on how we can bring improvement to 
this domain. Over the last number of years, we have seen regional navies enter into 
submarine rescue arrangements. Our view is that these reactive measures are insuf-
ficient. Submarine rescue arrangements are reactive because they apply when an 
incident has already happened, with attendant risk. 
Our proposal is to put forth a more comprehensive regional framework for sub-
marine operational safety, comprising both reactive and preventive measures. 
To allay your concerns, we are not proposing a water space management system 
for our region, like that we see in NATO. That would be a bridge too far for the Asia 
Pacific, given the sensitivity of submarine operations. 
However, in our view, underwater safety can be significantly improved by sharing 
nonsensitive information, such as locations of fishing concentrations, mobile oil 
rigs, and very large crew carriers when they’re doing towing operations, and so on. 
In May this year, during the Second Submarine Operational Safety Conference 
held in South Korea, co-chaired by Singapore and South Korea, we introduced a 
Submarine Safety Information Portal, to strengthen underwater awareness and to 
reduce the risk of accidents. This portal is hosted on Singapore’s Information Fu-
sion Center website. I want to thank navies who have contributed liaison officers to 
staff the Information Fusion Center. 
We proposed this portal. We also propose the establishment of an underwater 
Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. Today, the code applies largely to the sur-
face. We need a chapter to deal with underwater safety.
This underwater Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea will articulate a set of 
guidelines that both submarines and ships can take independently to prevent un-
derwater accidents. This begins with very innocuous features—features and proce-
dures that we’re familiar with as practitioners, like the UNCLOS procedures. These 
very innocuous procedures, in our minds, can contribute to underwater safety, con-
tribute to the prevention of underwater accidents, and help to mitigate risks. 
Next May, the Singapore Navy will organize and host a submarine safety work-
shop, in conjunction with International Maritime Defense Exhibition Asia 2017, to 
move this proposal forward. 
Conclusion. International law and norms can enhance safety, security, and stabil-
ity of the maritime commons. As heads of our respective navies and coast guards, we 
have an opportunity at the International Seapower Symposium and the obligation 
to translate and apply international law and norms to operational arrangements to 
guide and govern the actions of our maritime forces. 
These operational arrangements will make us stronger maritime partners. Safer, 
more secure, and more stable seas will strengthen the strategic trust among our na-
tions and our navies and form the bedrock for a more prosperous, interdependent, 
and peaceful, rules-based maritime order. This is in our collective and our national 
interests.
 Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, Norway:
Thank you, Admiral Lai, for those suggestions for developing the Code for Un-
planned Encounters at Sea and your insights. 
150 Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium
 DISCUSSION
Comment: 
I’d like to relate [this discussion] to what Secretary of Defense Robert Work talked 
about. It is a very interesting approach to future warfare, the new Offset Strategy. 
But he talked about something that most of us, as small nations, can’t afford. 
I think we, the smaller nations, have got to hedge more on defense diplomacy 
and think about a similar approach to an offset, which addresses the “humanware” 
perspective, rather than just the hardware and software. We look at how to affect or 
influence the minds of the politicians or the minds of lawyers, for example.
Response A:
Thank you; that’s a very good point. 
I agree. Small, compact navies are challenged when it comes to resources. That’s the 
reason why you find, in New Zealand in particular, a coordinated approach to maritime 
security, which is not just about ships and airplanes. It’s also about diplomatic relation-
ships, and it plays out in our need to reinforce international frameworks, and so on. 
So, it’s not just about this hardware and software. It’s about relationships. It’s 
about reinforcing frameworks. 
The idea that we need to keep up with larger navies is a challenge in terms of 
the next generation of thinking that we heard. That’s going to be a significant chal-
lenge. One of the ways we can do that, to at least have a chance, is through the 
development of good relationships to make sure that we have the right foundations 
to move forward together. 
Response B:
Thank you very much for the comment. I think you are exactly right. 
You talk about defense diplomacy, you talk about humanware. It’s really about soft 
power. I suppose the Offset Strategy that Secretary Work outlined was about hard power. 
Navies, as small as we are, need a combination of both hard and soft power. That 
gives us the construct of smart power. I would like to think that as we advocate for 
various operational arrangements—where there is CUES and so on—there’s an ex-
ercise of smart power, bringing people together to agree to certain norms that are 
in our collective interests. Hopefully we can get the better outcome for our region.
Question:
The theme of the symposium is “Stronger Maritime Partners.” Strength is not only 
in equipment and software, but also in relationships. Strength is in building trust 
among nations. You might have all the equipment you need, but if there’s not trust 
between nations, you’ve got a problem. 
You know the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. It is not a lack of knowing what 
we want to do. We know what we want to do, but there is lack of trust among the 
countries in that region. You have the Anglophone, the Francophone, and other 
challenges. How can we build trust so that we can work better in the Gulf of Guinea?
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Response A:
We’ve been asked to be very free with our remarks, so I’m going to be very free with 
my remarks.
I entirely agree with you. We have had challenges in the area of trust. But I think 
to the credit of the U.S. government, and the U.S. Navy in particular, that over the 
last six, seven years with the prodding and prompting of U.S. Africa Command, 
we’ve managed to work together in this last few years, with both Anglophone and 
Francophone. 
It was the case with Ghana, for instance, which is surrounded by Francophone 
countries and the sea, that we don’t do a lot of French speaking. So we did not tend 
to interact and operate a lot with our neighbors, basically because of the language 
problems. 
I’m not too sure about the trust as operators. We are all friends. As mariners, we 
all do our work at sea. 
Of course, we have to depend on the good sense and the diplomacy of our 
elected officials to ensure that their policies will make us live in peace and har-
mony.
I would say that, perhaps, putting it as lack of trust is a little bit on the harsh 
side. It’s just that we didn’t have the opportunity, basically because of language 
issues.
I think you will agree that over the last few years, we’ve done a lot in that direc-
tion, especially with assistance of U.S. Africa Command. You talk of Obangame/
Saharan Express, and all those sorts of exercises. I think it’s getting better.
Response B:
I would just underline that. You see the presentations about different regions find-
ing different instruments to cooperate. It takes a long time to do that. It’s often 
initiatives among countries that actually build trust to do things better, because they 
see the national interests of doing it. 
Comment from the Floor:
Africa has some issues. To deal with these threats, we have to cooperate, share in-
formation, and harmonize legislation. That’s very important for Africa, to tighten 
the law against piracy and other trafficking, and set up a subregional, continental 
strategy.
The international partnership has to be stronger for good maritime governance 
on the sea and the ocean below. The Twenty-Second International Seapower Sym-
posium is one of the best strategic and global approaches to improving safety and 
security. 
In this regard, the Republic of Togo will host the first African Head of State 
Summit on Safety, Security, and Development on 15 October 2016 to set up an 
African maritime initiative to deal with maritime threats, in order to boost the blue 
economy.
Let’s go together. Your contributions are welcome for the success of this summit. 
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Question:
There was a question put to me that I answered to the best of my ability. I would 
like to pose the same question back to the panel, including the moderator: What 
options are available when a major power fails to abide by international norms and 
standards? 
Response A:
There are different options. In our region, the main thing is good relations. There 
are also different forms of cooperation—a lot of exercising together, sharing com-
mon values, sharing maritime situational awareness at sea, and of course, trying to 
convince the bad boys that we are right and doing right things. 
Response B:
When I heard this question, I cringed in my seat. As a small-nation navy, that is the 
reason why we participate: in the event that you get into trouble with a large-nation 
navy, someone else will come and give you a hand. 
That’s what I always thought the United Nations was about—collective security 
and ensuring the sovereignty of small countries or, in fact, every country. Regardless 
of size, each country is important. We felt that that was so important, as an interna-
tional community, that we were going to uphold that. 
I look with concern at countries that appear to be operating outside those frame-
works and outside those norms. The international community seems to be unable 
to address it. 
That’s the reason why I think collective security and, in particular, the idea of col-
lective thought. Exercising but also understanding values and ideals, is important. 
This is what this conference sets out to establish, as well.
Admiral Verma, just as you sidestepped the answer last time, I think the panel 
should do the same thing to you.
Response C:
What options do we have when major states or large states don’t follow international 
law? That reminds me of the Melian dialogue, where the strong do what they will 
and the weak or small suffer what they must. 
Thankfully, we are no longer in Ancient Greece, so that helps. In our generation, 
in this century, and the future that we see on the horizon, even big states are not too 
big to benefit from a rules-based international order. Where there’s cyber warefare, 
physical space and physical size may not matter as much. 
That’s a point of asymmetry—cyberspace, space, and the whole host of trans-
national security challenges. For small states, it is really to make a persuasive case 
that this is a convergence of interests for big states to cooperate, for big states to 
contribute, for big states to be constructive. I think that’s the only option we have. I 
hope that enlightened leadership will see that that is, indeed, the case, and indeed 
beneficial for the region and for the global order. 
Of course, we try to apply smart power along the way when we can.
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Response D:
This is the complicated thing. Actually bigger nations can learn from smaller na-
tions. We are sort of forced to—when our sovereign rights or sovereignty are chal-
lenged—to follow the legal as long as possible, to avoid a military conflict, and to 
document what the different parties are doing and follow it up with diplomatic and 
international bodies. Our primary strategy is to avoid a military conflict.
Again, most nations are, in the end, entitled to defend themselves, either as a na-
tion or in an alliance. This is sort of the two swords tactic. Even bigger nations will 
have a problem with that.

Presentation of the Hattendorf Prize 
for Distinguished Original Research in 
Maritime History 
Awarded to 
Captain Werner Rahn (Ret.)
German Navy
Rear Admiral Jef frey A. Harley, United States:
We’d like to make two special presentations. I’d like to invite the U.S. Chief ofNaval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, and Professor John Hattendorf 
to join me center stage. 
PRESENTATION OF THE NAVY DISTINGUISHED CIVILIAN
SERVICE AWARD TO JOHN B. HATTENDORF
We’d like to recognize the man for whom the Hattendorf Prize is named, on the oc-
casion of his impending retirement. We are blessed to have Professor Hattendorf’s 
beautiful wife, Berit, here with us today as well.
10
Retired German Navy Captain Werner Rahn (left-center) is presented the Hattendorf Prize for Distinguished Original 
Research in Maritime History by Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations. Also present are Vice Admiral 
Andreas Krause, Chief of the German Navy (right), and Professor John Hattendorf (left), for whom the prize is named.
156 Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium
Professor John Hattendorf is a legend here at the Naval War College and within 
the international circle of naval historians. The professional journal U.S. Naval In-
stitute Proceedings has described him as one of the most widely known and respected 
naval historians in the world.
The foundation of his knowledge of naval affairs comes from his wartime service as a 
naval officer during the Vietnam era. He’s also the author, co-author, editor, or co-editor 
of more than forty books on British and American maritime history and naval warfare. 
He’s won numerous awards for his contributions to the field of maritime history, 
including the Navy League of the United States’ Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for 
Literary Achievement and the Admiral of the Navy George Dewey Award from the 
Naval Order of the United States. In March of this year, the University of Oxford 
awarded him its Doctor of Letters degree, a rare earned degree above that of a PhD, 
recognizing his achievement as an authority on naval history. 
He will retire from government service at the end of this month, fifty-two years 
after coming to Newport for his Officer Candidate School training in September 
1964. We are blessed, indeed, to have him at the War College all of these years and 
to have him with us here today.
The award reads as follows:
The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the Department of 
the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award to John B. Hattendorf for 
distinguished service as the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History and 
Chairman of the Maritime History Department, U.S. Naval War College, from 
July 1977 to September 2016. 
Professor Hattendorf set the international academic standard, demonstrating 
unrivaled dedication as a naval professional in both peace and war. Through 
his history of war expertise, he influenced strategic thinking in combined 
and joint operations, as an advisor, mentor, and teacher to chiefs of naval 
operations, operational commanders, and seagoing professionals. 
Professor Hattendorf published sixty-five books and monographs, and 
produced 334 edited volumes, book reviews, and scholarly notes. 
A historian who clearly stood out, he emphasized the humanistic approach 
in examining the phenomenon of war and the influence of history upon 
American concepts of sea power. 
Professor Hattendorf’s exceptional record of leadership and thirty-nine years 
of superior performance were major contributors to the remarkable success, 
enjoyed by the U.S. Naval War College, reflected great credit upon him and 
were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Department of the Navy. 
Signed: Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy
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PRESENTATION OF HATTENDORF PRIZE TO CAPTAIN RAHN 
Rear Admiral Jef frey A. Harley, United States:
We turn now to the recognition of this year’s Hattendorf Prize winner. I’d like to 
invite Vice Admiral Krause, Chief of the German Navy, and Captain Werner Rahn to 
join Admiral Richardson and Professor Hattendorf on the stage. We are also blessed 
to have Captain Rahn’s wife, Hiemke, and daughter, Claudia, with us today. 
The purpose of the Hattendorf Prize is to recognize and honor distinguished 
academic research and writing in the field of maritime history. Today, the U.S. Na-
val War College is honored to present the third award of the Hattendorf Prize for 
Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History. I believe it is particularly ap-
propriate for us to make this announcement before the distinguished company of 
maritime leaders, who are participating in this International Seapower Symposium. 
This prize is presented to recognize world-class achievement in original research 
that contributes to a deeper understanding of the broad context of interrelation-
ships involved in the roles, contributions, limitations, and uses of the sea services 
throughout history. It is widely viewed as the most prestigious award that any scholar 
can receive in this field. We hope that it will serve as a permanent beacon to encour-
age and promote new scholarship in this very important field of study. 
I’d like to thank, on behalf of the U.S. Naval War College, the Naval War College 
Foundation for permanently endowing the Hattendorf Prize, enabling us to present 
a $10,000 cash prize. Ambassador Judy McLennan is here with us representing the 
Naval War College Foundation. Thank you, Ambassador. This endowment also allows 
us to present a bronze medal designed by Professor Hattendorf’s youngest daughter, 
Anna Hattendorf. 
Captain Werner Rahn, the Naval War College is pleased to recognize your achieve-
ments by naming you as the Hattendorf Prize laureate for your distinguished origi-
nal research in maritime history. The award reads as follows:
This award is fully merited by your distinguished scholarly contributions to 
maritime history. You have shaped the world’s understanding of German 
navies and traced their influence upon professional military education, 
among the rules of navies and sea power. Your definitive historical studies 
reveal the social dynamics of naval cultures in the broadest sense.
In particular, we honor you for your work as senior editor, with Dr. Gerhard 
Schreiber, of the annotated edition of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff, 1939–
1945, that appeared over nine years between 1988 and 1997 in sixty-eight bound 
volumes.1 Your impeccable scholarship on this huge documentary source has 
made your edition the single-most important authoritative source for the strategic 
and operational decisions of the German Navy during the Second World War. 
Your operational histories and strategic studies of the German Navy, in 
particular, have informed contemporary practitioners to understand the 
1. This effort was addressed by Professor John Hattendorf in “Review Essay: The War Diary of the Ger-
man Naval Staff, 1939–1945,” Documentary Editing, September 1996.
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underlying politics of organizational group dynamics upon naval affairs, in 
both peace and war, over the entire scope of the German naval history, from 
1848 to the present. 
Your long and impressive naval service, combined with your continuing body 
of scholarship, represents a singular contribution to the future of the field of 
study in history. 
This award honors you and your incomparable work as a naval professional 
and as a scholarly historian, expressing appreciation for your distinguished 
contributions in framing our collective understanding of the influence of sea 
power upon international history. 
Presented this twenty-first day of September 2016 at the U.S. Naval War 
College, Newport, Rhode Island.
Captain Werner Rahn (Ret.), Germany:
Admiral Richardson, Admiral Harley, admirals, delegates, and ladies and gentle-
men, let me at first express my deep gratitude that an independent panel of Naval 
War College faculty members has selected me as the Hattendorf Prize laureate for 
2016. This news was a great surprise. It is also a great honor for me and, of course, 
for the German Navy. 
I express my special thanks to you, Admiral Richardson, who approved that the award 
should take place during this important meeting of world naval leaders. Many thanks. 
In my life as a naval historian I wrote, among other topics, some papers about the U.S. 
Navy in World War II. Today, it’s an honor for me to meet a Chief of Naval Operations. 
During more than twenty years, I benefited greatly from the stimulating intel-
lectual environment at the Naval War College, especially during my stay in Newport 
for six months in 1991–1992. 
Last but not least, I pass my deepest gratitude to my friend, John Hattendorf, 
who was and is my best teacher and pilot for understanding the U.S. Navy and its 
approach to history.
GERMAN NAVIES FROM 1848 TO 2016: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND
COURSES FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION2
Approaching Naval History. Military history deals with the evolution and structure 
of armed forces and their position in state and society. In this sense, naval history is 
taken to mean that part of military history that concentrates its studies on the navy. 
However, when dealing with the fields of research, there is one sphere that is the 
greatest challenge for military and naval historians—I am referring to warfare in 
the widest sense.
In his book The Face of Battle, the British historian John Keegan pointed out that 
many historians are shy of exploring the profundities and realities of war. 
2. The expanded, article-length version of these remarks appear in the Naval War College Review 70, no. 3
(Summer 2017).
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Generally speaking, it can be ex-
pected of military or naval historians 
that they have a certain affinity with 
the subject of their research. They 
should have a basic knowledge about 
the military in the same way that we 
expect an economic historian to have 
a sound basic knowledge of economic 
theory. Keegan is thus justified in de-
manding that the military historian 
should spend as much time as pos-
sible among military personnel, “be-
cause the quite chance observation of 
trivial incidents may illuminate his . . . 
understanding of all sorts of problems 
from the past which will otherwise al-
most certainly remain obscured.” 
Like any historian, the naval his-
torian bears a great responsibility in 
striving after historical truth, if he 
wants to be taken seriously. The un-
critical patriotic history that used to 
glorify naval actions should be a thing 
of the past, nowadays. 
Today, some historians tend to
judge personalities, events, and struc-
tures according to today’s moral cat-
egories. They end up, and I quote Professor Thomas Nipperdey, “putting the past 
on trial, and since the critical historian, armed with his generation’s self-confidence 
or with the progressive concept of the future, knows everything better, in this trial 
he will be prosecutor, judge and legislator all in one.” 
In 1957, the German Navy began to develop a new approach in studying its own 
history. That year, the first Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Rear Admiral Rolf Johan-
nesson, organized the Historical-Tactical Conference. Since then, it has been held 
every year. It is now a standard element of the naval officer’s historical education. 
Admiral Johannesson’s aim was to distance himself from the subjective naval his-
tory about World War I. He hoped that a critical discussion of the past would teach 
the officers truth, loyalty, and moral courage, and that they would determine their 
own position more solidly by recourse to history and the federal constitution. 
Up to 2016, fifty-six conventions have been held, covering a wide variety of sub-
jects. Papers are usually presented by junior officers from the fleet, who are assisted 
by naval historians. The presentation of the papers and the candid discussion of 
subjects relevant to the business of the day usually give testimony to the intellectual 
talents among the Navy’s officer corps. Many an admiral-to-be made a mark when 
he, as a lieutenant, presented some critical theory, provoking the older generation’s 
opposition. 
Captain Werner Rahn provides remarks after receiving the 
Hattendorf Prize.
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Today, the German Navy has both a lively interest in its history and also a special 
relationship with it. A clear link can be seen between the historical self-perception of 
its officers and the history of their service. In the past, this link often served only to 
secure the Navy’s own position in its fight for recognition and even for its existence.
It is a perennial challenge to historians to try and come close to historical truth. 
The commercial success of popular publications as well as the number of visitors 
attracted to the museums indicate how many people have some historical interest.
This continuing interest is a stimulating challenge for professional historians. We 
should continue to try and present our findings about past backgrounds and struc-
tures in such a way that the message gets across. That is, that historical knowledge 
and sensitivity become stabilizing factors for a liberal society. 
The Humorous Touch. If this calling sounds ponderous enough, we should not 
forget the humorous touch—it always was and will be a refreshing element of hu-
man life. I’ll present a short example.
In 1943, the following story received clearance for publication in Germany, print-
ed with 20,000 copies! I emphasize it is at the climax of the Second World War.
During an air raid on Berlin, a circus had been hit. Two lions escaped and were 
on the loose in Berlin. Nobody had an idea where they might be. 
After a fortnight, one lion returned ruefully in his cage. He looked worn out and 
thin, and swore to his fellows, “Never again! I should rather put up with bad horse 
meat than have to find my own food in Berlin!”
The next day, the other lion came back, proud as anything, and fatter than he 
had ever been. 
“Hello, where have you been?” the others called to him. “What have you been 
up to?”
“Who me? I was in the Naval Command Headquarters, and every day I had an 
admiral for supper. But be careful not to tell anyone. No one’s noticed yet.” And 
back he ran to the Naval High Command.
Let me add that in December 1943, the German Navy had, indeed, some 130 
admirals. Of course, not all of them were in the Naval High Command. 
However, according to this story, you may say that during two world wars, German 
admirals were eaten by a lion, called British naval power, and by an eagle, called U.S. 
naval and air power.
To draw another analogy from this story, you could say that after World War II, 
German military and naval archives were, indeed, eaten by British and American 
historians, while German naval historians, without any access to the documents, 
looked worn out and thin for nearly ten years. 
Early Naval Cooperation. Let me present a short example of naval cooperation 
a long time ago. The first German Navy was established in 1848, when the conflict 
over the Duchy of Schleswig resulted in a war with Denmark. 
For the buildup of naval forces, it soon became clear that almost all requirements 
for personnel, materiel, and organization could not be met. In October 1848, the 
first German Secretary of the Navy forwarded an official request to the U.S. govern-
ment to assist the buildup of a fleet. In the United States, the German liberal revolu-
tion had been observed with interest and an open mind. 
First contacts were established by the frigate USS St. Lawrence, which was visiting 
Bremerhaven in 1848. The ship and crew were enthusiastically received as envoys 
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of a hoped-for ally. The U.S. Navy began its support activities by rendering training 
assistance. The materiel support concentrated on providing the frigate, which trans-
ferred to Europe in summer of 1849. 
Even though the duration and scope of this first American aid to Germany were 
limited, it was early evidence of American policy being ready and capable to sup-
port, across the Atlantic, the principles of democracy and liberalism. 
Confrontations. First examples of confrontation were German naval activities to 
the United States, during World War I. 
On 7 May 1915, the submarine U-20 sank, without warning, the British passenger 
liner RMS Lusitania. This attack claimed the lives of 1,200 civilians, among them 126 
Americans. That incident resulted in a severe diplomatic rift with the United States. 
On 7 October 1916—nearly 100 years ago—the thirty-one-year-old Lieutenant 
Hans Rose, with powers equivalent to those of an ancient Roman proconsul (Rose’s 
words!), headed his submarine, U-53, for Newport naval harbor in order to demon-
strate the efficiency of German submarines—so to speak, a warning to the U.S. Navy. 
After three hours, Rose left Newport and sank five ships off the American coast, un-
der prize rules. This action was observed at short distance by sixteen U.S. destroyers. 
In the course of the twentieth century, Germany has twice tried to force a strate-
gic decision in direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon naval powers by cutting 
the Atlantic shipping routes. Both attempts ended in failure. 
The second defeat brought with it the end of the German Reich and the dissolu-
tion of all German armed forces. 
The Western orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany led to the close 
binding of the new German armed forces into the Atlantic Alliance.
Long-term Cooperation. Let me finish with an example of long-term coopera-
tion. Ten years after the surrender in May 1945 came the difficult new start for Ger-
man forces. The Allied Forces supported the buildup, especially the U.S. Navy, with 
its then-CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke. 
During the first years of the buildup, a close cooperation and friendship devel-
oped between Arleigh Burke and Vice Admiral Fred Ruge, the first German CNO. 
Burke created a basis of confidence. He was firmly convinced that allied forces can 
only fulfill their common tasks if their cooperation is based on openness and mu-
tual trust. 
Vice Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this basis of confidence, which to-
day has become a matter of course. This meant, for the Navy, the smallest of the 
armed services within the Federal Armed Forces, that for the first time in its history 
it was obliged merely to perform that function “which a German Navy can actually 
perform”3 in close cooperation with the great maritime powers.
Rear Admiral Jef frey A. Harley, United States:
I think you’ll all agree that we made a fantastic selection for the third award of the 
Hattendorf Prize. Captain Rahn, congratulations on your many accomplishments. 
Admiral Richardson, Admiral Krause, Professor Hattendorf, thank you for help-
ing to honor this great scholar. 
3. For this quote, Captain Werner Rahn cites Dieter Hartwig in Die deutsche Flotte im Spannungsfeld der
Politik 1848–1985, ed. W. Rahn and G. Fromm (Herford: Mittler, 1985), p. 197.

Cybersecurity’s Role in Maritime Operations
Dr. James Lewis 
Senior Vice President and Program Director 
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Our final keynote address is from Dr. James Lewis. He is from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He’s worked with the Department 
of Commerce; the Department of State, and the Department of Defense (DoD), most 
notably in Operation Just Cause with U.S. Special Operations Command and Opera-
tion Desert Shield with U.S. Central Command. He really understands our business. 
Most importantly, at our last International Seapower Symposium one of the feed-
back items was that people wanted to hear about cybersecurity. It was clearly an 
interest item. It is a bigger interest item now. We brought in who we think is the best 
person to talk about cybersecurity.
Dr. James Lewis:
Thanks very much. I’m going to talk for about thirty minutes on cybersecurity. Then 
we can open up for questions.
11
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One of the things that I hope comes across in this discussion is that we’re now 
in a different era for international security. There was a period of about twenty-five 
years, after the end of the Cold War, where you had stable, great-power relations. 
That period is over. There are new challenges, new kinds of disputes. The world 
is going to be different than it’s been since 1990. 
NO NETWORK IS SECURE 
When we talk about cybersecurity, it’s good to clear up a couple of things up front. 
No network is secure. Sometimes people will say, “Well, my network isn’t connected 
to the Internet.” It probably is and you just don’t know it. Or they’ll say, “I have an 
air gap.” That’s a great idea, an air-gapped network. I learned how to defeat that 
about fifteen years ago.
When you use network devices, computing devices, chips, industrial control sys-
tems, you’re making a tradeoff. You’re getting benefit, but you’re also getting risk. 
At the same time, you’re also getting opportunity. Your potential opponents face the 
same set of risks that you do. It’s like any other weapon system. There’s a tradeoff 
between the benefits and the risks.
Nonstate actors do not have the capabilities to the do the most damaging cyber at-
tacks. You’ll hear this a lot of times—“Don’t we have to worry about nonstate actors?” 
The answer is, in most things, and particularly in your line of business, no. That may 
change. We’ve been expecting it to change now for about a decade and it hasn’t. 
Right now it’s state actors. There are multiple states pursuing offensive cyber 
capabilities—multiple being in the mid-twenties, maybe thirties. Many more are 
developing defensive capabilities. 
CYBER IN FUTURE WARFARE 
This is what warfare will look like in the future. An immediate reaction will be “Well, 
I don’t have any of these capabilities. I don’t know what they are.” You probably do 
and you don’t realize it. You use computers. You are familiar with electronic warfare. 
You’ve probably thought about how to modernize your intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR). Those are many of the components—but not all—of 
cyber warfare. So each navy has an incipient cyber capability. 
One thing to bear in mind: you probably wouldn’t go into a conflict without an elec-
tronic warfare capability. We’re now at that point where that’s true for cyber. You don’t 
want to go into a conflict without some kind of cyber capability. If you go in without elec-
tronic warfare, it changes you from a vessel to a target. The same will be true for cyber. 
The other thing that we know, based on about twenty years of experience, is that 
countries use cyber techniques consistent with their larger strategies and doctrine. 
If you think about what a country’s goals are, what its strategies are, this is a new tool 
for national power. [States] use it as a new tool for national power. 
The first cyber attacks occurred in the second half of the nineties. The first cases 
of cyber espionage occurred in the early 1980s. There’s a great book—it’s still in 
print, which tells you something—called The Cuckoo’s Egg,1 if you want to read it. 
1. Clifford Stoll, The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy through the Maze of Computer Espionage (New York:
Doubleday, 1989).
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We have two decades of experience with attacks and almost four decades of experi-
ence with espionage. So there’s a lot of experience. I’m trying to base some of my 
remarks on this. 
Cyber capabilities create a new operational space for force and for coercive ac-
tion. This is an important distinction. You can destroy things with cyber attack. 
We’ve seen that in Ukraine. We’ve seen that in Iran. There’s a test video on the 
Internet where you can see the United States blow up a generator at Idaho National 
Labs. You can destroy things. It’s hard. Only a few countries have this capability, but 
it’s possible.
More important is that we’ll be manipulating—manipulating your understand-
ings, your control systems, and creating an extended effect of the fog of war, which 
you know from Clausewitz. What is the strategic effect of this? To diminish an op-
ponent’s will and capacity to resist. In that sense, it is like any other kind of weapon. 
Having said that, though, that strategic-level attack is unlikely. Sometimes people 
talk about cyber 9/11s or cyber Manhattan Projects. It’s probably not going to be 
used that way. You could think of scenarios where I turn off the financial system, 
electrical grid, or the transportation system in an entire country. But what would I 
get from that? A lot of annoyed opponents. 
So people probably aren’t going to use this like it is a nuclear weapon. The Econo-
mist had a cover that had a picture that showed, like, a mushroom cloud. It’s not a 
nuclear weapon. Hard to get that effect, and probably a waste of time.
[Cyber] is more like a precision-guided munition. The code that has to be used 
for cyber effect, very often, is tailored to a particular system. Stuxnet is an example. 
Stuxnet had a delivery vehicle, that’s what escaped out. It was on thousands of sys-
tems around the world. It also had a payload, and it was designed for one specific 
target. That was the only target that was hit and the only target that was damaged.
PRECISION EFFECTS
Think of [cyber] as a precision-guided munition. Think of this as a new way to strike, 
precisely, against certain kinds of targets. The operational effect is really to degrade the 
performance of commanders, troops, and weapons. Let me do that in reverse order. 
Most of your weapons run on software of some kind. They have chips of some 
kind. All those are good targets. You might think, “My weapon isn’t connected to 
the Internet,” but you might connect it to the Internet, at some point. In any case, I 
can use radio frequency to deliver to a weapon system.
One of the hidden battles of the last decade has been different countries trying 
to penetrate their opponent’s weapon system to see what its capabilities are, learn if 
there’s anything useful they can borrow to build their own weapons, and disrupt the 
weapon performance in combat. 
This is just an expected part of conflict now. It’s something that people should 
think about. 
You may try a weapon and it may not work. Some open examples—they’re a bit 
dated, but I’ll use U.S. examples. At one point the Navy was computerizing a ship 
and they ran it on Windows. You all know Windows. If you say the word “Windows,” 
that’s immediately followed by “the blue screen of death.” The operating system 
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crashed. The ship was unable to maneuver or sail and had to be towed back to port. 
You could probably do that with a cyber attack. 
There was a more recent example, where a flight of F-22s was going from Ha-
waii to Japan. The F-22s crossed the international date line. Because of a software 
glitch, all their computer systems on the aircraft crashed. Software is really complex, 
every software has some error, and every error is exploitable. Fortunately, their en-
gines continued to operate. Also, they were being refueled at that moment, so they 
turned around and followed the tanker back to Hawaii, because they no longer had 
navigation or instrumentation. You could expect that kind of effect, as well. 
It may not be every weapon that’s affected, but if you have ten, maybe eight of 
them won’t work. Maybe two of them won’t work. Maybe they’ll go off course.
My favorite, of course, is Blue Force Tracker. Suppose I can scramble the red dots 
and the blue dots on your Blue Force Tracker, so you end up shooting at your own 
people. This is not a hypothetical example. It is a reasonable goal for this kind of 
cyber attack. 
Disrupting logistic schedules—if you are traveling on the airlines, going to San Jose, 
California, your luggage will go to San Jose, Costa Rica. You can do that kind of thing, as 
well. U.S. Transportation Command here in the United States, for example, has been a 
target, multiple times, for penetration, exploitation, and possible disruption. 
A good way to think about this is that you are operating with equipment that 
gives you tremendous advantage, but it also creates new vulnerabilities that people 
are trying to exploit. 
A more interesting thing is, what does this say about use? I told you the payload 
was specifically designed for a certain system. Sometimes it only works once. This is 
sort of a debate topic: are these single-use weapons? You get attacked, you figure out 
what the problem is, you fix it, and the weapon doesn’t work anymore in the future. 
What does it say for use? It tells me, I should use it right up front and early. So in 
one sense, if you’re seeing cyber activity against you, it is an indicator. It’s a warning 
of something else coming down the pike. 
Think about the 2007 Estonia incident. Estonia suffered a series of fairly basic, 
primitive attacks against government networks and a few financial networks. I got 
to talk to the Estonia Minister of Defense. You read in the paper that Estonia was 
brought to its knees by this attack. They weren’t brought to their knees. What they 
were afraid of, though, is that the attacks were a precursor to some sort of kinetic 
action, some sort of invasion.
Think of cyber as something that people will use early. It may be the first indica-
tor that you’re in some kind of shooting match. And if you have [cyber capability], 
you may have to ask, “Do I wait and lose the opportunity, or do I use it right away?”
CYBER, INTELLIGENCE, AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
You know the intelligence aspects of this. It’s been a goldmine for intelligence, not 
just for the the United States but for many other countries, as well.
The kind of operational security or communication security that you observe—it’s 
hard for people to think about that, sometimes, in an Internet context. My favorite [ex-
ample] is one country has been e-mailing beautiful maidens’ pictures to your sailors, 
saying, “I want to be a friend.” You know somebody’s going to fall for that. The ability to 
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get into your network, get information, and use that information to improve their own 
planning and thinking about how to disrupt operations is a crucial part of this.
One of the things we’re seeing is that cyber warfare is blending with electronic 
warfare, ISR, and intelligence assets. In the future, I think you’ll see more of a com-
bination between the people who do cyber, electronic warfare, and intelligence. 
Same sort of systems, same kind of thinking, same kind of intangible benefits. 
The good news is, that means you probably already have some capabilities that 
you can recombine and get more punch on the cyber side. It’s something to look 
forward to. 
One of the things we ought to think about, too, is that it’s likely that in a conflict 
people may not necessarily play in our lanes. You think about how you’re going to 
use this stuff. The other folks may think about how to use it differently. So cyber con-
flict is not really a good way to describe it, because it will probably include attacks on 
space assets, weapons systems, and communications. 
The goal is not so much to create physical disruption—a possibility—but to dis-
rupt performance and, more importantly, to take the informational advantage away 
and give it to the other side. The other side will be able to make decisions quicker, 
more accurately than you. They will be inside your decision cycle. That’s the real 
goal of cyber war, in some ways. I’m going to disrupt the information you depend 
on, whether it’s for targeting, troop position, or whatever. I’m going to disrupt that 
and use it for my own advantage.
This is very much about [the question] how do I expand the fog of war.
One thing we talk about, sometimes, is hybrid warfare. I go back and forth on 
whether or not I like this term. Hybrid warfare, in some ways, doesn’t capture the 
full part of this, but what it does point to is how war might be different in the future.
What you’ve got is a situation where we’ve had great power stability for twenty-five 
years. A couple of incidents shaped people’s thinking about what that meant.
The first was the Gulf War where you saw a new way of fighting warfare that com-
bined precision-guided munitions, space assets, and some of the informational advan-
tages we’re talking about to give the coalition side in warfare a tremendous advantage.
I was the fourteenth person to get to Riyadh, when the war [Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm] started. We were talking to the guy I worked for. General [Charles 
A.] Horner [U.S. Air Force] asked me which prison camp I wanted to go to, the 
civilian or military. We expected tens of thousands of casualties. 
That was not what happened in the war, and that was a shock for many countries. 
They realized that the militaries that they assembled were no longer effective and 
they needed to rethink how they fought it. That was shock number one.
Shock number two was the conflict in Serbia. You saw, again, the use of stealth, 
precision-guided munitions, informational advantage, and air assets. You had po-
tential opponents begin to ask, “How do I get around these American advantages? 
How do I get around this Western way of fighting? What are things I can do that will 
allow me to operate without triggering this overwhelming conventional advantage, 
that will let me avoid deterrence in some ways? How can I circumvent deterrence?”
Our opponents, at least, have been thinking about this for probably close to 
twenty years now. They’ve made some real progress with some weapon systems. You 
know about GPS jamming, attacking space assets, or cyber warfare. 
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GRAY AREA CONFLICT
A more important part is exploiting ambiguities in international law and in strate-
gies. What we’ve seen is conflicts where it doesn’t quite rise to the level of force. It 
doesn’t justify your right to self-defense under the UN Charter and international 
law. It doesn’t qualify as an armed attack. 
There’s a gray area. What we’ve seen against the United States in the last couple 
of years is a whole set of attacks that fall into this gray area. If you think about Sony, 
nobody died. There wasn’t any physical damage; it was clearly a coercive act. If you 
think about Iran and some of its attacks on our banks, clearly coercive acts. 
There are other things you can point to. Currently I’m told someone’s poking 
around in our electoral system. I think that’s a coercive act, but it’s not an act of 
war. Act of war isn’t really a legal term. It’s a way to coerce your opponent without 
triggering something that would let them use their military capabilities. We need to 
rethink how we respond to these kinds of incidents. We should expect that warfare 
will be different in the future. It will not be World War III. It will not be, necessarily, 
massed conventional forces engaged in conflict for years. It will be this kind of gray 
area conflict that’s very difficult to deal with and requires some rethinking. 
What we’re seeing is a mixture of unconventional strategies. People are experi-
menting with [questions like] how do I get this advantage? How do I get a coercive 
effect without triggering deterrence, without triggering the use of force in response?
This is where cyber can be very useful, because it’s borderline. A classic example 
would be Saudi Aramco. Saudi Aramco was attacked and thirty thousand comput-
ers had their data destroyed. Was that physical destruction? No. Is it armed attack? 
Probably not. But it had a real effect. It had a coercive effect. That might be what I’d 
want to do to you. I’d want to go onto your systems, erase your data, change things 
around, and you’d have to make a decision. You’d probably have to talk to your 
lawyers, which is always painful. 
What sort of response does this justify? The United States, in particular, is wres-
tling with the idea of proportional response. If you follow the Law of Armed Con-
flict, you want to be proportional in your response. What’s proportional to wiping 
out the data on thirty thousand computers, or leaking the e-mails of Sony execu-
tives? Hard to figure out.
It’s a gray area, and because the risks of open conventional conflict are so high 
more people try to exploit this gray area.
Exploiting ambiguity in international law will be emphasized here. In some ways, 
you don’t want to think about cyber attack in kinetic terms. Yes, you can have kinetic 
effects, but it will be in this kind of gray area that we’ll see most of the action.
 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT 
Where are we on international negotiations? I was the UN rapporteur for three suc-
cessful negotiations. Another negotiation has just started, but I was excused from 
duty. 
There is international agreement, to some extent, on how to treat cyber warfare. 
That includes the Law of Armed Conflict. There is agreement that the UN Charter 
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applies and that includes both the ability of states renouncing the use of force and 
the ability of states to exercise their legitimate right of self-defense if attacked.
So that’s good news. We have agreement on those two things. We have agreement 
that sovereignty applies to cyberspace. We’ve embedded it in the framework of in-
ternational law. That was 2013. 
In the 2015 negotiations, what we thought was, “This won’t be so hard. We’ve 
agreed on the big principles. We’ll go into the details now.”
There is no agreement on the details. People don’t agree on how the Law of 
Armed Conflict applies, what a proportionate response would be, where it’s ap-
propriate to use cyber weapons, if you have to think about mass effect. There’s no 
agreement on limiting [cyber weapons’] use in conflict, other than this general 
agreement that you should try and use them in a way that’s consistent with the in-
ternational humanitarian law. 
We found that some countries argue that the precedent here is like outer space. 
We have the Outer Space Treaty from the 1960s that bans weapons of mass destruc-
tion being placed in space. Some people say we should ban attacks in cyberspace. 
Unfortunately, the two countries that are most active in advocating in that position 
also happen to be two with the most powerful cyber-attack capabilities in the world. 
But this is the UN. Your behavior doesn’t have to be consistent with what you say. 
Other people say, “No, we’re all doing this. Just recognize it. It’s going to be part 
of warfare in the future. Let’s just say that you use it the way you would any other 
weapon. You think about the collateral damage. You think about the effect. You try 
and restrict it to legitimate military purposes.” 
There is a dispute here. How this dispute will turn out, I don’t know. But it means 
that in the near term, we’re unlikely to see any sort of agreement constraining the 
use of cyber attack in conflict or, frankly, in peacetime. This will be part of how 
people move ahead. 
CYBER: 100 PERCENT LIKELY IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The use of cyber means in conflict—and conflict is more than armed conflict, it’s 
this broader notion of hybrid warfare or other activities—the use of cyber tech-
niques in conflict is 100 percent likely. And the more advanced the opponent the 
more likely you are to see them attempt to use cyber effects. 
It will be part of your operational environment. 
Sometimes people call it a new domain. One of the benefits of calling it a new 
domain is that it makes it easier to think about. You could think about how you’d 
train, equip, operate in a new domain. 
But it turns out to be relatively difficult to work through the organizational and 
doctrinal aspects of cyber warfare. It’s just different enough that you have to think 
about it. The United States and others have been experimenting with different or-
ganizational models, different ways to structure. One of the debates [asks] is it like 
U.S. Strategic Command, where you have a global mission, or is it like a supporting 
command, where you assign people to one of the regional commanders to support 
their operations. It looks like the answer is both for now. There is a global mission. 
There is also an ability to send people to support regional commanders.
This is a period of experimentation, while people develop the weapon, while they 
think about how they’ll use it, and how they think they’ll get advantage from it. 
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This is just part of how warfare will change. This is not a surprise. Since the start 
of the Industrial Revolution, new technologies have come along and people have 
figured out how to use them to get military advantage. That’s what we’re doing now 
with this. 
In some ways, you’ve been through this. Navies have certainly been through this 
before. Think about moving from sail to steam, moving from surface to air, then 
from surface to subsurface. Think about the introduction of precision-guided mu-
nitions and electronic warfare. [Cyber] is a continuation of that path—of a new 
technology giving you a new way to exert force against your opponents and giving 
nations a new way to coerce or force other countries. 
I focused a little bit on warfare. I want to clarify one thing: if you decided that 
one advantage is exploiting the blurring of the line between peace and war and you 
want to expand that gray area, making it difficult for your opponent to react—you 
can see lots of examples of that in recent years. 
How do I get into this gray area? Cyber is a great way to do it. It may not be con-
flict. People are testing different attack capabilities. 
You may have seen an incident involving a German blast furnace in the last year, 
where German operators lost control of the blast furnace. That was a test by another 
country of a cyber attack. It was an attack on an industrial control system, the kind of 
devices that run your ships. I can get inside them. I 
can monkey with them.
As we move to merchant ships that have smaller 
crews, that are more automated, that are really run 
from their home port—that’s a huge opportunity. 
They’re going to communicate by radio. There’s a 
very good chance that their radio signals wouldn’t 
be sufficiently secure to prevent someone from get-
ting in. 
What if you take control of a merchant ship and make it sail around in circles? 
What if you did that? Is that an act of war? Not really. Is it a violation of your national 
sovereignty? Probably. How do you respond to it? You need to work that out in ad-
vance. Don’t wait for the start of conflict. 
WE’RE ALREADY IN A CONFLICT
In some ways, we’re already in a conflict in many areas of the world. In other ways, 
people who will use [cyber], will use it in peacetime. Don’t think of war and peace 
anymore. Think about larger periods of conflict, where cyber is a great tool. 
Think, too, about how you blend it. The most advantage will come from a blend 
of cyber techniques, electronic warfare, information and intelligence assets, and 
space assets. If you can blend [cyber] in a target set, blend [cyber] in some more 
effective way, you will gain advantage.
This is a continuation of a trend that started a couple of centuries ago. It’s an 
acceleration of the trends and technology changing how we fight. It’s also part of a 
change that nations are less likely to do. They’ll try to avoid direct conflict. They’ll 
try to avoid major clashes. It may not always work. 
Don’t think of war and 
peace anymore. Think 
about larger periods of 
conflict, where cyber is a 
great tool.
—Dr. James Lewis
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The risk of miscalculation is really high because it is a new way to attack people. 
You don’t know what the lines are. There is no international agreement on what 
the lines are. You may very well do something that you think is provocative and 
interesting and your opponent may well decide that it justifies some sort of forceful 
response. 
It’s a period of uncertainty and experimentation. That means you need to be 
experimenting. You need to think about how you will incorporate this capability. 
DISCUSSION
Question:
I have two questions. 
One is the challenge of designing attribution. The other is embedded malware 
that we may not have any cognizance of. You talk about indications and warnings, 
but perhaps there is embedded malware and systems that may be carrying viruses 
that we’re not aware of until a critical moment. 
Response:
Those are both great questions. Thank you for asking them.
An embedded malware issue is often called supply-chain risk. A while ago, I used 
to make fun of it saying, why would I bother? It’s so easy to break into your network. 
Why would I get into a chip, change the code in it, and then hope the chip ends up 
in a weapons system that I can then exploit?
Any network can be broken into, but the cost of breaking in is great and has 
increased for some things. That means that a strategy that infects your supply chain 
with embedded malware is attractive. There’s a lot of fun ways to do that. One proj-
ect we did a long time ago with DoD was to ask suppliers where they got their soft-
ware. You have the primes and they got [the software] from a contractor, and the 
contractor got it from a sub, and the sub got it from some guy he hired in another 
country that we didn’t know about. They mixed open-source software—freely avail-
able software.
There are lots of points in that chain where I could inject something that would 
give me an advantage. The tools we have for screening software will not yet detect 
these vulnerabilities. They will detect maybe 80 percent of them, but it’s a chance to 
get in. In the last few years, we’ve seen people begin to manipulate the supply chain 
and, in particular, it’s semiconductors. 
You need to just accept that you will be operating in a degraded environment, 
and that you will have systems that will not perform at 100 percent, or maybe not 
even at 25 percent. Your challenge is [to answer the question] how do I continue to 
operate effectively in this degraded informational environment. 
The supply chain risk, the embedded malware risk, is no longer a hypothetical 
risk. So that’s number one.
Attribution is a fun one. It comes up a lot. It’s actually a problem in some ways. 
We will talk about how the United States does attribution and then talk about other 
countries.
In 2006 to 2007, roughly, DoD began to put a huge effort into improving attribu-
tion capabilities. The motive for that was if you can attribute an attack, you’re more 
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likely to be able to deter it. The idea was that we’ll reinforce deterrence by develop-
ing strong attribution capabilities. 
This is something the United States has been working on for about a decade. It 
has had some effect. There’s one line in the 2015 State of the Union address where 
the president refers to our improved attribution capabilities.
How do we do it? One of the issues that people have is that the private sector 
uses forensic techniques. Your computer gets hacked, there may be something left 
behind. You look at that and try to figure out from that who it was. And that’s okay. 
That works maybe 25, 30 percent of the time. 
Now, I’m going to reinforce it. The first way I’m going to reinforce it is I’m go-
ing to use my own intelligence capabilities. I’m going to sit on your network and 
see what you’re doing. People can turn on the camera and microphone on your 
mobile device remotely, even if the device isn’t on. So that’s a golden opportunity. 
It seems cheesy, but a lot of us put tape over the camera if it’s built in because it can 
be turned on. That’s been true for more than a decade. 
I have the ability now to see what you’re doing. I can think about your doctrine, 
your plans, your operations, your units. Using that, I can reinforce the forensic 
activity. 
It’s the ability to blend the information an attacker might leave behind with all 
the intelligence sources you have—traditional signals intelligence, spatial intelli-
gence, communications intelligence—with cyber espionage that probably has im-
proved U.S. capabilities.
A former National Security Agency director told me that he could attribute ac-
curately nine out of ten cases. It was funny watching the staff behind him, because 
all their faces looked really shocked. I think it’s probably true. We can probably do 
three out of four. But it’s by combining all these techniques. 
What do you do if you’re a country that doesn’t have these techniques? The an-
swer is you don’t do attribution as well. This is a problem in negotiation. When we 
announce that we know it’s North Korea, or whoever, people always say, “Show me.” 
Well, sometimes we can’t show you, because it [reveals] sources and methods. 
The ability to attribute has improved. One of the things that is changing the en-
vironment is that you now can hire commercial actors who are not as good as the 
government but pretty good at attribution. There are three or four companies in 
the United States that probably get it right more often than not. That ability to hire 
a commercial service may give a country the ability to compensate for having less 
robust intelligence support.
The final note on this: I don’t know how it will change warfare. The original 
thought was that if we could do better at attribution it would reduce the chances of 
attack. That’s probably true, but it doesn’t reduce the chances of people planning 
to attack you using cyber techniques, or planning to embed malware. I think we 
will see some change in the environment as a result of better attribution but not 
enough. 
Question: 
Can you comment about perspectives on ethics? Do people care about ethics in 
this kind of activity, especially when we talk about nonstate actors? Also, you know, 
young, smart people are not difficult to get. They’re not expensive. How can this be 
controlled? 
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Response:
Another good question: what about hackers and nonstate actors? 
One of the problems in assessing these people is that they tend to brag a lot. I was 
at a meeting once where someone from Google told me that Google has the same 
capabilities as the National Security Agency. I said, “That’s amazing. I had no idea 
that you guys had satellites and nuclear submarines.” Well, they don’t. 
The community of people that do hacking, they’re doing it for prestige. They’re 
doing it for brownie points, in some ways. So let’s sort of break them apart. 
There are perhaps twenty or thirty hackers groups in the world that are better 
than most states. They are at a level where, if you were ranking them as a country, 
they would be in the top ten. 
Most of those hacker groups live in what we politely call Russian-speaking areas, 
and they can be proxies for the state. The most effective hackers, the ones who 
are the most skillful, live in a sanctuary where they are protected. They will not be 
arrested. 
The only time we arrest these people is when they’re dumb enough to take a vaca-
tion in Thailand, or Turkey, or someplace like that. It is kind of Darwinian. The best 
hackers, the smartest ones, don’t take vacations abroad and we’ll never get them. 
Why would they stop? Some of them have skills that are as good or better than 
most nation states, twenty or thirty groups. They can be used as proxies. There are 
a few states that depend on the hacker community and use it. Think of [these hack-
ers] as a militia or irregulars. We know they take directions from state intelligence 
services. We know they cooperate and act in ways that are coordinated with military 
activities. They’re nonstate actors, but they are nonstate actors like a militia, or ir-
regular forces, or guerrillas. 
Those people are the best in the world. Their day job, however, is to steal money. 
They are in it for the money. Most of the big bank breaches you see come from these 
groups. They’re not sitting around. It’s not like the movies, where evil geniuses 
think about how they’re going to disrupt the electrical grid. There are evil geniuses, 
but they are thinking about how they’re going to get into J.P. Morgan and extract 
tens of millions of dollars. That’s their day job.
Next layer down is a broad class of people who are anti-establishment, anti-state, 
willing to take political action. Fortunately, so far, they do not have the capability to 
cause a lot of damage. They can cause embarrassment. They can probably break in 
and get our e-mails. 
One thing I always tell the people who work for me is don’t write in an e-mail any-
thing you wouldn’t want to see published on the front page of the New York Times. 
That actually happened to me in 1998. It was very embarrassing. 
They can get your e-mail. They can, maybe, disrupt your data, but they can’t 
cause kinetic effects. In some cases, in particular the case of WikiLeaks—the entity 
that has released a lot of the material on the Democratic National Committee—
WikiLeaks appears, and this is speculation, to be operating in concert with a foreign 
power.
You have this linkage between powers who want to avoid direct conflict, want to 
disrupt the United States and other Western countries. We’re not the only ones who 
suffer from this. If you want to call it hybrid warfare, call it hybrid warfare. One of 
the tools [these powers] use is proxies who can extract information. It then goes 
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mysteriously to outlets like WikiLeaks. It appears and causes a political effect. I think 
that’s something to think about. 
The ability to get that kind of information is relatively easy, because most net-
works are so poorly defended. One thing to think about: if you defend your work 
network really well, congratulations. They’re going to go after your home network. 
If you think about defending your home network and your work network, that’s 
great too. 
They’re going to go after your contractors. You have persistent opponents who 
are skilled and will look for that opportunity. You might never have thought about 
that. They may be breaking in, scraping your Facebook page. If you put things up on 
Facebook, they’re going to look for that. There’s a good chance that will tell them 
what your password is. You do have hackers who are relatively skillful. 
The main difference, though, is the ones who live in countries that enforce the 
law tend to go to jail, within two to three years. The ones who live in countries that 
don’t enforce the law are invulnerable. There is political intent here. 
The ability to improve attribution and forensics means that more of these people 
get caught, if you find someone to enforce the law. 
The final one to talk about might be groups like Daesh, or ISIS, or ISIL. They 
have done a tremendous job of using the Internet for recruitment, training, com-
mand and control, fundraising, and propaganda. They are, again, exploiting the 
existing structure of international law. You’re committed to free speech. What do 
you do? It’s very hard to draw the line here. 
What we’ve seen, certainly in the last decade and maybe in the last twenty years, 
is opponents thinking carefully about where the gaps are in international law that 
they can take advantage of to achieve coercive or political effects. 
Daesh, or ISIS, and al-Qa‘eda do not have the ability to carry out the most sophis-
ticated cyber attacks. 
This is something I track very closely, in part because for the last fifteen years ana-
lysts have been saying Daesh and al-Qa‘eda will get the cyber-attack capabilities they 
need to cause true disruption within the next two to three years. I used to believe 
that. The first time I heard it, maybe in 2006 or 2007, I believed it. I just heard it last 
week from a senior American official and he said two to three years, again. As long 
as it’s two to three years out, I don’t really care. 
Eventually they will acquire [these skills], in part because there’s a huge criminal 
black market. Going back to the hacker question—the number of exploits against 
commercial systems is in the millions. You can go into a black market and buy the 
tools you need to break into a network, to disrupt data, to exfiltrate data. You cannot 
yet buy the tools you need to cause physical disruption. 
Even with that, Daesh, al-Qa‘eda, all these groups have not bought the tools they 
would need for even information extraction. Their capabilities remain really primi-
tive. It’s something to track. 
I look at Hezbollah as the most likely, because Hezbollah has a connection to 
Iran. Iran has a connection to Russia. Russia is probably the best in the world, with 
the United States, at hacking skills. Iran has improved radically in the last five years, 
going from basically zero to ninety. They now have the ability to infiltrate networks 
and possibly cause physical disruption.
In the Aramco attacks, they had the ability to manipulate industrial control sys-
tems. We don’t know if they just didn’t realize they had that or they chose not to do 
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it. But then if you think of the links between Iran and Hezbollah, it’s like why not? 
You give them missiles, for crying out loud. Why don’t you give them cyber attack? 
So far, it hasn’t happened, but it’s something to track.
So nonstate actors—think more of political effects but track their ability to cause 
disruptive or damaging effects. 
Question:
Thank you very much for the presentation. 
According to the latest military document of Russia, the Russians don’t make any 
differences between the cyber, strategic communication, media effect, information 
gathering, and information sharing. They just use the term “information space,” 
which means that everything is well coordinated. 
What do we need to do to achieve a synergy across all these areas, using our 
capabilities?
Response:
That’s a crucial point. I really thank you for your question. 
One of the things that makes this difficult is that national doctrines, particularly 
among the leading cyber powers, are very different. We show up equipped to play 
one kind of game. They show up to play another kind of game. 
For the Russians, the focus is very much on information, on opinion-shaping. 
They talk about preconflict opinion-shaping. How effective it is, is a matter of dis-
pute. It was initially very effective in Ukraine. The effect has gone down as the infor-
mation operations have become less connected to reality. 
On the other hand, these information operations are part of a larger campaign 
to disrupt the transatlantic alliance. This is what is going on. I apologize if this of-
fends anyone. But the goal is to disrupt the transatlantic alliance, to degrade the 
United States, and to attack the idea of democracy. 
It’s not just the United States that is suffering from intrusions into its Congress 
and its political parties. We’ve seen similar activities in the Scandinavian countries, 
Germany, and France. Their focus is less on kinetic effect. 
We tend to think about [cyber] as a weapon. I can use this to make your ship stop 
working, to make your missile go off course or not work when you press the button. 
The Russians think about it differently. They ask, “How do I gain information on 
damage?” It’s difficult to respond to. This is, of course, consistent with Soviet prac-
tice, going back to the czars. 
If you think about disinformation campaigns, the use of information, there are 
two things that you can do about it. The first is that you have to have the basics of 
network security, because it’s the ability to extract information and use it in politi-
cally damaging ways that has given these opponents tremendous effect.
Getting back to the attribution point—the first time we saw this kind of opinion 
manipulation was probably in 2008. You might remember that there was something 
called Climategate, where the networks of a group of leading climate scientists were 
broken into. Embarrassing e-mails were extracted and then leaked to the public, 
disrupting the conference. 
That’s a tremendous coup, if you can derail a big, global conference. 
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It’s likely we know who the attacker was, but we don’t know it with the certainty 
that we know, for example, the Democratic Party, or the Bundestag, or any of the 
other recent activities.
The first thing you have to ask yourself is, are my networks meeting at least some 
basic level of activity? The answer is probably no, unless you thought about it. Most 
attackers get in, dwell for months. They don’t have a lot of trouble. It’s only the most 
basic techniques that are required.
You can change that and reduce the effectiveness of these operations. 
The second thing, and it’s a little harder, is you need to think about what’s in your 
communications. This gets back to the e-mail point. It’s unfortunate, because we’ve 
grown to depend on these networks, but you can’t trust them. 
So what is it you’re writing? Is it encrypted? How well is it encrypted? Who con-
trols it? You’re getting back into a more traditional space for communications. It’s 
very difficult for people to think, “I’m writing an e-mail. It’s like a letter. It’s private.” 
It’s not. Even at the most basic levels of security it’s probably penetrable. 
So I think the Russians have developed new tactics, new techniques that exploit 
the openness of democratic societies, that exploit the porousness, the vulnerability 
of existing networks. They figured out a way to use it for political effect and we have 
not developed good countermeasures. That’s something, hopefully, we’ll work on. 
So what do you do? You leak the Democratic National Committee’s e-mails? We 
had one senior officer once say, if you hack my companies, maybe I shoot a cruise 
missile at your space-launch facilities. The answer is no, you don’t do that. That’s 
disproportional. It doesn’t make any sense. It’s not a credible threat. It’s not a cred-
ible threat to say you do this informational activity where no one dies and there’s no 
physical damage, and I respond with a kinetic.
That’s where we are. Our opponents have figured out strategies that evade the 
responses we have in place. Now we have to rethink them. 
That’s not a very satisfying answer. I wish I would tell you something else. 
I was just talking about this yesterday with people from the U.S. Cyber Command 
and we’re trying to figure out what do. It’s a very difficult problem. 
Question:
Could it be that the theft of identity within one country could be part of a plan for 
disrupting internal defense?
Response:
I think that’s one of the fundamental questions for this discussion. I’ve picked on a 
few countries. There are many countries that engage in these activities. The extent 
to which they engage in them is shaped by their national interests. 
All countries have some ability to carry out domestic surveillance of their internal 
communications. That usually means—I used to do this for a living—negotiating 
with people over what we call lawful access to communications. I never found a 
country that did not surveil its own citizens. I admit that I did not talk to the Vatican. 
So there might be one. 
If you have the ability to surveil domestic communications, you can—it’s a global 
network with global connectivity. Right now, Beijing is about ten milliseconds away 
from this auditorium. Moscow is about ten milliseconds away. It’s a two-way thing. 
You can connect globally. 
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Some of it is resource driven. You need resources to have the most advanced ca-
pabilities to get into a network. But if you can do domestic surveillance, if you can 
do electronic warfare, you can think about how you could get into someone’s net-
work. What we’ve seen is that countries use these capabilities consistent with their 
larger national strategies. 
I just gave a talk at the Organization of American States on confidence-building 
measures. Some of the ambassadors there said to me, “This is Latin America. We 
don’t need confidence-building measures, because we’re never going to go to war 
with each other.” 
They do need confidence-building measures, just to build confidence, to create 
transparency. 
Countries have this capability, at least incipient. Militaries have this capability, if 
they have electronic warfare and ISR. It’s incipient. The question is, how do they use 
it? The way they use it will be consistent with their larger national strategies.
You might want to [ask], who is it that would be interested in my information? It 
could be cyber criminals who are looking to gain financial advantage. It could be 
opposing intelligence forces who want to better understand your capabilities, plans, 
and intentions. It could be militaries who are prepositioning code for use in a con-
flict. Or it could be political activists who are looking for things they can do to shape 
your politics to embarrass you. 
It’s not a very nice environment, but that’s what you’re looking at—those people 
who are interested in hacking you.
Did I misunderstand the question? 
Reformulated Question:
The stealing of identities within a country, could that be part of plans by these 
hacker groups to create disturbances within a specific country?
Response: 
You have a device. It’s running some kind of software or code. I want to inject addi-
tional code that will cause the device to either give me information or malfunction. 
We can call that malicious software, or malware. What are the ways I get in to do 
that? Some of it is through radio frequency. 
I’m getting to the identity point. 
A radar receives signals. Radios receive signals. I can use that as an entry point 
into your network, to inject malicious code. I can infect the supply chain. I can, 
when you’re connected to the Internet, find out where you’re connected, find some 
way to use that Internet connection to inject this malicious code. 
I can think about poisoning websites. When you go to a website, or your crews go 
to a website, if they click on the website, they automatically download this malicious 
code.
A few years ago, some criminals decided it would be good to do this on the Super 
Bowl website in the United States, right before the Super Bowl was played. Fabulous 
success. 
The most common technique for gaining access to someone’s networks is to im-
personate their identity. I think that’s your question. The most common technique 
is called phishing. Hackers spell things funny. You get an e-mail that appears to 
be from a legitimate person? They’ve stolen your identity. Usually, they steal your 
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e-mail address. It’s that appearance of being a legitimate e-mail that gives you access 
to the network. 
A great one for business is an e-mail that comes with the subject line that says 
“Next year’s bonuses.” There’s a file in the e-mail. It appears to be from your chief 
financial officer. They have his e-mail identity—you click on it and they’re in. That 
one works really well.
Another one—a popular one now—is someone a couple of layers down in an ac-
counting office will get an e-mail over the weekend from the chief executive officer 
saying, “I couldn’t reach the chief financial officer. I need you to transfer $10 mil-
lion immediately to this client. Here’s their new banking information.”
When you put it that way, it sounds silly. Why would anyone be silly enough to fall 
for that? It works like a charm. It’s happened multiple times. 
The problem we have with identities in cyberspace is that it’s easy to steal. It’s easy 
to fraudulently purport to be someone. It’s one of the weaknesses. 
There are ways around that. The technical term would be “authentication.” 
Most people just don’t steal identities for fun. They steal identities for some pur-
pose, either for espionage or crime. It’s easy to do. It’s one of the things you need 
to think about.
Question: 
Yesterday, in the context of the maritime domain, we talked about codes of conduct 
and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. We talked about the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, largely to communicate, to limit miscalcula-
tion, and in some ways, to protect national domains. 
There are a lot of parallels you can draw between the maritime domain and the 
cyber, if you want to call it a domain. Do you see in the future that we’ll be adopting 
codes to limit miscalculations, to communicate intent, to protect national domains 
in a similar fashion that we have in the maritime domain, and what are the chal-
lenges to that?
Response:
That’s a good question. 
The short answer would be no, the way current trajectories are progressing. This 
began largely as an intelligence activity, so it has a high degree of covertness. Most 
countries still treat this as relatively covert. 
If you’ve read the open-source material on U.S. doctrine and cyber capabilities, 
which is pretty limited, that’s the most that almost any country has put out. Coun-
tries don’t want to talk about this. They don’t want to reveal their capabilities. 
With a physical domain, you have a rough idea of what the capabilities are. We 
have a long history of arms-control negotiation. I can tell you range, payload effect. 
That’s not true in cyber. In some ways, there’s a powerful incentive not to tell people 
when you have a capability. 
There are confidence-building measures that have been agreed to in the 
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE. Those include 
transparency in national doctrine, but not in capabilities in doctrine. They include 
creating mechanisms for regular exchanges on cyber capabilities to reduce the 
chances of miscommunication. 
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There are actually hotlines where you can call up to avoid miscommunication. 
The United Sttes has this with Russia. I think we’re developing it with China.
But the hotline idea doesn’t make a lot of sense because if this was a covert attack, 
you call the other guy and say, “Hey, was that you?” If it wasn’t him, he says, “No, it 
wasn’t me.” And if it was him, he says, “No, it wasn’t me.” 
It makes people feel better to have hotlines, but I’m not sure they are yet ro-
bust enough. We need a deeper understanding of how this will actually work. We 
need more willingness of countries to admit they have the capabilities before we can 
reach that point. 
Miscommunication is one of the great risks here, because you may be engaged 
in an intelligence operation and it could look like an attack. You may do something 
provocative, like turn off a power plant or a steel mill, and it could be misinter-
preted as an attack. 
So the risk of miscommunication, miscalculation is very high, because we don’t 
have rules and because it’s so covert.
Having sat through the negotiations on this for five years, I’m not confident that 
we’ll progress any time soon. 

Regional Breakout Group Reports
Moderated by Professor Thomas Mangold
Dean of International Programs, U.S. Naval War College
Dean Thomas Mangold:
We’ll be doing regional breakout groups. I will act as moderator. We’ll go to thefirst speaker, Vice Admiral Wijegunaratne from Sri Lanka. 
INDIAN OCEAN–GULF OF ADEN–ARABIAN SEA–RED SEA REGION
Vice Admiral Ravi Wijegunaratne, Sri Lanka:
U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson; President of the U.S.Naval War College; the chiefs of navies and coast guards; distinguished del-
egates; ladies and gentlemen.
The heads of the navies and coast guards from the Indian Ocean region had an excel-
lent conversation about the ongoing challenges in our region. [We also discussed] the 
lessons learned and the way forward to deepen and strengthen our cooperative efforts. 
You see the participating na-
tions in the following graphic. 
You can see it’s a formidable 
group: we are two nuclear pow-
ers, India and Pakistan; one 
continent, Australia; some of 
the world’s largest oil suppliers; 
and some of the best tourist des-
tinations in the world. 
The Indian Ocean is talked 
about now. There’s a lot of writ-
ing, [such as the books] Mon-
soon1 and Asia Looks Seaward.2 All 
of these books are saying that 
the center of gravity—of pow-
er—is shifting to the Indo–Asia 
Pacific region. 
1. Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 
2010).
2. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (Westport,
Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008).
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Persistent Challenges. When we go through the challenges, we have persistent 
[ones], even with the improved cooperation among the nations of the region and 
being well-supported by the extraregional powers. The security challenges in the 
Indian Ocean region remain unchanged.
Illicit Trafficking. First among the range of challenges is the trafficking of hu-
mans, narcotics, weapons, and other illegal goods. 
Piracy. Piracy is the second ongoing challenge that we identified. As noted ear-
lier in our meetings, instances of piracy in the Indian Ocean region have decreased 
due to our cooperative efforts. However, pirates remain—including their kingpins. 
Piracy could increase in the region if the underlying conditions change or coopera-
tive efforts decrease.
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. IUU fishing is an ongoing chal-
lenge across the region. 
Terrorism. Terrorism remains both a regional and global challenge. 
Pollution. Pollution is an ongoing issue in the region. 
New Challenges. Some of the challenges are relatively new, or they are manifest-
ing themselves in different areas. 
Illicit Trafficking in New Areas. Trafficking of humans, arms, and narcotics have 
changed locations over time, and they appear as new forms. Cooperation on these 
challenges has to be achieved. 
More Outside Actors. States and multinational actors from outside the Indian 
Ocean region are now more active in the region. The changes introduce new coop-
eration, and new patterns are emerging. This creates both opportunities for further 
List of nations that participated in the Indian Ocean–Gulf of Aden–Arabian Sea–Red Sea region outbreak group
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cooperation as well as potential challenges in understanding the intent of the new 
participants. 
Changing Shipping Patterns. New and growing transit hubs in the Indian Ocean 
are appearing, such as Colombo Harbor, where a large number of containers are be-
ing transshipped. Because of that, it is important to reinforce efforts in combating 
trafficking and smuggling activities.
Social Media. Members of our group also pointed out the growth of social media 
as a challenge. It is widely and effectively used by criminals, terrorists, and nonstate ac-
tors for recruiting and inspiring the younger generation, and for sharing information.
Lessons Learned. The group discussed the increased operations that have oc-
curred over the past years in the region, highlighting some of the key lessons learned. 
• Improved cooperation. States in the region, with regional powers supporting,
have increased information sharing, which has improved cooperative efforts.
However, all the delegates agree that much more needs to be done in the area
of information sharing.
• Effective Antipiracy. The delegates also noted, with gratitude, the effectiveness
of the coalition in the antipiracy campaign.
• Regional Centers Supporting Maritime Security. It was noted that the Euro-
pean Union’s support of the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center
and the Maritime Coordinating Center have been very successful in support-
ing comprehensive maritime security efforts.
• Controlling IUU. Several delegates pointed out that increased compliance
with the European Union’s regulations by states in the region has had a very
positive impact on the control of some of the IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean
region.
Building capacity successes. Finally, some delegates noted specific successes in 
bilateral cooperation to build the capabilities and capacities of smaller states.
Actionable Items. To build on these successes, delegates mentioned a number of 
areas where actions would be taken to deepen and expand cooperation. 
More Information Sharing. As noted before, this needs to take place to support 
cooperative efforts.
Increase and Persist in Building Capacities. Larger states’ assistance to the re-
gion’s smaller states in building the latter’s capabilities and capacities must increase 
and be persistent. The concept is to provide smaller countries with lasting capa-
bilities to address the range of maritime security issues in their exclusive economic 
zones. All delegates recognized that such efforts are expensive, but will produce 
high returns.
Increase Antipiracy on Land. Despite the successes of maritime efforts in reducing 
the instances of piracy, delegates said efforts should be increased on the land to assist 
states in dealing with pirates, to produce more lasting results. 
Increase Legal Assistance. Delegates indicated that increased assistance with le-
gal frameworks and procedures for prosecuting maritime criminal activities would 
produce much better dividends. Similarly, a large number of delegates pointed out 
that there needs to be increased assistance with the disposition of seized narcotics, 
weapons, and criminals, such as pirates. 
Broaden Efforts to Stop Pollution. Delegates pointed out that there are subre-
gional efforts in cooperating on pollution. However, within the south region there 
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should be a broader regional effort to increase cooperation . . . to stop pollution 
or environmental disasters, which are likely to happen, and which are beyond the 
capabilities of any single state or subregion to contain or to mitigate. 
Finally, let me thank and compliment Admiral Richardson and his able staff for a 
well-conducted Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium. Sir, it has been 
a great experience.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
That was a great presentation. Thank you very much. The next report is by Admiral 
Luís Fragoso from Portugal.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Admiral Luís Fragoso, Portugal:
Let me start by thanking and congratulating Admiral Richardson for the outstand-
ing organization of this Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium. 
Also, I’m honored to represent the Atlantic Region Breakout Group. I would like to 
say thank you for the contributions from all the delegates of the group, composed of Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, Ireland, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States, 
and Uruguay, and for the support of Professors Vogel and Dombrowski and their staff. 
Two years ago, this group decided to divide the Atlantic Ocean into four geo-
graphical areas in order to better identify specific impacts of enduring trends in 
maritime security. We admit that we found some different issues, and we confirm 
many of those in this following graphic. However, we realized that there are many 
common aspects—freedom of the seas and security of sea lines of communication 
being the most evident. 
This year we have identified the 
emergent concerns, opportunities 
for collaboration, and challenges 
that affect the Atlantic region. 
Increasing Terrorism and Cyber 
Threats to Maritime Domain. As we 
heard from Dr. James Lewis, we can 
consider these taking remote control 
of merchant ships, or even weapon 
systems in warfare, like warships.
Return of Former Actors. They 
remember navies. There is a need 
to be prepared for the whole spec-
trum of action at sea. 
Impacts of an Enlarged Panama 
Canal. Namely, these are the im-
pacts on maritime traffic patterns, 
the design of ports and inland 
communication networks, and of 
course, sea lines of communication.
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Opportunities for Collaboration. We identified exchange of communication in 
the maritime domain awareness, namely, among maritime operation centers, to 
counter drug operations. There is also the opportunity for further development 
of regional organizations, such as CAMAS, or the South Atlantic Maritime Area 
Coordinator; Comunidade dos Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (CPLP), 
a Portuguese-speaking countries community; and Venice Regional Seapower 
Symposium. Additionally, there is an opportunity in continuing programs that assist 
in building up the maritime capability where needed. 
Challenges. We started with unmanned vehicles—namely, the policy and regula-
tion for their use. There are also the impacts they may have on the balance of forces, 
on manpower and affordability.
We identified the difficulty of obtaining a United Nations mandate and legal 
framework that would enable maritime partners’ prosecution of illegal actors. 
One of the biggest challenges will be cooperation in the cyber domain, namely, 
information-sharing agreements among [those involved in] the Atlantic region. 
Finally, we considered the role of navies in maritime security operations versus 
constabulary in the traditional defense roles, stressing the need to keep navies’ ca-
pability to address the full spectrum of activities, from the low end to the high end. 
This concludes my presentation. Thank you for your attention. 
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Admiral.
Our next presentation will be on the Mediterranean Sea–Black Sea–Caspian Sea 
region. It’s to be given by Admiral Petev from Bulgaria.
Enduring maritime security trends identified by the four Atlantic region subdivisions
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA–BLACK SEA–CASPIAN SEA REGION
Rear Admiral Mitko Petev, Bulgaria:
Admiral Richardson, Rear Admiral Harley, distinguished colleagues, chiefs of navies, 
chiefs of coast guards, distinguished participants, delegates to the International 
Seapower Symposium, it has been a privilege to moderate the regional breakout 
group on the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, and Caspian Sea. It is an honor to back 
brief.
My job was very easy, because the contributions were outstanding. The represent-
ing people are not only good insiders but also practitioners who really shape the 
region. We have representatives from nineteen countries, which are shown in the 
following graphic.
I underline that there is no prioritization in the following list of challenges, be-
cause perceptions about maritime security challenges differ according to nations. 
Nature of the Problem Drives the Scope of Response. This is a starting point, 
from where we can go deeper. The nature of the problem drives the scope of the 
response. If we need a cooperative response, that’s supposed to build a mechanism 
incrementally: national coordination versus within the responding nation, then we 
go to regional cooperation. Global application is the final stage. 
We cannot move to the next stage without having a good foundation for the 
previous one.
Cooperative Deterrence. One very important way to respond to maritime chal-
lenges [involves] the concept of cooperative response and cooperative deterrence. 
When we respond collaboratively and cooperatively to one problem, to one chal-
lenge, we demonstrate resolve. This is a very good conflict-prevention message. So 
cooperative deterrence will definitely be in place. 
The Concept of the Wider Mediterranean. This was well understood by all par-
ticipants. It should not be seen as a purely geographical sum of three water bodies: 
the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Caspian Sea. It’s a concept of nations brought 
together because of the interdependency of their social, economic, and political 
processes in the region. For example, a landlocked nation like Armenia is part of 
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the wider Mediterranean because everything that happens in the Mediterranean 
affects its security, and vice versa. 
A Graduated Response. Once again, it depends on what kind of maritime security 
challenge we discuss. Also, the scope is different. For example, we can add the western 
approaches of the Gibraltar Straits and the Red Sea when we’re talking about freedom 
of navigation and other issues about maritime trade. Usually the most workable solu-
tion, for most cases in maritime security, is the so-called graduated response, where 
different agencies, nations, international organizations can be gradually involved. 
Illicit Trafficking. Most important is the interconnectivity of maritime threats 
and maritime security in the region. That’s why illicit trafficking is important and 
has global impact. 
Mass Migration Crisis. This is among the top challenges in the Mediterranean. 
Everybody hears about recent developments in the area. We have to pay attention 
from the maritime security perspective. This migration brings other problems. It is 
a national security and a collective security problem. The maritime security prob-
lem in this mass migration is the preservation of lives at sea. Many incidents of 
sea-worthless vessels have caused massive loss of life. This is where our navies and 
coast guards are supposed to act. We definitely need a maritime response—an in-
teragency one—that would be among other international organizations, with good 
coordination and cooperation. 
Maritime security problems are generated ashore. Maritime security problems 
can be mitigated. Keep in mind that a solution is unsure, because the problem has 
been created ashore. We definitely have to act. We should not wait for somebody 
List of nations that participated in the Mediterranean Sea–Black Sea–Caspian Sea regional breakout group
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else to do our job. This threat prioritization is very much [held] among participants. 
This perception definitely will bond resolve to act ashore.
Inadequate Information Sharing. It is interesting that our region has a very rich ca-
pability of gathering information. Still we have a problem with information sharing and 
processing of this information. So different organizations, different nations, different 
communities have abundant information, but still the level of sharing is not as we wish. 
Accessibility of choke points is crucial. One important feature of the region is 
that it’s surrounded by choke points, and accessibility of these choke points is cru-
cial. If we look at the Mediterranean at large, we can even say that the Mediter-
ranean itself is a choke point, because it’s only 1 percent of a global ocean. At the 
same time, we have about 20 percent of global trade crossing the Mediterranean. So 
freedom of navigation is not just a regional, but also a global problem. We need to 
defend this very vigorously. 
On the other hand, all the choke points for the Mediterranean and inside the 
Mediterranean region are surrounded by multiple nations. Accessibility relies not 
only on the nations that control these choke points, but also the neighboring ones. 
Building on Existing Initiatives. It is very important that, in order to have deeper 
and wider cooperation, we use tools already in place. There are a lot of subregional 
cooperative initiatives that are workable, and they have success stories. To deepen 
and widen our cooperation in the maritime domain, we have to use these, instead 
of inventing the wheel again. 
Strategy-Driven Actions, Not Event-Driven Reactions. [This concept is] very im-
portant; the dynamics are very high. We shall take care to act strategically driven. So 
far we just react, event-driven.
Setting Russia Apart. There is an interesting point about Russia. Because of the 
importance of this question and variety of opinions, we sat apart and we saw the key 
points expressed. 
Russia Is a Security Concern. This is definitely [true] because of the access and 
area denial capability exercised in the Black Sea. There is also good evidence that 
such a capability is in place and building up in the Middle East around the naval 
base of Tartus. So what is the point? The point is that definitely we have to respond, 
but not overreact. Our response should be credible but not provocative.
In short, definitely, we have a temptation to see what’s going on with Russia, as a re-
turn back to the Cold War. But we shall not seek old answers to new questions. For this 
reason, this is the norm we have to follow. Of course, it has been an expressed opinion 
that Russia is entitled to enjoy the application of international law, to use the freedom 
of navigation. But there is one very important part of this. You can enjoy the right, but 
only if you respect it. So the obligation to observe international law is a must. 
Russia, of course, is no longer a Cold War maritime super power. Still the resur-
gent Russian Navy in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea is something we have 
to pay attention to. Clearly, we have to say that annexation of Crimea is a violation 
of international law at the very high end. 
Most Applicable and Proposed Action. This is to deter credibly, defend vigor-
ously, and seek a dialogue, in order to find a solution to this situation. 
I will express our group’s gratitude to Admiral Richardson for the wonderful forum. 
Thank you very much for keeping the bar so high, so that we can enjoy this forum. Our 
thanks go to Rear Admiral Harley as well. It gives us emotional comfort being back. The 
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best years of our career were here in the Naval War College. Additionally, it gives sound 
proof that academics and naval science can contribute very much to maritime security.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Admiral. 
Our next report will be on the Norwegian, North, and Baltic seas, by Rear Admi-
ral Mordel from Poland.
NORWEGIAN SEA–NORTH SEA–BALTIC SEA REGION
Rear Admiral Miroslaw Mordel, Poland: 
Admiral Richardson, admirals, ladies and gentlemen, I have the pleasure to report 
the results of discussion in the breakout group for the Norwegian, North, and Bal-
tic seas. We are talking about northern and eastern Europe, the small and shallow 
waters of the Baltic Sea, the more open but very busy North Sea, and the Norwegian 
Sea as a window to the Arctic and Atlantic. 
As shown in the following graphic, taking part in the discussion were twelve coun-
tries’ navies, six of them with access only to the Baltic Sea. 
Threats and General Concerns. Compared to many other areas, we don’t face 
any problems with piracy. We don’t face any problems with human trafficking. So 
from this point of view, it would be a peaceful area. 
Growing Russian Capabilities. However, we all agree that the growing Russian 
capabilities and activities have become a key challenge, especially with the potential 
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for tactical miscalculations. There has been an increase in the number of Russian 
ships’ naval activity and exercises, including snap exercises in the Baltic Sea. 
When compared to the era of the Cold War, pre-1990, Russian actions are not 
overly aggressive. Only when compared to the past decade are we seeing a more 
aggressive posture. However, combined with modern media, there exists the threat 
of tactical miscalculations. The margin of error has dropped significantly. A small 
error in the cockpit or bridge could have a strong reaction from a government. 
Public Perceptions of Militaries, Especially Navies. There is little public percep-
tion of navies, especially compared to armies and air forces, which operate in a 
more visible manner. Additionally, Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine are land- 
and army-focused operations. 
Internal European Divisions. For the last forty years, Europe has come together. 
However, there has been evidence of more European division recently. Brexit [Brit-
ish exit from the European Union] and immigration are examples. 
The Problem of Funding Modern Navies. Some navies have recently seen an 
increase in funding. Most of the navies struggle with small budgets, especially com-
pared to their respective armies and air forces. Poland and the Polish Navy are, un-
fortunately, good examples of such situations. Both politicians and the public need 
to be convinced to invest in building and sustaining modern naval forces. 
Lessons Learned. [The following points highlight some of the key lessons learned.] 
• Shaping perceptions of maritime security. We see a need to engage media, to 
shape public perceptions regarding the importance of maintaining maritime 
security. The public does not perceive the importance of maritime power. Na-
vies and coast guards need to engage the people and the media to raise public 
awareness. Information sharing enables collaboration and cooperation.
• Exercises as a deterrent. Sustaining the growing regional military presence,
[conducting] exercises, and demonstrating force work as deterrents. In the 
last three years, there has been an increase in NATO and U.S. presence in the 
region. Baltops is an example. For many years, this was a small state exercise. 
Now, the exercise has expanded, in both forces and complexity. This is viewed 
as a positive, especially in light of growing Russian activity. 
List of nations participating in the Norwegian Sea–North Sea–Baltic Sea regional breakout group
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• Shift in geopolitical identities. This requires new ways of thinking. Old rules
and assumptions are no longer valid, as the boundaries have shifted east since
the Cold War.
Actionable Items. [Actionable items include the following.]
NATO/Partnership for Peace Sets the Standard of Cooperation. We have over 
sixty years of experience cooperating with our NATO allies and regional partners. 
Poland was happy to join this cooperation in 1999. This provides an important base 
for future cooperation, and the level of cooperation within this region is pretty 
high. Of course, there is always space or place for improvement. That’s why the 
Baltic Commanders Conference3 has been established, with many subgroups and 
working groups we’ve tasked to seek other areas of potential cooperation. 
Interoperability Remains Challenge. The need for security often conflicts with 
efficient action among NATO and partner countries. Policy must change to better 
integrate all regional partners. 
Science and Technology. There’s a need to foster the development of science 
and technology with NATO and allied partners. This would include scientific ex-
changes and scientists working in multinational [efforts]. 
Thank you very much. 
DISCUSSION 
Question:
You expressed concern about the resurgence of the Russian Navy, and the possibility 
of mishaps due to errors on the bridge. Are there any steps being taken to obviate 
such a situation? Is there some sort of confidence building or dialogue with the Rus-
sians? If not, should something be initiated?
Response:
I know many countries have taken steps toward talking to the Russians, and have 
defined how to solve or avoid such problems. In the case of Poland, no, we haven’t 
yet made any steps in this direction. However, we are currently considering talking 
to the Russians about it. 
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Admiral.
Our fifth presentation will be by Commander Gorman from Jamaica. She will 
brief the Caribbean Sea group. 
CARIBBEAN SEA REGION
Commander Antonette Gorman, Jamaica:
Admiral Richardson, Rear Admiral Harley, distinguished delegates of International 
Seapower Symposium 2016, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the delegates from 
3. For more on the Baltic Commanders Conference, see “Starkes Signal der Ostseepartner,” (“Strong
signal from Baltic partners”) Baltic Commanders Conference, 9 March 2016.
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the Caribbean Sea, let me say thank you to the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
U.S. Navy for the kind invitation and the warm welcome to Newport. 
The past few days have been professionally enlightening and personally fulfilling, 
as a returning resident of Newport. It has been a wonderful opportunity to refresh 
acquaintances from near and far, make new friends, and continue my quest to forge 
stronger and perhaps even smarter partnerships. 
I have the privilege of reporting on the discussions of the heads of navies and 
coast guards from the Caribbean Sea. The participants are shown on the follow-
ing graphic. You will notice that we have English-speaking, French-speaking, and 
Spanish-speaking members in this group.
Common Threats. As we discussed [common threats], we did not arrive at any-
thing vastly different from what the wider group has been talking about this past 
week, or what we may have spoken about at International Seapower Symposium 
2014. The difference, in some instances, may be in the scale or frequency of one or 
other threats, but we all face similar threats. Most of the points addressed were also 
highlighted before. I will speak about some that may not have been mentioned by 
presenters in previous regions. 
Piracy. In the Caribbean, we are seeing an increase in piracy, [though] not to 
the extent in other regions. More specifically, it is really at a small scale, almost like 
pilferage from yachts and so on in the tourism industry, but not specifically against 
large merchant ships.
More Shipping Traffic. In tourism, there is a large amount of shipping in our 
area. That we see as an area of concern, should it be targeted by one threat or anoth-
er in our maritime space. There’s also the widening of the Panama Canal that would 
see increased shipping passing through the Caribbean Sea. Plans in Nicaragua for 
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a canal will give us more shipping in the area. Participants of my region saw that as 
a concern. 
Defense versus Resources. We speak about defense in depth in a vast maritime 
space, versus our resources. For the most part, the delegates from the Caribbean 
are mostly heads of coast guards. I believe Honduras has a navy and so does the 
Dominican Republic. But for the most part, the other delegates are from very small 
constructs. For example, my unit has just over 300 persons. We have a small amount 
of resources. Our maritime space is twenty-five times the size of our land space, to 
put it in perspective. 
When we talk about defense in depth, in the Caribbean we have a lot of internal 
security issues in the islands. As the heads of coast guards and navies, we discussed 
our concern with that. Our political leadership does not see the importance or the 
connection of what is happening in the maritime space with what is happening in 
the islands of our respective countries. 
Illicit Trafficking. I’m talking about the trafficking of all things illicit—humans, 
weapons (in particular, to support transnational criminal operations operating in 
and around our islands), and criminal gangs. 
Weak Institutions and Corrupt Officials. Oftentimes, when we do law enforce-
ment or our interdiction at sea, it is countered ashore by corrupt public officials or a 
poor, slow, or inefficient legislative process. So that also hampers the bad guys. They 
know this and they know the loopholes. Those errors are often exploited. 
Natural Disasters. In the Caribbean, we’re slap-bang in the middle of a hurricane 
area. That is always an ever-present threat for us. 
Cyber Security. We are also vulnerable [in cybersecurity]. 
Barriers to Interoperability. I mentioned the list of participants in the region 
with different languages. That was highlighted as one of the barriers to interoper-
ability and information sharing. At International Seapower Symposium 2014, we 
did highlight this issue. I can say, certainly, in my job, I’ve seen improvement in this 
area. More of our military constructs have set up information sharing—information 
List of nations that participated in the Caribbean Sea region breakout group
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operation centers. We are working closely, in some cases among ourselves, to share 
information. There has been some improvement in that, but there is still room for 
improvement there. 
Radicalization. We have radicalization in some locals in the Caribbean. As one 
speaker said, sailors look at the horizon while soldiers look down at a map. We 
looked at our horizon. We did see this as an issue that would come up in the Carib-
bean. It is now just off our port bow. In some islands in the Caribbean, we’ve seen 
some evidence of locals becoming more radicalized and even traveling to other 
regions to support terrorist organizations. That is a significant issue now. We had 
been looking at it, but it is more imminent. We are looking at how we will deal with 
that—the obvious gaps in our domain awareness and capabilities in our maritime 
space, and how they can exploit that. 
Grave Instability in Neighboring Countries. I will speak particularly of Venezu-
ela. Two years ago, the situation in Venezuela was slightly different. Today, we see 
the potential for mass migration. We see, as a result of the instability in Venezuela, 
increased piracy in the southern part of the Caribbean. That was also highlighted 
as a concern. 
Actionable Items. How can we address some of these concerns? 
Common Legal Frameworks and Agreements. We have these. They’re actually 
things that have some construct in place, in some cases, but need to be deepened, 
expanded, worked on. In some cases, there are none. Those are things that we can 
do in the Caribbean region to improve or to mitigate some of the threats we’ve 
highlighted. 
Strategic Communications. There was discussion about strategic communication 
to political leaders. That is definitely an avenue that, as maritime leaders in the 
Caribbean, we need to look at. How do we communicate with our political leaders, 
as they directly influence our modus operandi, capabilities, resources, and how we 
work with each other. 
Leverage Information-Sharing Mechanisms. Although the Caribbean is a very 
small place, it is populated with many different islands. Everyone is closely guarding 
their sovereignty. That presents a lot of barriers to sharing and working together at 
the strategic level. We need to learn how to communicate to our leaders the impor-
tance and benefits of cooperation.
Trust and Cooperation. We see that we are doing that. In a lot of instances, train-
ing, cooperation, and exchanges are facilitated by external partners, primarily be-
cause of their good interests and good partnership with us, but also because as a 
region we don’t have the resources to pull off large exercises among the different 
islands.
Bilateral Exercises and Agreements. For example, there is a plan for Colombia 
and Jamaica to do an exercise in the San Andreas area, as soon as we are able to do 
that. There are also things like Exercise Tradewinds and participation in 
UNITAS and Panama. These are things that we should continue to leverage to 
expand our ability to operate together and cooperate.
Institutionalized Regional Engagement. At the operatives level, we do speak to 
each other. We try to do things together. But in most cases, this is not institutional-
ized. We think that if we do that, it would make us better able to address our threats.
Finally, I would like to thank you again and wish all of you fair winds and follow-
ing seas back to your respective countries.
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Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, ma’am.
Our next speaker will talk on the Gulf of Guinea. That’s Rear Admiral Konaté 
from Côte d’Ivoire. The admiral is going to speak in French. 
GULF OF GUINEA
Rear Admiral Djakaridja Konaté, Côte d’Ivoire: 
I am not good with English, but I want to say something in English before I express 
myself in French. I am honored to represent my distinguished colleagues from the 
Gulf of Guinea region. On behalf of my colleagues of the Gulf of Guinea, I thank 
the U.S. Navy, particularly the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson, for 
giving us this opportunity to attend this symposium. With your permission, I will 
deliver the results of our discussion in French. 
It is a great honor to represent my distinguished colleagues from the Gulf of 
Guinea, as well as other colleagues. We had very interesting and productive discus-
sions. I thank my colleagues for their candid and relevant remarks. I will do my best 
to summarize a few of the salient themes we discussed.
The participants were from the countries shown in the following graphic. Some 
of those countries do not abut the Gulf of Guinea, but they support us because the 
problems of the region affect them as well.
Vast Challenges. First and foremost, we all agreed that the Gulf of Guinea faces a 
number of challenges—very specific and complex challenges.
As mentioned in previous presentations, the Gulf of Guinea is considered one of 
the most dangerous maritime domains. There is maritime piracy, illicit trafficking, 
and IUU fishing—a number of big problems. 
No Single Solution. Secondly, we came to the conclusion that no single solution 
can address all of these challenges. Indeed, maritime capabilities in the region are 
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quite uneven from one country to the next in the region overall. What is com-
mon, however, is that a number of efforts have been led. We need to continue to 
exert pressure on our politicians to act in order to strengthen security and enhance 
maritime security. It is incumbent upon each country to identify its own specific  
requirements.
Incremental Improvements and Opportunities. Thirdly, in spite of the numerous 
challenges facing the region, we have seen some interesting, incremental improve-
ments, and they are crucial. From an operational standpoint, the experience 
of the MT Maximus made it possible for us to emphasize regional and 
extraregional cooperation. From a strategic standpoint, a number of conferences, 
exercises, and seminars continue to leverage a number of opportunities—
opportunities that allow us to improve our regional integration little by little.
Heads of state and government of the Greater Gulf of Guinea have adopted a 
number of strategic documents, to wit, the African Integrated Maritime Strategy, or 
AIMS and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, as well as other regional strategy 
docu-ments in East and West Africa. 
Operationalizing Strategy. Yet the main problem is in implementation of these 
strategies. We need to transform these strategies into operational concepts—in-
deed, operationalize these strategic frameworks. To do so will require creative and 
innovative solutions such as the pooling of resources. It is essential that we forge 
partnerships at all levels. The Gulf of Guinea’s countries need to look for opportuni-
ties that will make it possible to leverage public–private partnerships. 
Inclusive and Comprehensive. Lastly, the solutions that are adopted will need 
to be inclusive and comprehensive. We need to pursue mechanisms that are fully 
inclusive as well as integrated across all political boundaries. Once developed and 
set up, it will behoove us to monitor the implementation of those decisions and 
evaluate progress made. 
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This summarizes our discussions yesterday in the Gulf of Guinea session. Thank you.
Dean Thomas Mangold: 
Thank you so much, Admiral. 
Our final presentation is by Admiral Kamarulzaman from Malaysia. I’d add that 
the admiral is our fourth Naval War College graduate speaking this morning.
PACIFIC OCEAN
Admiral Ahmad Kamarulzaman, Malaysia: 
Thank you very much. Firstly, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Admiral 
Richardson, Admiral Harley, and all the team for having us here at this fine institu-
tion. I’ve been very humbled and very honored to be back in the same hall. Twenty 
years ago, I was here as a Naval War College graduate in 1996. It’s just fantastic to 
be back again. 
I’m representing the Pacific group. I’d like to list the nations—the partners—in 
this Pacific group. The list represents countries [ranging] from an island state to 
one of the biggest nations in the world, a very small population to one of the most 
populous in the world, small nations that do not have any power to super powers.
Look at the list of twenty-two nations represented—there are at least thirteen dif-
ferent languages. You can imagine some of the cultural issues, the challenges that 
we’re going to face whenever we look at things.
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Lessons Learned. [Representatives of] all twenty-two nations all relate to the lev-
el and number of issues. All are worried about the survival of their nations, based 
on the increased sea level. That’s all they worry about. They’re not worried about 
nuclear war. They’re not worried about competing claims. They just worry about 
their survival. Another partner worries about how much fishermen bring into har-
bor, and when fishermen start to complain to them. 
Wide Range of Issues. This the point I would like to relate. Obviously, these 
relate to threats and also instabilities. I’m not going to go through all the issues 
because they’ve all been mentioned. What is important is that the level of concern 
is different; the level of interest is different. How much political will a nation state 
has on issues is different. You’re looking at about half of the world. Malaysia is just 
across the world—thirty hours of flight time before I am back to Kuala Lumpur. 
Legitimacy of the Government. The core issue is related to the legitimacy of the 
government. We talk about how much political will each government has when we 
talk about issues. 
Trust Is the Foundation of International Cooperation. We’ve all been mentioning 
trust the last two and a half days. We talk about trust. We talk about interpersonal trust 
that relates to interpersonal relationships. Building this trust is very, very important. 
As you increase the level of trust, you increase the level of confidence in working 
together. As easy as it is to say “trust,” it’s very, very difficult to build trust. We have to 
understand that. And it’s very easy to lose trust. That makes it more difficult. 
Personal relationships can overcome bureaucratic obstacles. It is very key that we 
understand that. There are sometimes simple issues that we, among navies, under-
stand. As long as we talk among ourselves in the front line, we get issues over with, 
just like that. But if we bring it to the next level of foreign affairs, or the foreign min-
istry, it gets into a different ball game altogether. This is why it is very important that 
[we understand that] personal relationships can overcome bureaucratic obstacles. 
One of the key lessons I will be highlighting later on is, as maritime leaders, how 
courageous are we going back home and trying to influence the internal stakehold-
ers in our countries? We can influence maybe other nations. We can change them. 
You can influence. But what we can do is influence people back home in our own or-
ganizations, in our own countries. Trust will build over time. That’s very important. 
It needs to be sustained. More importantly, it needs to have momentum. 
Again, this is fantastic, having all of us here to understand. It is a building rela-
tionship. It’s very important. And developing trust involves accepting risks in mak-
ing the first move. But why not? Someone will have to do it. We need to be coura-
geous in actually making that first move. This way, you bring this trust. 
Also, managing perception is key. It is very important. We must never assume 
what other people [think]. Even though you’re perceived [one] way, you have to 
manage and mitigate that. 
Similar Problems, Different Perspectives. There can be similar problems when 
you talk about issues—wide-ranging issues. What is different is the perspective of 
looking at these problems. I’m in a command that uses this tool, PESTELS (po-
litical, economical, social, technological, environmental, legal, security). We, espe-
cially naval commanders, sometimes tend only to look at the security perspective 
of things. Understanding other perspectives will help us to make better decisions. 
I think that’s very important. This is where it is a very good, useful tool whenever 
we look at maritime security issues. When we look at this [PESTELS], they’re all 
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actually interlinked. And very interestingly, a lot of it actually is going to be focused 
toward politics. This is the key issue that I’d like to stress.
Regional Agreements and Associations. There are a host of [regional associa-
tions] that are very, very good. We’re talking about symposia like this, numerous 
conferences around the world. But how many is too many? For a small nation like 
Malaysia and also the colleagues in my group, we can’t afford to have too many 
people in some of these conferences. We need to prioritize. Again, that relates to 
resource constraints. Also, what are we going to do in terms of actually getting in-
volved? We must prioritize, because resources are very limited. 
Navies, a Driving Force for Peace. [That navies can be a driving force for peace] 
is what we have captured during the discussion here. It is very important. The navy, 
instead of looking from the hard power [perspective], actually can use that soft-
power approach to be a driving force for peace. We need to also balance sea safety 
and national policies. 
Multiple Stakeholders. This is the other huge challenge that we discussed. It 
makes it more challenging, more complex, and more sophisticated.
Stakeholder Analysis. When we talk about stakeholders, what I would like to offer 
you is this tool, shown in the following graphic. If you’re able to actually map out 
all the stakeholders into a power and interest grid, you start to understand them. 
For example, over here, this one fisherman (noted as “F/M” in upper right of the 
following graphic) is very interested in how much fish he gets every day. But, as one 
fisherman, he does not have any power. But if all these fishermen group together 
and become an association, and all the associations group together and use media, 
maybe the politician comes in and they put forward their case. Then that issue will 
be obviously taken in a different light. This is a very simple example. 
List of nations that participated in the Pacific Ocean breakout group
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You can build this grid for a more complex situation. This case is just based on 
internal stakeholders. If you go to international relations, you can build it up for 
internal as well as external stakeholders. You can put nations here. Using this tool 
in analyzing stakeholders, you can double up. There’s actually a range of maritime 
security operations [that can be considered] in this manner. 
Those that are easy can be put on the left side, where they can achieve a high con-
sensus. The most difficult ones should be on the right-hand side. You can work this 
using the stakeholder analysis as you develop across time. You can develop a trend. 
Trust Matrix. Having put this tool across, there’s another tool. The reason why 
we use this is, if something is tangible—something that you can feel, something that 
you can see, something that you can measure—it is much easier for us to actually 
decide on things. Therefore, we would like to offer this trust matrix [below]. This 
is very interesting to see.
[The colors are] supposed to [represent] traffic lights, but rather than using 
circles for traffic lights, we just used boxes of colors. You can put a host of issues 
down here [to discuss]. I put CUES there, because that was discussed earlier. What 
it means is just a color code: [Red] is basically a no go. Everybody does not agree 
or a country does not agree with it. [Yellow] means they are looking at it. [Green] 
means they’re happy with it. 
The idea is to work hard, let it turn to gray and hopefully turn into checkered. If 
you look at that as a snapshot, a blip over time, you will probably see the number of 
reds will reduce and number of yellows reduce, and hopefully green will [increase] 
like that. 
Stakeholders mapped into a “power and interest” grid
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So it gives confidence. It gives individual nations or stakeholders their own met-
rics that they can keep them for themselves. Then when they do a bilateral [pro-
posal], they will compare their own two metrics with the bilateral. You [could] do 
a trilateral, maybe you could compare three. By having this, you are able to build 
more trust and confidence into any discussions. 
Takeaways and Actionable Items to Deepen and Expand Cooperation. 
Design Events to Build Personal and Professional Trust. We need to design more 
engagement activities, events, to build personal trust and professional trust. That is 
very important. It has to be considered across the chain of command. It is not just 
at at higher levels. It goes down to the cadets, for example. Work on this, because I 
met some of you down here. We need to create these small wins for the trust metrics. 
Actually, you create the small wins and often small wins will create more big wins. 
This is a momentum that we need to achieve greater success. 
• Consider the Stakeholders. You may need to include the stakeholders in and 
across agencies, or across nation states. 
• What Gets Measured Gets Done: Adopt Tools Such as the Trust Matrix. Once 
gap measures get done—by having something that we all can look at and com-
pare, even though there’s a color code—it is measurable. It will help [us] move 
on and achieve better levels of success. 
• Manage Perception. This is key. It is a very important point. Again and again, 
when we look at issues, we have to actually look at perception and listen 
accurately to understand the real issues. In this regard, effective messaging 
is very important. It is how you use media, what you want to put across as a 
message in managing this perception. 
• Develop International Norms and Standards. It is very important to actually 
manage the system through configuration control. We’re able to ensure that 
procedures are being updated, protocols are being updated, toward being 
more binding. We talked about starting with the soft law. Remember when we 
An example of the “trust matrix” championed by Admiral Kamarulzaman, who represented the Pacific Ocean 
breakout group.
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did the trust matrix? Whenever it’s green, you create basically soft law. Then as 
you move on, you can look into having that as an agreement. 
• Address Problems through a Holistic Approach. PESTELS—political, looking 
at it from an economy point of view, social, technological, environmental, 
legal, and security. 
Again, I would like to thank Admiral Richardson and everybody else for a fantas-
tic time in Newport, Rhode Island. I’m sure all of you will have fond memories. I’m 
looking forward to the next International Seapower Symposium. Thank you all, and 
fair winds and following seas. 
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Admiral. That was a great presentation.
Closing Remarks
Admiral John M. Richardson, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral John M. Richardson:
Ladies and gentlemen, fellow chiefs of navy, and fellow chiefs of coast guard,thank you again for making the time to join us in Newport for this very impor-
tant week. You’ve all been very generous with your time and with your thanks for the 
support provided to you. 
Thanks to the team. Because we’ve all run events of this type, you know that this 
only happens by virtue of the terrific contributions of a very capable team. I wanted 
to take a moment to allow you the opportunity to join me in thanking the team. 
Please bear with me for just a moment.
First and foremost, I think we’ve all realized that we’ve got a special place here 
at the War College, run by a very special staff and faculty. I’d ask you to join me in 
thanking Admiral Jeff Harley and his team, and certainly our able master of ceremo-
nies, Dean Tom Mangold. Tom, thank you so much for leading us here.
Also, the person from my staff who has been the man with the radio, moving 
to and from events, keeping things on track, is Commander Chris Fallon. Chris 
has been the person coordinating the efforts of over 120 naval reserve personnel, 
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thirty-six Naval War College faculty, thirty-five War College security personnel, over 
one hundred U.S. Coast Guard security personnel maintaining waterborne security, 
and then thirty-five men and women from my team that came up from Washington.
Thanks to all of you for what you’ve done to provide the venue, provide the sup-
port, the information technology support—everything needed to allow all of us to 
have the comprehensive conversations, conferences, and presentations that we had. 
I’d also like to provide a quick thanks to a team that rarely gets thanks: it’s to all 
of our translators in the back. They’ve been working very hard to keep us all con-
nected. Have the translators step out here. It’s a great looking group. They never 
get to show their faces. Team, thank you all 
very much. 
Before I go on, I just want to say that ev-
erybody who was in the room during Ad-
miral Kamarulzaman’s lecture gets three 
credits for their next War College course. 
That last lecture was worth academic credit. 
Thank you for that great lecture. 
Certainly, I think we can all agree that being a chief of navy and a chief of coast 
guard is a unique position. Again, just as this symposium was supported by a ter-
rific team, all of us individuals are supported by a terrific team. All of the staff, the 
executive assistants, aides-de-camp—it’s been rewarding to see you supporting your 
principal. So, one last thanks to all the supporting staff who traveled with us. Those 
supporting staffs are so critical because the scope of our responsibilities is so vast. 
No one person could ever do it alone. 
Rapid Change and Common Interests. One only has to consider how quickly 
things are changing in our world. The pace of change is more rapid than ever be-
fore. One only has to consider the situations of Admiral Srur from Argentina and 
Admiral Tin Augn San from Myanmar to see how quickly things can change, liter-
ally, in the course of a single-day election. You have a completely different trajectory 
on which your navy is proceeding. It’s been wonderful to talk with each of those 
folks, and see the great opportunity on the horizon. 
I think we all appreciate—and the regional symposia outbrief made it very 
clear—that our maritime environment is changing as rapidly as ever, is busier than 
ever, and is becoming more important than ever. That environment also unites us. 
We have much more in common. We operate in that maritime environment. 
We’re each responsible to our respective nations for keeping the seas and rivers 
safe, for keeping sea lines and lines of communication open for trade. We have 
common interests. We need to continue to use venues like this and other regional 
venues to strive to cooperate and find areas of commonality and ways that we can 
achieve our common mission. 
Also, while we found tremendous areas of commonality—areas where we agree, 
have common interests—we also touched on those areas where there are differenc-
es of opinion and different viewpoints. It’s just as important that we come together 
and speak very frankly about those areas, where we have those differences, and work 
toward a peaceful resolution of those differences. 
Common Themes. Admiral Verma’s discussion about the role that international 
law has played to resolve some longstanding issues, contentious issues, and to do so 
Part of what defines this blue 
century is an increasingly blue 
economy. 
—Admiral John M. Richardson,  
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
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in a peaceful manner was very compelling. As we resolve those, we can continue to 
work face-to-face to mitigate risk—the risk of miscalculation, the risk of some type of 
a mistake. We can, as I said, continue to work toward a peaceful resolution. 
In all of those regards, this week has been completely gratifying for me as we’ve 
worked through the regional symposia, the keynote speeches, the leadership up-
dates and the panel discussions. I take away a renewed appreciation of the work that 
we can do together to reinforce our areas of mutual understanding and to continue 
to work through our areas of differences. 
Admiral Lanba of India introduced to us [the concept] that this is the “century of 
the seas.” I want to take a bit of a turn on that phrase and say that it’s a blue century 
that faces us. That should get all of our attention. 
Admiral Ferreira of Brazil also mentioned that part of what defines this blue cen-
tury is an increasingly blue economy. Many of our nations already have our econo-
mies so closely tied to the sea, but that’s going to be more so in the future. 
The universal challenge we all share is keeping the maritime secure—it demands 
solutions. One common solution—and you saw it in all the regional outbriefs—was 
the idea of information sharing, the power of information sharing and its ability 
to level the playing field. How do we do this? Most of the time, when we talk about 
information sharing, we talk about it at a tactical level, sharing track information, 
contact information, a maritime domain picture, a maritime domain awareness. 
One thing that became clear to me is that there is also a need to share and reinforce 
information at the strategic level. After all, it’s a blue century, not a blue year or a 
blue decade. 
We need to think with the long game in mind. How do we build confidence 
among ourselves, at the strategic level, and transmit our support and advocacy for 
the importance of international laws and international rules?
I believe we can all leave this symposium reinvigorated and reinforced, and be 
more intentional about transmitting that message. After all, in the long run, in a 
blue century, the roles of international law at sea and international rules and norms 
of behavior will serve all of us, as each of our nations continues to grow and rides 
through the turbulence that we all face in this century. 
I’m a submariner by trade. We operate independently and have this phrase, “no 
news is good news.” If you hear no news, things must be going well. You’re executing 
your mission just fine. In this area of international rules and norms and the messag-
ing of their importance, I would say that no news is not good news. We need to be 
active in filling this space. We need to be vocal about it. It’s something that I think 
we can all share. It will be to the strategic benefit of not only all of our navies, all of 
our coast guards, but all of our nations. 
One of the common themes of the regional outbriefs was that in many of those 
regions and in many of those theaters there is an increasing radicalization of many 
of our youth. That radicalization becomes much easier if we don’t provide a coun-
terexample, a countermessage of the values that we embrace—the positive values 
that are so well-represented by the rules, norms, and behavior at sea, and the prin-
ciples that underpin those rules. 
I would encourage us all to use the media, and every opportunity that we have, 
to come together and transmit and be vocal about the importance of those norms 
and behavior.
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We spoke a lot about the regional challenges, but also about methods for so-
lutions. Admiral Ibas of Nigeria gave a terrific outline of the measures that have 
worked to solve the very tangled and complex challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. I 
think we all leave here with a renewed appreciation for the challenges that region 
still faces, but also appreciating the value of persistence in continuing to press for 
an approach. 
Many of these challenges are complex. It’s just going to take patience and per-
sistence, working toward sharing information, sharing resources when that makes 
sense, and working through regional disputes, borderline disputes, disputes over 
exclusive economic zones, and so forth. 
Admiral Barrett pointed out the importance of a persistent approach to continue 
to beat back problems and make progress. Consistency and stability will lead to bet-
ter results. 
After listening to Dr. Lewis’s discussion on cyber, there was a lot of discussion in 
the hallway about how interesting that talk was—interesting and also a bit scary, a bit 
terrifying. He gave us a terrific look into this emerging area of cyber security, cyber 
operations . . . cyberwarfare. 
About what Admiral Martin from New Zealand called a postmodern navy—we 
think about each of our navies and coast guards operating in domains that range 
from space to all the way to the seafloor and everything in between. It includes infor-
mation on cyber domain. It ranges from deep water all the way to the littorals and 
into rivers. You can start to see what this postmodern navy might embrace.
The Next International Seapower Symposium. One thing that I think is a topic 
for our next get-together at International Seapower Symposium round twenty-three 
will be what do we want to say, as a group, about the maritime environments and the 
need to be sustainable—the need to be respectful to the environment?
Pollution and environmental concerns were mentioned in many of the regional 
outbriefs. That is something that we’re going to look to put on the agenda next 
time. As we build capability, can we think about building warships from a sustain-
able perspective? Again, thinking in terms of a blue century, as we bring each of 
those systems to the end of its life, from cradle to grave, can we be thinking more 
sustainably?
I’ve hinted that I’m already starting to look forward to International Seapower 
Symposium XXIII. I’ve got a couple of ideas that I’d like to pitch, and we’ll be in 
touch with you before you know it to start putting together the agenda. 
The capabilities of our navies rely on the strength and initiative of our enlisted 
cadre. I might want to offer up a venue to bring in our senior enlisted advisers for 
the navy next time. We can ask them to put together an agenda. I’ll bring my Master 
Chief Petty Officer of the Navy. We will invite all of your equivalent enlisted advisers. 
They can put together an agenda. We can have a session or two where we overlap 
and discuss the importance of that teamwork.
I think at International Seapower Symposium XXIII we’re also going to have 
more opportunity for each of us to interact with the media. On the agenda we’ll 
have more media—on terms that are comfortable to you (and you’ll be able to de-
fine them), you’ll be able to interact with the world media and media in your coun-
tries. This can live stream, easily, back to all the audiences that we have concluded 
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we need to be more influential with, to highlight the importance of what the blue 
century and this blue economy mean.
We’ve been saying throughout [this symposium] that we’re looking forward to 
International Seapower Symposium XXIII. We truly do read the feedback. I’d en-
courage you to give us your straightforward, frank ideas. Many of you commented 
that the International Seapower Symposium seems to improve; each one gets better 
than the one before. That’s directly related to the feedback that we get from you. I’d 
ask you to be very honest with us in that regard.
To Stronger Maritime Partners, Fair Winds and Following Seas. Finally, I want to 
thank each one of you for helping to shape the agenda. My overall goal was that we 
could come together to address the issues that were important to us. You identified 
them before we got here. Our agenda was built around your input, your priorities. 
We came together to address those priorities, each of us. No matter what country 
we came from, no matter what the size of our maritime force, we each came here 
with an identity, with a sense of the responsibility that we carry for our nations. My 
great hope is that that identity was completely respected and highlighted during 
these last few days in Newport.
I want to thank you once again for your contributions—each speaker, each panel 
member, each person who got up to speak in any way, all the one-on-one, bilateral 
conversations that happened, and all of the discussions around coffee. Thank you 
all. 
I’d like to close by saying to my partners, I daresay my smarter and therefore 
stronger maritime partners, I wish you all safe travels, fair winds and following seas. 
I look forward to seeing you at the next International Seapower Symposium. 
Thank you very much.

Stronger Maritime Families
Moderated by Ms. Wendy Boler, United States
Remarks: Admiral John M. Richardson, United States
Chief of Naval Operations
Panel Members
Mrs. Dana Richardson, United States 
Mrs. Mercedes Welch, United States 
Ms. Sabrina dela Dingco, United States 
Mrs. Kathryn Dennis, United States
Ms. Wendy Boler, United States:
I’d like to introduce Mrs. Richardson.
Mrs. Dana Richardson, United States: 
I’m so happy that you stayed and that you’re here for this part of the program. This is 
really the “meat and potatoes” of our program. I’d like to introduce my husband, the 
thirty-first U.S. Chief of Naval Operations. He’s been my husband for thirty-four years, 
my boyfriend for forty, and he is the father of my five children. Here’s my husband.
APPENDIX A
Spouses of delegates attending the Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium gather for a photo on Colbert 
Plaza at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
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Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
Thank you all. I hope that you’re having a meaningful and fun agenda. 
On our side, all of your spouses are involved in great conversations. After we 
had our first morning, things loosened up. Now we’re really into the sporty part of 
the conference where we’re exchanging views very frankly. We find that we have so 
much in common across the world because at the end of the day we’re sailors. We 
find that the mere act of going to sea in ships brings us together and unites us in 
ways that can cut across cultures, across geography. So it’s with great gratitude that 
I welcome all of you to the conference as well. 
Dana and I were talking about your agenda. She put a lot of thought into this 
agenda for you. We hope that you enjoy the program this afternoon. It might be 
useful to give you a sense of how we in the U.S. Navy feel about the contributions 
and the family role. As Dana highlighted, we have a big family. We have five chil-
dren. We’ve been together ever since we entered the Navy together. We’ve moved 
the family twenty-one times, all around the world. Getting up and moving all five 
kids—that’s a great sacrifice. 
As in many of your navies, our officers and sailors will get on their ships and de-
ploy for months at a time—six months, seven months, up to ten months lately, with 
the wars in the Middle East. We know that while we get on board ships, fly aircraft, 
drive submarines for seven months at a time that there is a family back home that 
is also working through great challenges. By virtue of that separation, our spouses 
stand shoulder-to-shoulder in terms of the contribution that we all make to the pros-
perity and the security of our nation. 
In our Navy, we invest heavily in making sure that we respect that sacrifice, that 
contribution, and do everything that we can to support our families who are part of 
our Navy team. 
The agenda this afternoon is designed to bring some people in who offer these dif-
ferent support programs, to give you a sense of how this is executed. Much of it is done 
through tremendous volunteerism, which is something that we are so lucky to have. 
People are willing to volunteer their time and their resources and come together as a 
community and help each other—to help our families—as they work through these 
sacrifices of many moves, and lots of separation, as we all go to sea and do our business. 
It’s the same in the Coast Guard, in all our maritime services—the Marine Corps 
—very much the same in terms of how we do this. The thought—and this is all Dana’s 
thinking, I can’t take any credit for it—is that we provide just some opportunities for 
you to consider. There are many different cultures, many different places that take dif-
ferent views on this. We wanted to give you our view. If you see anything that you might 
want to take home and try out in your own navy, then it’s a menu. It’s a menu for you 
to appreciate, and maybe take an item or two from, and take back home.
That’s really my message to you. I wanted to come before you, not only as Dana’s 
husband, but also as Chief of Naval Operations, to tell you that we think of the 
sailors and the families as two parts of one team, all of which need a tremendous 
amount of support. We support our people in uniform, men and women, and we 
support our families that stay behind, and we support the execution of the mission. 
I’d be happy to take any questions you have; otherwise, I’ll get out of the way and 
let you get back to your program. Thank you very much for your time. I hope you 
enjoy your afternoon. 
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Ms. Wendy Boler, United States: 
Our first briefer is Mrs. Mercedes Welch. She is the lead spouse instructor at the 
Naval Leadership and Ethics Center. She is a 1987 graduate of the United States 
Naval Academy and a twenty-five-year Navy spouse. She is married to Captain David 
Welch. They have a daughter and three sons. She has enjoyed the privilege of three 
command spouse experiences. Her passion is sharing life with other navy spouses—
educating them, encouraging them to thrive in the place the navy places them. 
COMMAND SPOUSE LEADERSHIP COURSE BRIEF
Mrs. Mercedes Welch, United States:
Thank you, Wendy. In 1995, a group of forward-thinking flag spouses were together 
at a conference. They got into a conversation about how ill-prepared they felt the 
first time their spouses took command of a naval unit. They looked around and 
realized that the United States Army had a class for command spouses, as did the 
United States Air Force and the United States Marine Corps—but not the Navy. 
So they thought [they] should start something that could help educate spouses 
so they could feel confident going into this season of life. Two years later the course 
was fully funded and under way. I dare you to find a program sponsored by someone 
on active duty that’s gone from inception to complete and total activity in two years. 
You can’t do it. In America, these were visionaries. They had a vision for what a team 
could do for a command. In the end, it is all about battle efficiency and combat ef-
fectiveness, but it doesn’t look like that from the family side of the team.
Command Support Team. This conference emphasizes teamwork and team 
building. We have come up with the term “command support team.” That is used 
in the Navy to describe the union of the commanding officer’s spouse, the execu-
tive officer’s spouse, and the lead enlisted spouse. They work together in our Navy. 
They’re seen as a value-added [component] within the command. 
Let’s talk a little bit of culture. In America, we deploy and go far away. We have peo-
ple stationed in Japan, Germany, Spain, South America—everywhere. We are not home. 
The Navy frequently moves us long distances away from family. Navy spouses are amaz-
ingly resilient, and they come together to form a larger family in those seasons of life, 
and that’s where this command support team comes in. [The spouses] bond together.
I have this fantastic book. This is the 1955 copy of The Navy Wife, originally print-
ed in 1942. This is a fantastic example of the culture of America regarding Navy 
spouses and family. Here’s a quote from it: 
The navy’s wife’s problems are different from those of army and civilian wives, 
because her household follows the ship, if and when it is possible. Often she 
will find herself living alone and not liking it. The way the young navy wife 
meets these separations, the philosophy she brings to the situation, and her 
knowledge of the customs and traditions of the service, will go far in assuring 
her husband’s success.
Obviously, this was written a long time ago, but it has fully impacted our families 
and our Navy today. 
212 Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium
Spouse Leadership Courses. The mission of our Command Spouse Leadership 
Course is to promote a team-building approach to command by recognizing, inspir-
ing, and educating commanding officers’ spouses so they realize the positive impact 
they can have on the morale and success of the command.
Ten years after that first course was started, a second course was begun for the 
lead enlisted spouses of every command: The Command Master Chief and the Chief 
of the Boat Spouse Leadership Course. 
As I speak, the course is in session. We have thirty-two spouses in our classroom 
this afternoon. The mission of the second course is to help prepare prospective 
command master chiefs and chief of the boat spouses to be their best—to lead, 
inspire, and motivate others as an integral member of the command support team. 
The Navy recognizes and funds spouse leadership because it acknowledges that 
in American culture the job of the commanding officer has unique stressors, unique 
life experiences. The spouse of a commanding officer is often seen as an extension 
of that command, and is often looked to in times of crisis for resources, leader-
ship—to be a stable rock for support. That’s an unspoken expectation. It’s not a 
legal expectation. We are not required to be that, or to do that, but let me tell you 
how I realized this was a big deal. 
My husband took command of the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93). The ship went to 
sea, as ships are wont to do. The spouses and I went out to dinner one night to get 
together—to get to know each other and have fun with each other. We were in Ho-
nolulu, Hawaii, and none of us were from Honolulu. So we were getting together to 
build that bigger family. And as we’re sitting at the table, the waiter comes over and 
says, “Hello ladies. Are we having wine with dinner tonight?” At that point, six sets 
of eyes looked at me. “I don’t know, Mom. Are we having wine with dinner tonight?” 
I had no clue that what I thought or how I acted would be looked at so closely, 
would influence so many others and the way they lived their lives. That impacted 
me. The spouse’s participation within the command is not required. But as we tell 
our spouses in the classroom, if not you, then who? 
Find someone who’s going to take that lead role and be there in times of crisis. 
We find that times of crisis [are] handled in a more skilled and less traumatic way 
when you have a lead spouse. It is a value-added [part] to the command. 
Our course inspires spouses to be themselves. I end every class session with “You 
do you.” No two of us are alike. Everyone has their own personality that they bring 
to the table. We inspire them to provide opportunity for personal vision develop-
ment. We have them think about "Why am I doing that?" and "What does it matter?” 
That inspires them to move forward in whatever activity they choose to participate. 
We work on what we call a command tour charter. This is a list of things for the 
couple to talk about together. We know unspoken expectations destroy relation-
ships. We want these expectations to be in the open, so they can be spoken about. 
We want our spouses happily married at the end of the tour to the same person that 
they are [married to] at the beginning of the tour. 
We’re not marriage counselors, but we do like to make sure that the relationship 
is strong throughout the tour. It is a unique experience for them: mutual under-
standing; responsibilities; activities with the children, with the command, with life, 
with other families. They make that experience a more joyful one, and avoid one 
that’s filled with disagreements. 
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The Courses’ Contents and Conduct. I’m the lead spouse instructor. I’m a full-
time government employee, by virtue of my husband’s command experience and 
my willingness to be in front of a classroom. I have three part-time instructors who 
are all post-command or post-command master chief’s spouses. They have experi-
enced that and are willing to come in the classroom and share. For each class we 
bring in three mentors—one command master chief spouse and two post-command 
spouses—to share what’s happening right now in the fleet and what’s going on. 
We also have a steering committee for each course that looks at what we’re teach-
ing and says that’s still relevant for what’s going on in the fleet. The course educates 
spouses on topics. It is not an etiquette and protocol course. In fact, we have no 
modules on etiquette or protocol—none. We educate the spouses on topics rang-
ing from personality styles to crisis management. As I speak, the chaplain and one 
instructor, Mel, are doing a crisis-management brief. They’re talking about casualty 
assistance, Red Cross, public affairs officers, where you go when things go horribly 
wrong, and how can you be a conduit for resources. 
We don’t want them to solve everyone’s problems. That is not the point. We want 
them to be able to empower other families to solve their own problems. We also tell 
them about resources available to every Navy family, and let them realize that their 
own family is also [eligible] for that. The course is built on four levels of relation-
ship and communication. We talk about self: why you do what you do. We talk about 
you and your spouse and what we are going to do together. We talk about you in the 
Navy, the resources available to you, what an ombudsman does, and that conduit 
between the commands and the families. We talk about a family readiness group 
and how you can get information to all the families—particularly in times of crisis, 
or when the ship, aircraft squadron, or submarine is deployed. 
We talk about the Navy chaplains and the resources available to them—and that 
last level of communication and relationship is new—and the Navy as a whole. We 
bring in every warfare specialty, all of our reservists, and all the shore and staff com-
munities together. They take the classes sitting next to each other, to break down 
those tribal lines: “Well, I fly planes,” “Well, I drive ships,” “Well, I ride a submarine.” 
We break those down, so that they see everyone has the same issues in life, and we 
all have many resources available. 
Other topics we talk about are social media, values, and ethics. We do a great 
group dynamics module, Navy organization from the big-picture view, [to show 
you] this is what your spouse is dealing with. So, when your spouse comes home 
from work and talks about the “wamodine” and “framowitz”— those are made up 
words—and what’s going on in his or her unit, then you can say, “Oh, I’ve heard of 
that.” You’re actually a better support to your spouse, because you have some idea 
of what’s going on with that.
We talk about Navy heritage, customs, navigating personal and operational stress, 
conflict resolution. 
Other Organizations and Resources. It is a fantastic legacy to be a part of, and 
I’m very proud to be a part of this course. This legacy has continued. It didn’t just 
stop there with that course. There are so many organizations out there that have 
come and grown, and done all kinds of things for our families—both married fami-
lies and our single sailors, who are part of the navy family as a whole. 
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We have Dogs on Deployment, which was started by a military spouse. It takes the 
pets of single sailors as they deploy and makes sure they are cared for during the 
deployment. When the sailors come home, their pets are alive and well and ready 
to play again.
We have fantastic new resources. There’s a new group called PCS Concierge. 
Spouses in multiple locations have agreed to check out houses for you because they 
just moved there. They ask that when you go there that you will be willing to help 
out with that, too. They will take pictures and talk to realtors for you. 
We’re trying to spread the love. So wherever you go, you know somebody is there 
for you and resources are available. There’s amazing financial advice. There’s even 
a spouse who has taken all fifty of our American states' driver’s license laws and put 
them in one document, with links to each state’s official government website with 
the rules. That’s a big deal for American spouses: “Do I have to change what I drive 
and how?” 
That, in a nutshell, is what we do and teach. We do this to enable our sailors to 
go to sea and do their jobs without having to think about whether their spouses 
and their families are being cared for. By the way, the course is voluntary and fully 
funded by the government. We don’t pay for childcare, but we do pay for trans-
portation, food, and lodging during the week that the spouses are there with their 
active-duty member.
DISCUSSION 
Question: 
How long is the course?
Response:
The course is one week long, and it is from 7:30 in the morning until 4:30 in the 
afternoon. It is now delivered via iPad. The course content and course material are 
on an iPad. We renew this every course. It has a separate password for each course. 
The material is able to be updated as things change in the Navy. 
Question: 
For those of us who were in that very first class—has it changed?
Response: 
It has changed drastically. The first time that I went through in 2005 the course 
looked nothing like this course. The actual modules are not available, but the lead 
spouse instructor might be able to send you some things, some information on that. 
An active-duty member whose spouse cannot attend the course is given a CD 
[containing] the course materials and resources. We are moving to a command 
website where that material will be available for all later next year. 
Question: 
For our visiting friends, how can they get this resource? 
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Response: 
We are part of the Naval War College. You can connect with the Naval War College. 
On their website is a link to our website. You can connect and contact us that way. 
We will hook you up with the resources and the information to get a program going. 
We’d be willing to work with that. Here is the link: https://www.usnwc.edu/Depart-
ments---Colleges/Command-Leadership-School-(1)/CO-Spouse-Course-(1).aspx
Question: 
Is the course common for officers’ and sailors’ wives?
Response:
Ninety percent of our modules are done jointly. We have modules that we sepa-
rate out, like Navy Heritage Customs and Traditions, because the enlisted side talks 
about the chiefs and chiefs pinning on chief petty officer. The officer’s side talks 
about changes of command. That’s about it. Everything else is together, so that we 
learn how to become a team, as the command support team.
Question: 
What about the Navy and the commanders? How do you support them?
Response:
We support the Navy and the commanders by ensuring that a support system is in 
place for families when their serving spouses go to sea, no matter how long it is for, 
when they go away from their command—to make sure people know what resources 
are available should they need them and providing networks of connectivity so that 
spouses can find each other for support and assistance. 
Question:
What is the role that the spouse plays? What about the unit heads’ spouses? What 
are their relationships with this?
Response:
The relationship is whatever they want it to be. They can be as involved as they 
want—setting up meetings, having people to their home, things like that—or they 
may not be involved at all. It is up to them. It is completely a volunteer role. 
Ms. Wendy Boler, United States:
Our second briefer is Sabrina dela Dingco. She comes from a military family and 
was raised overseas. In Japan, she was a family life educator for three years, spe-
cializing in anger management and suicide awareness and prevention. She ar-
rived in Newport as an Exceptional Family Member program liaison and now is a 
trainer/instructor.
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FLEET FAMILY READINESS BRIEF 
Ms. Sabrina dela Dingco, United States: 
Thank you so much for the introduction, Ms. Wendy. My name is Sabrina. I do 
come from the Seventh Fleet. I am here to teach you what my program has to 
offer.
The Fleet and Family Support Center. The Fleet and Family Support Center was 
founded by the Navy because it heartily believes that this whole mission is not just 
about the war fighter. We 100 percent believe that the family must be supported. In 
short, if the war fighter is to go out and do the mission, he must have the reassur-
ance that his family, his children, are being taken care of. I hope this makes sense. 
I will bring information that we have to offer. I hope that you will learn some-
thing new from it and take it back home, if it applies to your culture. 
Throughout the world, we have eleven specific regions that our U.S. Navy cov-
ers—sixty-nine installations, seventy-eight fleet and family support sites serving al-
most 323,000 active-duty sailors, with 394,000 family members [shown in the follow-
ing graphic].
 Why does it look like this? The reason is we support families who want to go out 
with their service members so that they feel supported and safe, no matter where it 
is that they go. 
The Fleet and Family Support Program benefits service members’ families around the world.
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WHY THE UNITED STATES NAVY NEEDS THIS PROGRAM. 
Deployments and Separations. We believe that with all the deployments and separa-
tions in the Navy, we need to educate our families on how deployments work, and 
why separations take place. 
Frequent Moves. The moves that our service members make range from any-
where between ten months to three years, constantly rotating, moving anywhere 
around the world where our support is needed. 
Financial Stress on Both Service Members and Families. Unfortunately all of 
these moves do take a toll. We want to educate our sailors on how to budget cor-
rectly, so that they can focus on the mission. 
Young and Diverse Demographic. A lot of our sailors are fresh out of high school. 
They’re seventeen, eighteen, nineteen years old. They are not aware of how to tran-
sition into the military lifestyle. We make sure that their needs are supported. 
Spouse and Family Employment Challenges. Because the United States Navy 
supports its families following the service members around the world, lots of our 
American wives leave their careers in the United States. Once, in America, they were 
lawyers, doctors, teachers, and caregivers, but because the service members move to 
Bahrain, Italy, Germany, Japan, Korea, they leave these amazing jobs that they have. 
At fleet and family support centers, our job is to make sure that when they do get 
to that next foreign duty station, that if they want to work once again, we will help 
them with the skill set that they have. 
Unfamiliar Locations. A lot of our service members haven’t been outside the 
state that they were born. We’re sending them to Souda Bay in Greece, Sigonella in 
Sicily, Portsmouth in the United Kingdom. They’ve never been to these places be-
fore. We help break the ice for them so that they can transition well into the country 
that is accepting them. We want to make sure that our sailors are great ambassadors 
of the United States. 
Transition to Civilian Job Market. After a sailor has done his tour with us—
maybe for four, twenty, or thirty years—we want to thank them for their service to 
our nation by making sure that all of the skill sets they have accrued in the military 
become transferable to civilian life. So when they write their résumés and apply 
for a job in the civilian sector, they become more marketable and get jobs outside 
of the military. 
Personal and Professional Issues Requiring Fleet and Family Support. Sometimes 
inside a command, people get conflicted, stressed. They have anger-management 
issues sometimes, in their relationships or at home. They have those issues. I make 
sure that we address those problems, so that they’re able to do the mission correctly, 
and make sure that they do not bring the stressors of work into family life. 
Family Support Programs. These are broken into five specific categories: work 
and family life; Navy gold star; counseling, advocacy, and prevention; sexual assault 
prevention and response; and emergency response. 
Deployment Readiness. The unique thing about the United States Navy is we be-
lieve that this does not only impact the mission and the sailors. We believe that even 
children get affected by the separation that happens with the service member. The 
service member could be gone from three months to ten months to three years. We 
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want to make sure that children and spouses left behind understand what’s going 
on, and what their roles are to make sure that this mission is 100 percent a success. 
Relocation Assistance. The Navy is in all of these regions around the world. We 
want to make sure that our sailors feel welcome as soon as they reach the new coun-
try that they’ll be stationed at. That is what our relocation project does.
. Here is an amazing concept that belongs to the United States Navy. We have 
a spouse coming from the command. She volunteered. She is not paid. She is the 
conduit between the command and the families. She makes sure that everything 
that happens in the command is transmitted correctly to the families. 
Once that command is deployed or at sea she provides information from the 
families to the command, and back and forth, making sure that it is seamless and 
smooth. The command knows that their families are doing okay. The family knows 
that the command is doing whatever it is that they’re doing out there, and knows 
when they will come back home. 
This is an amazing part of the United States Navy. We are proud, because these 
ombudsmen, these spouses that are left back home, do a volunteer job 100 percent 
out of the goodness of their hearts. 
Transition Assistance. This was that topic that I spoke to you about. After you 
have served in the United States Navy for four years, six years, or however long that 
you serve, we want to make sure that we thank you by putting all of your military skill 
sets onto paper so that you will be able to get a job when you leave the Navy.
Family Employment Readiness. As I stated in the beginning of my brief, we make 
sure that if a spouse leaves her job in the United States, as a lawyer, teacher, or what 
have you, that when she moves to a foreign country she is taken care of, whether 
The Fleet and Family Support Program provides unified, customer-focused, consistent, and efficient programs and 
services to support sustained mission and Navy readiness.
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she wants to be a volunteer, go into an internship at a university and do research, 
or get another job. 
We help them with job-search strategies and how to write their résumés correctly, 
so that they have the confidence to do interviews that will get them the job that they 
want, in whatever country they may be stationed. 
Personal Financial Management. We help our sailors with financial planning, 
credit and debt management, military retirement plans—even with how to buy a 
house and how to buy a car. Most sailors come in single and then start a family. We 
want to make sure that they will be able to focus on the career and have less stress 
by teaching them how to manage their money correctly.
Counseling, Advocacy, and Prevention. This is a key cornerstone in what my pro-
gram offers. We foster resiliency in sailors and families. Our culture believes that if 
you are having an issue, the healthy way to deal with it is to talk about it. We do not 
bottle it up. If we do, we believe that we will not be able to effectively take care of 
the mission. 
We support our sailors receiving counseling if they are stressed about anything. 
The same thing goes with their families. We do home visitation for at-risk, expect-
ant, and new parents; child and domestic abuse prevention education; case manage-
ment and intervention; domestic abuse and victim advocacy; and critical incident 
response. We also take care of individual counseling and couples counseling. 
Family Advocacy Program. Our services include training military personnel in 
recognizing and reporting domestic abuse. Aside from the fact that we make sure 
that domestic and child abuse do not occur in our Navy, we actively go to commands 
and teach our sailors from the highest to the lowest ranks that it is their responsibil-
ity to make sure that child abuse and domestic violence does not take place in our 
Numerous resources are provided to help the spouses of active-duty personnel find meaningful employment.
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Navy. We have no room for it. We do not tolerate it. We make sure that they’re aware 
that they need to report whatever [instances] of domestic violence or child abuse 
they see, even if it is alleged. We take this very seriously. 
Prevention Activities. We conduct anger- and stress-prevention activities as well as 
parenting-skills training. We understand that sometimes these incidents of domestic 
violence and child abuse happen because of stressors in the workplace. Because of 
that, we’ve come up with parenting classes for our sailors and the spouses.
New Parent Support Program. In joining the Navy and then moving to a foreign 
country, you leave behind your parents, high school friends, neighbors, people you 
know. So the Navy thought, what if the sailor and spouse move and she is preg-
nant—she cannot call home, Skype, or FaceTime because there’s a sixteen-hour 
time difference. We came up with the New Parent Support program. If a spouse is 
expecting, and the service member has to deploy to Afghanistan or to Iraq, we make 
sure that she is taught how to be a mother, how to parent. We teach her the differ-
ence between infant formula and breastfeeding, how to choose the right car seat 
for the baby, and how to change a baby’s diaper—those basic things. We understand 
that sometimes you leave your parents behind in the United States. Who is going 
to teach you to do these basic things if you are a first-time parent? We take care of 
even the smallest detail to make sure that the sailor feels reassured that his house is 
being taken care of.
Deployment Resiliency Counselors. We provide nonmedical, clinical counseling 
and resiliency training whenever our sailors go to deploy. One of our staff members 
will go with them to make sure that they feel supported. Again, regarding stress, we 
Family advocacy includes prevention, identification, reporting, evaluation, intervention, and follow-up of allega-
tions of child abuse / neglect and domestic abuse involving active-duty personnel, their intimate partners, and family 
members.
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make sure that they have somebody there to speak with and help them regulate the 
stress levels of being under way with the mission. 
Exceptional Family Member Program. I ran this program in Naval Station New-
port from March until September. This is a very important program. We understand 
that some service members' families go through very specific problems, maybe stage 
4 cancer, maybe cerebral palsy. Maybe a child has autism. One of the children that I 
had to deal with was four years old and had a brain tumor. 
These are specific medical behavioral and academic needs that need to be ad-
dressed. After a family has been categorized for a specific degree of assistance, we 
make sure the service member will stay within continental United States and will 
physically be there to support the family member who is in need. 
This is an incredible help for a sailor so that he doesn’t wonder how he can do 
his job if he’s worried about his wife who had a stillbirth or a miscarriage or his son 
that has lung cancer. We make sure that the service member will be there. We make 
sure that they feel supported in a time of great need.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR). We provide a standardized, 
Navy-wide, victim support system to promote a command climate that encourag-
es reporting, prevention, and offender accountability. Our Navy has no room for 
sexual harassment in any way, shape, or form. We create a climate of prevention 
through victim safety. We promote bystander intervention. If you see something, say 
something. We do restricted and unrestricted reporting, which helps all survivors of 
sexual assault stand up and get the help that they need.
Emergency Response. These services include case management for the Navy and 
Family Accountability and Assessment System. Oftentimes, disaster strikes when we 
least expect it. This can range from 
maybe a terrorist act to an act of na-
ture, such as a landslide or a major 
typhoon. In 2011 in Japan, when I 
was stationed there, the great earth-
quake happened on the main island 
of Japan. When that happened, Navy 
families were dispersed throughout 
the world to safe harbors. Thanks to 
this program, we were able to make 
sure that all families were taken care 
of. We knew exactly where they were 
taken. This is a very integral part—
making sure that families are okay, no 
matter where it is that they go.
Navy Gold Star Program. This is 
an assistance program designed for 
families of a service member who dies 
during active duty. We make sure that 
the family left behind gets taken care 
of. This program began in 2014, so 
it is still relatively new. It provides a 
level of long-term assistance and sup-
port that was not previously available. 
SAPR strives to create a command climate of sexual-assault 
prevention, where victims are comfortable reporting, bystand-
ers intervene to effectively prevent sexual assaults, and of-
fenders are held accountable.
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We have eighteen dedicated coordinators. They provide support for the family for 
as long as they need. 
This is the end of my presentation. I hope that you are able to get something new 
or different that you can apply to your navies when you go back to your respective 
countries.
DISCUSSION
Question:
I have a question about the last program—the Gold Star. How long are you support-
ing the families? 
Response: 
The slide says they’re there for as long as they want it. A lot of families don’t want 
that support, and we understand and respect that. That is 100 percent voluntary.
Question:
That is emotional support, right?
Response A: 
Yes, it’s also emotional. It’s emotional support and resources, where they might pos-
sibly need it. Some might want it for an extended period of time, others might want 
it just for a month or so. It all depends on the family. 
Comment: 
In my country, we don’t have a program like this, that really supports our members. 
I think we’re really lagging behind. When we return to our country, I would like to 
make use of the information that you have provided us. Thank you very much. I was 
very happy to hear your presentation. It was useful information. 
Response B: 
Thank you so much for being part of this. I hope that you got something from it. 
Question: 
We would like to establish an association of the same sort in my country. How could 
we? Could we have a link with the United States and your program so that we could 
go forward in our country with such a program?
Response: 
She was asking if there is a way that her country could possibly speak with my depart-
ments, and if they could replicate the services that we currently have at Fleet and 
Family Support Center. I would like to get with you after this presentation, ma’am. 
I can give you my business card so you can contact me. I will speak directly with my 
supervisor. We can probably speak with our captain about it and see what I can do, 
because we are definitely here to support and help you as well.
223
Question: 
In this family support, after the loss of the spouse—the financial aspect, the fam-
ily pension and the money that they get—if they need any assistance investing the 
money, is that assistance also given?
Response A: 
Thank you so much for your question. That is a very important one. 
My department does not give the pension to the family of the survivor. If they do 
come to us for financial assistance on how to manage that pension, we have done 
that before. For example, a widow that we take care of—we give her suggestions on 
how to handle the pension that’s coming in, assisting with maybe investments, or 
maybe with a child’s college fund. 
We give them that assistance for however long they want. We understand that 
with the grief that’s ongoing, sometimes they feel helpless. Sometimes they’re not 
exactly sure what to do with the pension that is given to them. We make sure that if 
they do want that assistance, that we help them throughout the whole process.
Response B:
Also, we have casualty assistance calls officers who come to the homes and explain 
the financial part.
Response C:
We make sure they’re educated in all of the things that are going to take place. 
Ms. Wendy Boler, United States:
Our last briefer will be Mrs. Kathryn Dennis. She is the Director of the Navy–Marine 
Corps Relief Society in Newport. She and her family just returned from five years 
in Japan, where she was the Director of the Navy Relief Sasebo office for five years. 
Her husband, a surface warfare officer, completed his command tour aboard the 
USS Chief (MCM 14). 
NAVY–MARINE CORPS RELIEF SOCIETY BRIEF
Mrs. Kathryn Dennis, United States: 
Thank you so much for having me.
I’m from the Navy–Marine Corps Relief Society. I did have the pleasure of work-
ing for the Society in Japan, where we were for five years. We just moved to Newport 
about two months ago. I’ll tell you a little about how I got into working with the 
Society. It was completely by accident. I’m sure many people in the audience have 
a very similar story. 
We got married and moved to Japan, leaving my job of twelve years in marketing 
and hospitality. I wake up one day and think to myself, “What have I done? I don’t 
have a job. I don’t understand anything anybody is saying in Japanese, or on the 
Navy base because it’s all acronyms. I need to find something to do.” 
So Fleet and Family Support Center told me that the Navy–Marine Corps Relief 
Society (Navy Relief, for short) has volunteer opportunities. I had never volunteered 
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before, had no experience with a nonprofit organization. So I went there. I had no 
idea what they did, no idea what the mission was, their daily work schedule, any-
thing like that. It turned out to be the best mistake I’ve ever made. 
Mission and Vision. Plainly speaking, we are a nonprofit organization. That means 
everything that we provide—services, loans, programs—is all from donations. That’s 
how we keep our programs going. We are completely independently run. We are not 
run by the Navy. The Society is designated a Department of Defense nonfederal en-
tity. That does make us very special. It’s one of the many reasons we’re very special. 
We exist on Navy and Marine Corps bases everywhere around the world because 
our leadership thinks it’s important that we’re there. We do not pay for spaces. We 
don’t pay for our offices, desks, computers, printers. We don’t pay for any of that, 
and that’s the reason that we can continue. We have been doing what we’re doing 
since 1904. So we’re doing something right.
We provide interest-free loans for service members, their family members, reserv-
ists, retirees, widows, surviving children, and survivors. 
The vision—and it will never change—is that we always hope to give every tool 
possible to our active-duty personnel, their families, and retirees to assist them with 
financial emergencies and to help them become self-sufficient and have long-term 
resolutions for any issue. 
Everything that we do is confidential. I always say that we’re kind of like the chap-
lains in the Navy. Everything that is said in the office stays in the office. Of course 
when anyone is affecting the security and safety of our children and spouses, the 
active-duty member, retiree—whoever it is—then obviously we get other people in-
volved. Other than that, everything is confidential.
Guiding Principles. Our foundation is definitely the most important part of what 
we do. It’s how we work with our clients. It’s how we recruit our volunteers. It’s 
how we keep our volunteers. It’s how we’ve been in business since 1904. One of 
the reasons I fell in love with Navy Relief so quickly is because of the people and 
organizations. Companies set out guiding principles like this, but very seldom do 
they actually live up to it every day in everything that they do. I knew it was different 
when I was in Japan, e-mailing at noon, which is very early in the morning at our 
headquarters in Virginia. I would have a response in five minutes. It’s still that way. 
The main goal of the Navy–Marine Corps Relief Society is to provide active-duty personnel and their families the neces-
sary resources to become financially self-sufficient.
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Every day, no matter where you are, our headquarters is there to support. Of-
fices are there to support our satellite offices. Our guiding principles are extremely 
important to us. We take them very seriously. We always say clients and volunteers 
alike will always remember how you made them feel. It’s how we keep our staff of 
volunteers. It’s how we keep our clients and build relationships with our clients. 
If we hand an assistance check to a service member, retiree, or a widow and we 
made them feel bad for coming in for that help, we've ruined the relationship. 
That’s one of the most important things that we do (how we make people feel). It’s 
one of the things we train volunteers to do. It’s also what our volunteers love most 
about being with the organization, I think.
Financial Assistance. In 2015, we provided almost $46 million in loans. This is ob-
viously a huge endeavor. We have about 260 or so employees and 4,000 volunteers. 
We cannot do this without volunteers. Has anyone been to our thrift shop yet? We 
have seventeen volunteers in the thrift shop. They do everything. They work so hard 
sorting six days a week, putting everything out, maintaining that building, and mak-
ing sure that everything is there for our community to benefit. 
These are the general categories, in terms of the loans that we do assist with the 
most. So what does that mean? To be a little bit more specific, the financial assis-
tance is in these categories [shown in the following graphic]. 
Parents to Bedside. This is one example. It’s very hard to have a family overseas, even 
when things go right. You’re very far from relatives and friends. We always have situations 
where a service member is deployed for three years, six months. A spouse becomes ill, may-
be needs surgery, and that spouse needs to be admitted to the hospital. Maybe they have 
A summary of the financial assistance provided by the Navy–Marine Corps Relief Society in 2015
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three children. How are those children going to be cared for with a deployed husband or 
wife, and that spouse in the hospital for maybe a week, even more? 
We actually have a form of assistance called “Parents to Bedside.” We can assist 
with a loan to bring that spouse’s parents to Japan, or wherever they are, to help 
take care of the children while that spouse is in the hospital and recovers at home.
It happens all the time. It’s an emergency. Sometimes the spouse or the service 
member isn’t even the one requesting assistance. Maybe it’s the ombudsman com-
ing in on behalf of the spouse because they can’t get to the office. That’s an exam-
ple. There are very straightforward types of assistance, like car repairs. If you blow 
a tire on the way to work, you need new tires, probably four. We can assist with car 
repairs, cracked windshields, tires. 
Assistance with Pay Issues. This is a big one as well. This is very near and dear 
to spouses and family members because it happens when the service member is 
deployed. It happens when there is a permanent change of station, when you’re in 
limbo. Say the service member is on tour as a geographic bachelor, which means the 
service member is deployed and the family stays at home. That pay—the housing 
allowance—is supposed to stay the same, but most of the time it doesn’t. So we can 
help with bridge loans, so that the family can pay the mortgage, rent, groceries—
whatever it may be. We can help with things like that.
Aiding Families in Disaster Areas. Another example is one in which we got the com-
mand involved. In April 2015, an earthquake occurred in Nepal. A couple of service 
members on one of the ships had families in Nepal. One wife was there, pregnant, and 
it was a two-day walk to the nearest shelter. We never send people into disaster zones. 
We can’t do that. What we have to do is get commands involved and say, “We want you 
to send this person to this disaster area, so he can make sure his wife is okay.” We got 
the commanding officer involved, who said, “Yes, please send him.” We sent him to 
Kathmandu to find his wife. He did, and he got her and the rest of the family to safety.
So that’s a little idea of what we do financially. There are many more categories 
that we help with, this is just a small list.
Budget for Baby Classes. This is a very popular program. It’s open to all pay grades, 
from enlisted to officer. We give out several things during the class, like a handmade 
blanket from a volunteer, knit by volunteers, and items donated by Gerber. It’s all free 
for us. The yarn is also given to us. We give it to our volunteers to make blankets. The 
Baby and You book is from our visiting nurses, which I will talk about later. In the Budget 
for Baby program, we talk about how much these bundles of joy cost, which is quite a 
bit. It’s always a shock to our families, but wonderful information. It is a very popular 
class. 
Thrift Shops. Thrift shops we already talked about. Some of you have seen them 
firsthand. We have twenty-eight thrift shops. They are all volunteer-run. Paid staff 
are not allowed to work in the shops. It’s a wonderful program. Every dollar that is 
received is put back into the Society for the loan programs, Visiting Nurse program, 
the Budget for Baby program. It’s all put right back into the Society, 100 percent. 
Visiting Nurse Program. The Visiting Nurse program is definitely one of the most 
robust and multifaceted programs that I could ever imagine. We’re the only orga-
nization that can send nurses to people’s homes. It’s all free. They do free home 
visits. We have about twenty traditional nurses, obstetrics nurses, family practitioner 
nurses, neonatal intensive care unit nurses, and pediatric surgeon nurses. They do 
new-parent visits at people’s homes. They do weight checks for the baby, wellness 
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checks for mom, and prenatal and postnatal visits. They can remind you how to 
bathe your baby. They can advise you on anything that you may be worried about as 
a new parent, which is many things. They can do preoperation and postoperation 
care. It’s not just for new parents. They visit many, many of our retirees and widows 
and help them with chronic medical conditions. They also can pick up prescriptions 
for their patients and bring them to their home if they can’t get there. We have one 
nurse who goes to a widow’s house every month and helps her with her insulin, be-
cause she’s blind and she’s eighty-five. 
Combat Casualty Assistance Visiting Nurse Program. This is a division of the visit-
ing nurse program. The nurses assist injured sailors and Marines. We have nurses 
going to every state (except Alaska, because they don’t have a patient in Alaska). They 
get on a flight and go see their patients wherever they are. They will travel to Walter 
Reed National Military Medical Center or to their homes. They will talk to patients 
on the phone. We had one nurse travel to the Midwest. The patient had called her 
and said, “I’m thinking about ending it all.” She got on a flight and saved his life. It’s 
an amazing, amazing program. It is all free to our service members’ families, retirees, 
widows. We have nurses at every location, even overseas. We had three in Sasebo.
The Power of Our People. Our volunteers are absolutely everything to what we 
do. We cannot do it without them. We always get the question, “How do you pay 
your volunteers?” It’s a great question. It’s the best one. We appreciate them. We 
do National Volunteer Week, volunteer award ceremonies, certificates of merit. We 
do appreciation luncheons. We also reimburse them for their childcare expenses 
during the hours that they volunteer at the office. And we reimburse them for tolls 
and mileage for distances they travel to the office. Sometimes they can walk to us. 
Sometimes they drive eighty miles. We have folks at Newport that knit for us and 
they cannot drive. We have one legally blind volunteer who knits. We will go to her 
house to pick up the blankets when they’re ready. Last year 481,000 hours were 
spent carrying out the Society's mission. It’s just incredible. 
That’s a very general overview of what we do on a daily basis. We have offices 
everywhere—in Japan, Korea, Greece, Italy, Germany, Bahrain. We’re opening a 
new office in Bahrain very soon. There are offices all over the United States. It is a 
wonderful organization. 
I keep talking about Japan. We had many Japanese volunteers who translated every 
PowerPoint presentation that we gave for Budget for Baby and budgeting basics class-
es. Our Japanese volunteers translated every presentation so our Japanese spouses 
could take every class and understand everything that was going on. We do this ev-
erywhere. It’s definitely an international organization and a wonderful organization. 
DISCUSSION
Question 
The nurses’ program—are those volunteers also? 
Response:
Overseas they are volunteers. All three in Japan, in Sasebo, were volunteer. In the 
United States they are paid. So the sites outside the continental United States are 
the only ones where they can be volunteers.
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Question: 
How do you get your volunteers abroad? 
Response:
That’s a great question. We do many base indoctrinations. In the base indoctrina-
tions, when people move somewhere, they have a fair. We get people who are teach-
ers. Maybe they are only in a place for nine months. They can’t find a teaching 
position. So they teach one of our classes. 
We put it out on Facebook and other social media, and we go through the grape-
vine. We always advertise. We always have our nametags on and our tote bags. Hon-
estly, it’s from conversation. People who have volunteered in other locations will 
look when they transfer. They will come to our office and talk about opportunities. 
It’s through the base fairs, indoctrinations, ombudsmen, the family readiness 
groups. We have a lot of retirees, spouses, and tons of active duty. Many locations 
have an after-hours case-working program. That duty phone is manned by the active 
duty. A lot of our active-duty knitters are men. We had about twenty-five in Sasebo. 
They all worked at the clinic. They would never let me take a picture of them. 
We also have active duty who want their volunteer service medal. So they give up 
their lunch hours and work at our thrift shop. We get them from everywhere—just 
being involved, being on bases every day, and talking to people. 
Question:
Where do you get the funding from?
Response:
It is a nonprofit, so everything is from donations. Our active duty are very kind. They 
run a fund drive for us every March. The active-duty fund drive brings in anywhere 
from US$11 million to US$15 million. Our headquarters’ office runs a campaign 
fund drive for retirees. The retirees help us with about another US$5 million to 
US$10 million. 
We do have a reserve fund, an investment fund, that we pull from if we don’t 
break even with the loan repayments. There is a 1 percent default rate on the loans. 
We grant loans for people who simply cannot afford it. We grant loans to service 
members who have passed away. We do have to pull from the reserve fund every 
year for that reason. 
Question: 
Do students volunteer?
Response:
We just recruited a volunteer this week. She’s going to the University of Rhode 
Island. She’s getting her degree in psychology and needs six hours a week for her 
degree. So she’s coming in every week. She’s also an Air Force spouse as well. We 
also have children of volunteers who are high school students. They come in and 
help with the thrift shop. 
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Question: 
Do you give documentation that they have worked with you?
Response:
We do. We have letters for volunteers who need them for school. We have letters 
for civilians who are just doing it because they love it. We have letters for active duty 
who need them for their commanding officers. So we have different forms. We have 
different levels of certificates, appreciation, and hourly awards. 
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